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Carl Schmitt and Hans Kelsen were prominent jurists during the Weimar Republic who 
engaged in the debate on the nature and use of emergency powers in a political crisis of liberal 
democracy (‘PCLD’).  As a liberal, Kelsen advocated a law- based response to an emergency 
situation together with the narrow interpretation of emergency powers and constitutional 
review, whereas as an anti-liberal conservative, Schmitt called for legally unconstrained 
emergency decisions by the sovereign to exclude ‘ enemies’  causing a political crisis.  This 
thesis considers how this debate might apply to Thailand.  In post-absolutist Thailand after 
1932, the conflict between the pro- democracy and the conservative factions reflected the 
PCLD, and resulted in military coups together with martial law supported by the suspension of 
liberal democracy viewed as a threat to the nationalist-conservative tradition known as Thai-
ness and other uses of emergency legislations by the government of both factions. Though the 
conservative, later known as the ‘Yellow’ faction, still holds the upper- hand in politics given 
its ability to engineer a coup—the invocation of sovereign authority in the Schmittian sense—
such hegemony and ability have been declining in recent years due to the struggles for a 
commitment to liberal constitutionalism, including the fuller implementation of the Kelsenian 
project in 1997.  The application of the Kelsen-Schmitt debate in the Thai context accordingly 
exemplifies an aspiring democracy struggling against the declining hegemony of the 
Schmittian idea.  It then reveals what I call the binary-star conception of emergency powers 
which shows the gravitational pull between the increasing need to liberalise and institutionalise 
the Schmittian idea, especially by resorting to a Kelsenian legal-rational legitimacy, and the 
growing need to resort to Schmitt’ s idea of political struggle to move the Kelsenian liberal-
democratic project forward. Such pull suggests an alternative normative perspective for reading 
Kelsen and Schmitt—‘pragmatic hybrid’ which comprises the ideas of ‘the paradoxical 
friction’, the politics of ‘defective co-optation’, and ‘the fragile equilibrium’. The application 
of the Kelsen-Schmitt debate in Thailand then directs us to reassess their theories of law and 
politics, the conception of authority to invoke emergency powers, notably the competing 
conceptions of institution (i.e., the tension between legality and law) and the state of exception, 
their debate on the scope of emergency powers in political crises, the conception of legal and 
political accountability for the invocation and use of emergency powers, and the agony of 
heteronomy. It ultimately suggests reconsidering the theoretical structure underlying Kelsen’s 
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 Carl Schmitt (1888-1985) and Hans Kelsen (1881-1973) were prominent jurists during 
the Weimar period in Germany (1919-1933) that witnessed a struggle for entrenching liberal 
democracy and a series of political crises. At the beginning of the 20th century, Germany was 
defeated in the First World War. The Treaty of Versailles not only required it to pay war 
reparations to the Allies and stripped it of some territories it had previously gained, but also 
led to the abolition of the German monarchical system and the inception of the Weimar 
Republic together with the adoption of parliamentary democracy and the constitution of 1919. 
Yet, the Republic was beset by conflicts from the very beginning.  
 The rightist-conservative elites were largely sceptical about the liberal parliamentary 
regime, viewing it as a cause of further fragmentation due to its openness which, in turn, 
accommodated a political space for both the communists on the left and the Nazis supporting 
extreme nationalism on the right. They sought to replace such a regime with nationalist-
authoritarian rule. Many of them, including Schmitt, were outraged at the collapse of the 
monarchy and the Versailles settlement. Their shock was further aggravated by hyperinflation 
and the ‘stab-in-the-back’ myth (Dolchstoßlegende), according to which, the Weimar Republic 
was the result of a betrayal of the army by the centre-left civilian government which signed the 
armistice, subjecting Germany to territorial loses and the payment of war reparations. Put 
simply, for the right-wing conservatives, the Weimar Constitution was a shameful compromise 
and a source of a public emergency and political instability. The only bulwark against the 
collaspe of the Weimar Republic was the Social Democratic Party (‘SPD’) which had a 
stronghold in the largest and most powerful Land—Prussia.  
 The tension between those advocating and those sceptical about the legitimacy of 
liberal democracy and its mechanisms for facilitating political stability can be characterised as 
‘the political crisis of liberal democracy’ (‘PCLD’). In 1923, a state of emergency was invoked 
by the SPD government led by President Friedrich Ebert, the first president, by virtue of Article 
48 of the Weimar Constitution to repress the PCLD resulting from the attempts to overthrow 
the Weimar Republic by the Nazis and the communists. After Ebert’s death, the rightist 
conservative Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg became Reichspräsident in 1925. 
Notwithstanding a temporary period of relative stability between 1923 and 1929, Weimar 
experienced subsequent coalition governments. Nevertheless, the Great Depression made the 
regime of parliamentary democracy increasingly unpopular, while the Nazis had increased their 
seats in the Reichstag since 1928. Worse, Franz von Papen, an ultra-conservative aristocrat, 
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was later appointed by von Hindenburg as Chancellor in 1932, paving the way for another 
round of the PCLD, the uses of emergency powers, and the eventual collapse of the Weimar 
Republic. The new chancellor believed that an authoritarian turn was required to repress threats 
to national security, notably from the communists and the Nazis. Believing that the Reichstag 
was an obstacle to realise his goal, he did not hesitate to resort to Article 48 of the Weimar 
Constitution to subvert parliamentary democracy and to purge the social democrats from 
politics. Its extensive interpretation as envisaged by Schmitt together with a series of 
parliamentary dissolutions led to the curtailment of parliamentary checks. Later, Article 48 was 
exploited by Adolf Hitler, who came to power as Chancellor in 1933, in particular, to curtail 
constitutional rights, and to eradicate political opponents and eventually the Weimar Republic 
itself. Hitler became Führer (the supreme leader) in 1934 and with whom Schmitt was later 
affiliated. 
 Having experienced the PCLD during their professorships, both Kelsen and Schmitt 
developed their arguments suggesting the legal-political institutional framework concerning 
the nature and use of Article 48 and engaged in debate with each other. Their constitutional 
emergency models are based on each jurist’s effort to establish peace within what each deemed 
to be a legitimate order through the top-down state mechanism. These elements rest on their 
divergent positions on whether liberal constitutionalism and liberal democracy should be 
complied with and preserved or contested and replaced.  
 Kelsen was a pro-democracy legalist and a former professor at the University of 
Cologne, who, owing to his Jewish ancestry, fled to the United States after Hitler ascended to 
power. Providing his famous Pure Theory of Law is read in combination with his support for 
liberal democracy, we can understand his thesis in terms of articulating and defending the 
project of authority (‘POA’)—the institutional condition under which the conformity of 
exercises of state power, including emergency powers, with a democratic legal constitution and 
its basic organisational principles is ensured. His legal and political stances are therefore 
premised on the presupposition that a liberal-based exercise of emergency powers is more 
legitimate because it is acceptable to every party to a conflict and preserves an opportunity for 
compromise among different interests. 
 By contrast, Schmitt was an anti-liberal conservative, and a former professor in Bonn 
and Berlin. His position on emergency powers mirrors a hardline form of ‘realism’. To Schmitt, 
liberalism turns politics into political romanticism, that is, to simply the realm of ‘endless 
discussion’, and eventually precipitating political conflicts/crises. He eventually called for the 
sovereign capable of making decisions in times of political crises—the Head of State who 
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transcends the heterogeneity of the people, and unites the particular people/nation as one. It is 
also for such a person/institution to apply emergency powers to suppress ‘political enemies’—
a threat to such homogeneity, notably liberal parliamentary democracy and groups/people 
challenging political homogeneity. For Schmitt, emergency measures contradicting and even 
suspending the principle of legality, thus precipitating the state of exception (‘the SoE’), can 
be justified if necessary to safeguard homogeneity. He later joined the Nazis, and radicalised 
his argument against Kelsen’s to justify Hitler’s rule, arguing that the latter had done everything 
the sovereign must do, including the elimination of ‘political enemies’. 
 The Kelsen-Schmitt debate culminated after the Preussenschlag (the Prussian coup)—
an incident which paved the way for the end of liberal democracy in Weimar, and subsequently 
facilitated the rise of Hitler. In June 1932, the ban on the SA (Sturmabteilung)—the Nazis’ 
paramilitary organisation—was lifted by von Papen, precipitating violent clashes between the 
communists, the Nazis and the police in the Prussian town of Altona on 17 July. On 20 July, 
the Chancellor took this opportunity to resort to an emergency decree under Article 48 
previously issued by the 84-year-old senile von Hindenburg, who was then under his influence, 
to dismiss the SPD-led (caretaker) Prussian coalition government headed by Otto Braun. By 
virtue of this emergency power, Prussia’s executive power was transferred to von Papen, who 
was, in turn, appointed Prussian Commissioner, thus placing its executive under direct 
administration of the conservative federal government. However, as we can see, the real 
objective of the Preussenschlag was to purge republicans and democrats and to take control of 
Prussia which was the strongest and largest bulwark against the rightist conservatives and the 
Nazis. Both von Papen and Kurt von Schleicher, the latter of whom served as Reich Minister 
of Defense under von Papen, wrongly believed that this strategy would first enable the federal 
government to purge ‘the left’, including the communists, and then to control ‘the right’, in 
particular, the Nazis. 
 Committing to the democratic ideas and legality and supporting the continuity of the 
Weimar Republic, the SPD chose to challenge the legality of this emergency decree before the 
Staatsgerichtshof—the quasi-constitutional court. The Court eventually decided the case on 25 
October 1932, holding that von Papen’s Preussenschlag decree was justified as a means to 
safeguard national security and that it was for the President to exercise his discretion on this 
matter. It also rejected the Prussian government’s claim that the coup was a collusion between 
Hitler and von Papen. Yet, it also ruled that such a decree could not be exploited permanently 
to infringe Prussia’s autonomy, thus, in turn, upholding the seat of the Braun Cabinet in the 
Reichsrat (i.e., a de facto upper house). In other words, the verdict was quite a matter of 
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compromise and relatively confusing as it, on the one hand, declared the Preussenschlag decree 
constitutional, yet, at the same time, recognised its partial unconstitutionality.  
 Kelsen and Schmitt applied their theories to the court’s judgment, the latter also acting 
as von Papen’s counsel. Kelsen thought that the emergency decree in question was illegal and 
unconstitutional as it violated, in particular, the principle of democracy since it secured von 
Papen’s authoritarian rule at the expense of pluralism. For him, the court should have totally 
annulled the legal effect of this unconstitutional/illegal emergency decree. By contrast, Schmitt 
endorsed the Preussenschlag decree, and repudiated the court’s role in reviewing its 
constitutionality from the first instance. To him, given the political nature of the decree, the 
court, a legal organ, possessed no jurisdiction to scrutinise the decision made by the President 
to secure the political unity of the German people in the context of a volatile political situation. 
Nevertheless, von Papen had already dismissed members of the Braun Cabinet on 20 July, 
paving the way for the demise of Weimar and the rise of Hitler in 1933.   
 However, a study of the Kelsen-Schmitt debate should not be limited to, but can be 
applied beyond the Weimar context, including and especially Thailand’s experience of 
emergency powers in the PCLD. Similar to Weimar, democracy in Thailand is nascent and 
unstable. Since its transition to a formal liberal democracy with a parliamentary system in 1932, 
the country has gone through an intermittent struggle for political power between the 
progressive, rising-democratic demands and the dominant rightist royalist-conservative elites, 
leading to a cycle of repression, violence and political crises. Emergency powers, either in the 
form of coups with martial law declarations or emergency legislation, were invoked in response 
to incidents deemed to be a political crisis on several occasions by the military and civilian 
government. What is obvious from resort to these powers is the tension it reveals in the Kelsen-
Schmitt debate, that is, between the liberal attempt to respond to a political crisis through a 
rule-bound legalism together with the preservation of liberal democracy as the norm and the 
conservative manifestation of anti-liberal realism (i.e., the use of extra-normative measures 
directed at imposing the SoE) together with the attempt to label liberal democracy as the cause 
of the PCLD in the context of developing democracy. 
 This PhD thesis is theoretical as it adopts a framework of legal and political theory, and 
in particular, an extended engagement with the legal and political works of Kelsen and Schmitt, 
notably those on Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution, an approach which will enable us to 
understand what the liberal-democrat Kelsen and the rightist-conservative Schmitt understood 
as ‘the norm’ and ‘the exception’, and the institutional role of the state in dealing with 
emergency powers in the PCLD. It also adopts the ‘neo-Kantian’ approach employed by Max 
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Weber, whose arguments partially but significantly underlie Kelsen’s and Schmitt’s 
frameworks. Weber examined the relationship between authority and value-judgment within 
the politics of a modern liberalised state (i.e., the disenchanted world)—more specifically, the 
paradoxical relationship between rationality or cognition (‘is’) and ideal entities (‘ought’). This 
study of the Kelsen-Schmitt debate on emergency powers in PCLD will be constructed around 
these two poles. I will revisit Kelsen’s and Schmitt’s theories of law and politics, and other key 
elements related to their application in the context of emergency powers in the PCLD, namely 
their conception of authority to invoke emergency powers, their debate on the scope of 
emergency powers in political crises, and their conception of legal and political accountability 
of such powers together with the agony of heteronomy (‘the AoH’), that is, the tension between 
‘emergency authority to preserve a social order’ and ‘value-judgment on such authority’. These 
issues are simultaneously related to (a) the competing conceptions of ‘institution’ which 
connotes the tension between the legitimacy of legality and the radical legitimacy of law and 
(b) the notion the SoE inherent in the Kelsen-Schmitt debate. Contemporary contributions on 
emergency powers and legal and political philosophies will also be used to help explain Kelsen 
and Schmitt, though they do not principally concern the relationship between such powers and 
political crises.   
 Chapter 1 constructs a theoretical framework for this study, fully describing the 
institutional framework of the competing constitutional emergency models. I also assess the 
deficiencies of the approach employed by these works and explain why the Thai experience is 
used to expose ‘the gap’ left open by them. My key research questions are: To what extent do 
the views of Kelsen and Schmitt on the nature and use of emergency powers in times of 
exceptional political situations apply to the distinctive Thai experience? Are there any elements 
of their models of constitutional emergencies which may need to be reconsidered/re-read in 
order to accommodate the Thai experience? I seek to reassess the aforementioned key elements 
underlying Kelsen’s and Schmitt’s models and propose an alternative approach for reading 
their debate. The Thai experience, I will show, exposes the asymmetry between ‘static’ and 
‘dynamic’, that is, between Kelsen and Schmitt as ‘jurists/theorists’ and Kelsen and Schmitt as 
‘representatives of raw conflicting interests and values’.  
  Chapter 2 is concerned with emergency powers in political crises in Thai historical 
perspective. The constitutional saṃsāra—the repetitive cycle of coups and emergency powers 
to overthrow parliamentary democracy considered by royalist-conservatives as the source of 
the PCLD in post-1932 Thailand—is my main focus. However, to understand the traditional 
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Thai notion of emergency powers and its resemblance with Schmitt’s idea, the country’s 
political history before 1932 needs to also be briefly examined.  
 In Chapter 3, I assess the contestation and the eventual collision between the attempts 
to maintain sovereign authority resembling Schmitt’s model by the royalist-conservative 
faction and the struggles to liberalise emergency powers. Official documents, including 
declarations of states of emergency or internal security by the Thai government and the military 
to identify what types of emergency powers modern Thai polity normally adopts, and the 
Constitutional Court’s decisions which affected the contours of emergency powers in the 
colour-coded crises are also considered.  
 In Chapter 4, I use the Thai experience to draw the theoretical lessons for the 
contributions of Kelsen and Schmitt by focusing upon the internal and external perspectives 
of the constitutional emergency model. The former connotes the extent to which Kelsen’s and 
Schmitt’s models might each be adapted to (re-)assert their political legitimacy and hegemony 
against the challenge by the opposing model, whilst the latter signifies their application and 
justification in the context of the collision between liberal movements and the attempts to 
maintain royal sovereign authority, which breeds the AoH and the PCLD and causes the total 
lack of consensus on whether Kelsen or Schmitt offers the best model. I answer these questions 
by reassessing the normative perspectives underlying their debate, the notion of ‘institution’ 
inherent in Schmitt’s legal theory, Kelsen’s post-foundational conception of normativity, the 
relationship between liberal democracy and the AoH, the concept of the SoE together with its 
effects on the problem of accountability, and the alternative function of liberalism.  
 Then, in Chapter 5, I ultimately use my synthesis in Chapter 4 to conclude the binary-
star conception of emergency powers. This model is directed at challenging Kelsen’s and 
Schmitt’s competing views on the Weberian paradox of modernity and liberalisation, and offers 
an alternative understanding and reading of the relation between the two constitutional 
emergency models, including of their connection with social and political forces. It is based on 
the normative perspective of pragmatic hybrid which, in turn, comprises three key elements I 
coin in Chapter 4: (a) the paradoxical friction which connotes the friction between the growing 
need to separate legal ‘ought’ from ‘is’ to ensure the prevalence of anti-liberal realism over 
increasingly sturdy liberal forces on the one hand and their connection facilitated by the 
political struggles for the PoA against anti-liberal realism and its institutionalisation based on 
‘self-interested preservation’ on the other (b) the politics of defective co-optation according to 
which liberalism and authoritarian rule cannot avoid the gravitational pull of, and, in fact, have 
to co-opt, the presence of their opposition, thus making each unable to absolutely prevail as the 
vii 
 
norm; and (c) the fragile equilibrium which concerns the growing need to liberalise emergency 
powers in the PCLD by relying on political prudence to avoid ‘heavy costs and risks’ associated 



























Chapter 1: Conceptions of emergency powers in political crises: the Kelsen-
Schmitt debate in Weberian perspective 
1. Introduction 
 As its title illustrates, this PhD thesis mainly focuses on the Kelsen-Schmitt debate on 
the nature and use of emergency powers in the political crisis of liberal democracy (‘PCLD’). 
Actually, Carl Schmitt’s anti-liberal realist theory of emergency powers has recently become 
widely studied by many modern scholars who regard it as a conservative, anti-liberal theory 
championing authoritarian power structures.1 Fewer scholars pay comprehensive attention to 
Hans Kelsen’s liberal and normative view on emergency powers, Dyzenhaus, Greene, and 
Zwitter being three of the most prominent of these.2 Nevertheless, the issue of emergency 
powers in the PCLD is largely ignored by these modern scholars. Many of them choose to 
instead apply Kelsen’s and Schmitt’s theories to explain the permanent state of emergency 
(Greene) and to discuss whether emergency powers are ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ a liberal-
democratic legal order (e.g., Gross and Ní Aoláin), including their relationship with human 
rights standards (e.g., Criddle, Fox-Decent and Zwitter). They portray Schmitt’s theory as a 
threat to a liberal legal order, and Kelsen’s identity thesis—the principle of legality—as 
compulsory for any use of emergency powers. Caldwell, Dyzenhaus, McCormick, and Paulson 
are perhaps the most prominent scholars who study Kelsen and Schmitt with regard to the 
PCLD in Weimar.3 Despite touching upon the role of an emergency provision—Article 48 of 
the Weimar Constitution—the main concern for Caldwell, Dyzenhaus, and Paulson is however 
not emergency powers, but the relation between constitutional theory and the PCLD. 
Dyzenhaus, as I will discuss in Chapter 4, instead chooses later to apply Kelsen and Schmitt to 
develop a general constitutional emergency model for established liberal democracies in his 
                                                          
 1 Clement Fatovic, ‘Filling the Void: Democratic Deliberation and the Legitimization of Extra-legal 
Action’ in Clement Fatovic and Benjamin A. Kleinerman (eds), Extra-Legal Power and Legitimacy: Perspectives 
on Prerogative (OUP 2013); David Dyzenhaus, The Constitution of Law: Legality in a Time of Emergency (CUP 
2006); Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent, ‘Human Rights, Emergencies, and the Rule of Law’ (2012) 34 HRQ 
39; Karin Loevy, Emergencies in Public Law: the Legal Politics of Containment (CUP 2016), pp 5-6; Oren Gross 
and Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Law in Times of Crisis (CUP 2006). 
 2 Alan Greene, Permanent States of Emergency and the Rule of Law: Constitutions in an Age of Crisis 
(Bloomsbury 2018), ch 2; Andrej Zwitter, ‘The Rule of Law in Times of Crisis: A Legal Theory on the State of 
Emergency in the Liberal Democracy’ [2012] ARSP 95; David Dyzenhaus, ‘The compulsion of legality’ in Victor 
Ramraj (ed), Emergencies and the Limits of Legality (CUP 2012), p 36. 
 3 David Dyzenhaus, Legality and Legitimacy: Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen and Hermann Heller in Weimar 
(OUP 1997); John P. McCormick, ‘The Dilemmas of Dictatorship: Carl Schmitt and Constitutional Emergency 
Powers’ (1997) 10 Can JL & Jur. 163, p 187; Peter Caldwell, Popular Sovereignty and the Crisis of German 
Constitutional Law: The Theory and Practice of Weimar Constitutionalism (DUP 1997), ch 4; Stanley L. Paulson, 
‘Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt: Growing Discord, Culminating in the “Guardian” Controversy of 1931’ in Jens 
Meierhenrich and Oliver Simons (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Carl Schmitt (OUP 2017). 
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separate works. Meanwhile, although McCormick mainly focuses on Schmitt’s support for the 
Weimar President’s extensive emergency authority, he is silent on what Kelsen called the 
agony of heteronomy (‘the AoH’)—the tension between social order and individual 
autonomy—bred by the PCLD and its effects on the use of emergency powers.4   
 Based on the Kelsen-Schmitt debate in the context of Weimar, the PCLD connotes the 
competing views between liberal democrats and rightist conservatives on whether liberal 
democracy and constitutionalism should constitute the state’s fundamental values. In other 
words, this incident primarily mirrors states struggling with a fledgling democracy rather than 
those experiencing what Rawls called ‘a plurality of reasonable yet incompatible 
comprehensive doctrines’, that is, doctrines which do not resist ‘the essentials of a democratic 
regime’.5 Given the friction it entails, the use of emergency powers in this context is more 
sharply challenged by ‘the AoH’ as they are applied against specific members of any given 
community. Kelsen and Schmitt witnessed the invocations of such powers to tackle a volatile 
political situation in post-war Germany until Hitler’s rise to power which forced Kelsen to flee 
the country. Both applied their theories of law and politics to suggest how Article 48 of the 
Weimar Constitution should be applied, especially when the Preussenschlag occurred in 1932. 
Overall, while Kelsen championed emergency powers in the PCLD that commit to the liberal-
democratic framework and preserves the chance for the politics of reconciliation, Schmitt 
supported dealing with the PCLD through extra-normative emergency powers made by the 
sovereign to exclude political enemies.   
 In this chapter, I revisit Kelsen’s and Schmitt’s theories of law and politics, and other 
key elements related to their application in the context of emergency powers in the PCLD, 
namely their conception of authority to invoke emergency powers, their debate on the scope 
and accountability of emergency powers in political crises, and the AoH. In Section 2, I 
examine the background to the Kelsen-Schmitt debate and then the scope of its key elements, 
namely emergency powers and the PCLD, through the lens of Max Weber’s works on politics, 
the paradox of modernity and liberalisation, and the ethics of politics. Then, in Sections 3 to 5, 
I attempt to draw the full picture of the Kelsenian and Schmittian models of constitutional 
emergencies by assessing their key relevant notions, notably the competing conceptions of 
‘institution’—the tension between the legitimacy of legality and that of law—and the state of 
exception (‘SoE’). Next, in Section 6, I assess the assumptions underlying both models, i.e., 
                                                          
 4 Hans Kelsen, The Essence and Value of Democracy (Nadia Urbinati and Carlo Invernizzi Accetti (eds), 
Brian Graf (tr), Rowman and Littlefield 2013), p 27.  
 5 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia 2005), p xvi.  
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what elements help secure their effectiveness—before identifying the asymmetry inherent in 
the Kelsen-Schmitt debate, namely the asymmetry between Kelsen and Schmitt as 
jurists//theorists and Kelsen and Schmitt as representatives of raw conflicting interests. In the 
last two sections. I briefly consider Thai constitutional history in tandem with such asymmetry 
before applying this finding to construct the theoretical framework for synthesising Kelsen and 
Schmitt.  
2. The ‘Weberian’ background to the Kelsen-Schmitt debate: modern politics and 
liberalism 
 To construct a theoretical framework for considering the Kelsen-Schmitt debate on 
emergency powers in the PCLD, we first need to understand the background to their core 
theoretical stances and assumptions. As many scholars observe, Weber can be seen as an 
intellectual influence upon both Kelsen and Schmitt.6 Thus, I will examine their debate in the 
context of Weber’s perspective on politics, including its ethics, and the disenchantment of the 
world, on which it rests.  
2.1 Politics  
 Initially, it is useful to begin this section by explaining Weber’s position on politics. 
Though not explicitly citing Hobbes, Weber believed that the state of nature in which 
individuals are subject merely to their own will, and thus given the right to employ force to 
preserve themselves from others, is an undesirable political condition.7 Sceptical about a state 
of anarchy, peace and security, for him, can only be realised when there is organised control 
over a society, that is, the organisation of a modern state to monopolise the means of 
domination and administration, notably the enactment of law and the legitimate use of coercive 
force.8 It is this basic idea that underlies Kelsen’s and Schmitt’s theses.  
 Kelsen and Schmitt regarded politics as that part of everyday life which involves 
regulating human behaviour. They then shared the Weberian view that this practice is a matter 
of ‘conflicts of interest’, in that, it concerns competition for political power between different 
groups within the state and involves the assertion of ‘truth claims’ and the ‘will’ of competing 
                                                          
 6 Antonino Scalone, ‘Führerprinzip and democracy in Weber and Kelsen’ in Ian Bryan, Peter Langford 
and John McGarry (eds), The Reconstruction of the Juridico-Political: Affinity and Divergence in Hans Kelsen 
and Max Weber (Routledge 2016); David Dyzenhaus, ‘Hermann Heller and the Legitimacy of Legality’ (1996) 
16 Oxf. J. Leg. Stud. 641, pp 646-648; Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Max Weber and German Politics, 1890-1920 
(Michael S. Steinberg (tr), UCP 1984), p 387. 
 7  Max Weber, ‘The Profession and Vocation of Politics’ in Max Weber, Political Writings (Peter 
Lassman and Ronald Speirs (eds), CUP 1994) p 310; Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (J.C.A. Gaskin (ed), OUP 1996), 
pp 86-87. 




interests, and accordingly ‘presupposes the conscious or unconscious assumption of values’.9 
Viewing politics as an activity within a modern state and, like Weber, disdaining a state of 
anarchy, state authority, for Kelsen and Schmitt, becomes an essential instrument, without 
which the main problem of politics, namely how to realise order—peace, normality and 
stability—in the context of struggling values and interests, cannot be resolved. In the process, 
they embraced Weber’s top-down approach to managing politics, namely by considering a 
modern state as ‘the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its 
order’, which ‘has as its consequence endorsement of particular values’.10 The monopoly of 
authority to produce these desired outcomes is the central characteristic of ‘sovereignty’.11 
 In summary, Kelsen and Schmitt adopted the Weberian two-pronged approach to 
politics. To them, politics mirrors both ‘objectivity’ and ‘subjectivity’, thus containing two key 
elements, namely (a) state authority; and (b) the realm of values and interests. It is therefore 
always a matter of struggles and conflicts, not just for influencing the distribution of state 
power, but also for hegemony between/among divergent values. These two elements are then 
linked to the processes of modernisation and liberalisation.  
2.2 The paradox of modernity and liberalisation: the basis of the PCLD  
 Modernity, to Kelsen and Schmitt, connotes what Weber called the disenchantment of 
the world, and produces two main consequences. 12  Firstly, it facilitates the triumph of 
‘rationalism and intellectualism’ over ‘mysterious incalculable forces’, especially when state 
authority is wielded. 13  However, secondly, rationalisation simultaneously buttresses the 
awakening of the self, which, in turn, parallels liberalisation.14 In the process, the individual is 
                                                          
 9 Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy (Ellen Kennedy (tr), MIT Press 1988), pp 36-38 
(emphasis added); Carl Schmitt, State, Movement, People (Simona Draghici (tr), Plutarch Press 2001), pp 4, 15; 
Carl Schmitt, The Theory of the Partisan: A Commentary/Remark on the Concept of the Political (A. C. Goodson 
(tr), MSU Press 2004), p 3; Hans Kelsen, ‘Science and Politics’ (1951) 45 Am. Political Sci. Rev 641, p 641 
(emphasis added); Kelsen, The Essence, p 29; Max Weber, ‘Politics as a Vocation’ in Max Weber, From Max 
Weber:  Essays in Sociology (H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (trs), Routledge 2009), p 78. 
 10 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (George Schwab (tr), 
UCP 2005), p 12; Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (Anders Wedberg (tr), HUP 1945), pp 22, 284-
285 [‘GTLS’]; Hans Kelsen, ‘The Nature and Development of Constitutional Adjudication’ in Vinx (ed)(tr), The 
Guardian, p 22; Max Weber, ‘The objectivity of knowledge in social science and social policy’ in Sam 
Whimster (ed), The Essential Weber: A Reader Paperback (Routledge 2004), p 362; Weber, Economy, 
p 54. 
 11 Carl Schmitt, Constitutional Theory (Jeffrey Seitzer and Christopher Thornhill (trs), DUP 2008), p 
101; Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (Max Knight (tr), 5th edn, Law Book Exchange 2008), p 343 [‘PTL’]. 
 12 Carl Schmitt, Political Romanticism (Guy Oakes (tr), Transaction Publishers 2011), p 65; Hans Kelsen, 
Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory (Bonnie Litschewski Paulson and Stanley L. Paulson (trs), 
Clarendon Press 1992), p 21. 
 13 Max Weber, ‘Science as a Vocation’ in Weber, From Max Weber, p 139. 
 14 Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment (John Cumming (tr), Verso 
1997), p 9. 
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supported in resting his intellectual orientations to life on political values which he deems to 
be an ultimate end existing beyond the realm of reasoned debate and cognition. 15 
Modernisation and liberalisation accordingly stimulate, in Weber’s words, the polytheism of 
values, and eventually spread political struggles by urging pluralistic self-interests to compete 
freely with one another to put forward their preferred political values and ends for state 
authority.16 This intensifies the AoH—the political tension between an objective social order 
created by the state’s monopoly of force and an individual’s subjective will/value.17  
 Kelsen and Schmitt recognised the Weberian paradox of modernity and liberalisation, 
namely that the triumph of reason and the rationalisation of political power, facilitated by the 
disenchantment, paradoxically expose, but still inextricably depend upon, the ideal realm 
rendered by ‘the awakening of the self’. 18  Their two-pronged approach to politics in 
combination with this tense, but inextricable, relationship between rationality/system and the 
self characterising modernity reveal their agreement and divergence in general as follows.  
 For Kelsen and Schmitt, the triumph of reason over delusion and mysticism, which 
enhances human capacity to ‘master all things by calculation’, fosters greater demands for 
human-centred reasons together with objective and rational criteria and values for justifying 
the state’s monopoly of legitimate force—its authority—and its application to deal with the 
AoH.19 Accordingly, they concede the importance of a modern state, notably the irreversibility 
of bureaucratisation, and that democracy is the most rational regime in the modern world.   
 Nevertheless, Kelsen and Schmitt disagreed over the legitimacy of liberalism itself, that 
is, its status as the state’s fundamental value and as a value guiding the exercise of its authority 
in dealing with the polytheism of values. They disagreed about whether liberalism really 
reconciles the two poles of the AoH entailed by political polytheism, or instead threatens 
disunity and the collapse of the homogeneous state. Where Kelsen advocated liberalism as the 
state’s fundamental value due to its capability to forge compromise out of conflicting interests, 
Schmitt thought that the awakening of ‘the self’ galvanises the AoH, generates disunity within 
the state, and weakens its monopoly of force.  
 
                                                          
 15 Schmitt, Political Romanticism, p 159. 
 16 Ibid, p 116; Max Weber, ‘Between Two Laws’ in Weber, Political Writings, pp 78-79.  
 17 Kelsen, The Essence, p 27.  
 18 N.E. Simmonds, ‘Review: Legality and Legitimacy: Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen and Hermann Heller 
in Weimar by David Dyzenhaus’ (1998) 57  CLJ 195, p 195 (emphasis added). 
 19 Weber, ‘Science’, p 139; Max Weber, ‘The Social Psychology of the World Religions’ in Weber, From 
Max Weber, p 290. 
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  2.3 Weberian ethics underlying the Kelsen-Schmitt debate on emergency 
powers in the PCLD 
 Kelsen’s and Schmitt’s divergent views on the paradox of modernity and liberalisation 
above are intrinsically related to Weber’s two ethics of politics which constituted the backbone 
of the emergency provision of the Weimar Constitution—Article 48. The synthetic 
consideration of these two issues enables us to derive the role of emergency powers in the 
PCLD from the Kelsenian and Schmittian standpoints.   
 After the First World War, the monarchy was dissolved in Germany. The National 
assembly produced the new constitution confirming the establishment of a formally liberal 
democratic republic—the Weimar Constitution—which was subsequently signed by President 
Ebert in 1919. Weber played an influential role in providing its theoretical framework, just 
before his passing in 1920. He was very concerned with the problem of how to establish 
political stability in a volatile democracy such as the Weimar Republic, causing him to propose 
a balance between two ethics of political conduct, namely the ethic of responsibility (‘EoR’) 
and the ethic of conviction (‘EoC’). As a liberal, he considered the EoR—the legality of 
bureaucratic administration and political participation through party politics—essential for 
guaranteeing the continuity of democracy and compromise in the context of divergent party 
interests. 20  However, he also espoused the EoC which entrusts a plebiscitary leader—a 
charismatic president chosen by plebiscite and capable of inspiring a large number of political 
followers—with roles in counterweighting party politics and the bureaucratic state, and even 
in governing alone through emergency decrees in times of political crises by virtue of what 
becomes Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution.21  
 Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution: 
 ‘If a land does not fulfil its duties under [this] constitution …, the President may compel its action 
through the use of armed force. 
 Provided public order is severely threatened …, the President may employ measures necessary to restore 
public order … [H]e may suspend constitutional rights enshrined in Articles 114 [the right to liberty], 115 [the 
right to respect for his home], 117 [the right to respect for his correspondence], 118 [the right to hold opinions], 
123 [the right to unarmed and peaceful assembly], 124 [the right to freedom of association] and 153 [the right 
to the peaceful enjoyment of one’s private properties]… partially or entirely. 




                                                          
 20 Max Weber, ‘Parliament and government in Germany under a New Political Order’ in Weber, Political 
Writings. 




Put differently, this idea ‘combines personalism and structure [, and] … favours the rise of 
individuals who present themselves as representatives of the masses’ and plays an important 
role in maintaining the unity of the national state challenged by pluralistic liberalism. 22 
Nevertheless, these roles based on the EoC are still balanced by the EoR—the duty to respect 
the legality of bureaucratic administration.23 
 After Weber’s death, Kelsen and Schmitt witnessed the political instability of the 
Weimar Republic, including more intense events theoretically characterised as ‘political crisis’, 
namely a high degree of societal polarisation leading to high levels of political and mass 
mobilisation, violent clashes of arms between organised groups, a coup d’état and political 
repression, but not quite reaching the threshold of civil war.24 Acknowledging the absence of 
‘universal political morality’ in a disenchanted world, Kelsen and Schmitt asserted that what 
genuinely constitutes a political crisis, as in Weimar, depends on the question of the legitimacy 
of fundamental/high-priority values held by particular political actors, leading to disputes over 
what political values are hegemonic for a particular political order and provide the basis for 
political authority.25 This circumstance connotes those perceiving a ‘greater-than-usual’ threat 
to purported fundamental values, in particular, a perceived threat to overthrow the regime, and 
their attempt to counter this threat, possibly through emergency powers as right-wing 
nationalist elites did in Weimar.26 Put differently, while violence and disorder are pertinent 
factors, they are not necessary and decisive as indicators of what constitutes a political crisis. 
Instead, the existence of the latter is actor-centred, and intrinsically intertwined with political 
values and ends—the realm of ideal entities.27  
 The growing intense discord between the liberal and anti-liberal views on the paradox 
of modernity and liberalisation, which bred the problem of the AoH and the risk of violence 
and antagonistic mobilisation, culminated in the PCLD—more precisely, the Preussenschlag 
                                                          
 22 Stefan Breuer, ‘The Concept of Democracy in Weber’s Political Sociology’ in Ralph Schroeder (ed), 
Max Weber, Democracy and Modernization (Macmillan 1998), p 8. 
 23 Mommsen, Max Weber, p 386. 
 24 Leon Hurwitz, ‘Contemporary Approaches to Political Stability’ (1973) 5 Comparative Politics 449, 
pp 449-454; Vicenç Fisas Armengol and others, ‘Alert 2015! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding’ 
(Escola de Cultura de Pau 2015), p 97. 
 25 Carl Schmitt, ‘The guardian of the constitution: Schmitt on pluralism and the president as the guardian 
of the constitution’ in Lars Vinx (ed)(tr), The Guardian of the Constitution: Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt on the 
Limits of Constitutional Law (CUP 2015), p 146 [‘Pluralism’]; Claudia Auer, ‘Conceptualizing Political Crisis 
and the Role of Public Diplomacy in Crisis Communication Research’ in Andreas Schwarz, Matthew W. Seeger 
and Claudia Auer (eds), The Handbook of International Crisis Communication Research (Wiley Blackwell 2016), 
pp 120-121; Dyzenhaus, ‘Hermann Heller’, p 650; Hans Kelsen, ‘Foundations of Democracy’ (1955) 66 Ethics 
1, p 16.  
 26 Ekkart Zimmermann, Political Violence, Crises and Revolutions (Routledge 1983), pp 189-190, 203; 
Nick C. Sagos, Democracy, Emergency, and Arbitrary Coercion (Brill 2015), p 139. 
 27 Jürgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (Polity Press 1988). 
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and eventually the Nazi takeover. Meanwhile, Kelsen and Schmitt recognised the place of 
emergency powers under Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution in responding swiftly to threats 
to national security during the PCLD. Though emergency powers are normally seen as 
involving resort to repression, such as preventive detention, media censorship, the prohibition 
of public gathering or the deployment of troops, Kelsen and Schmitt, in their Preussenschlag 
debate, recognised other powers not directly concerning those uses, for instance, the 
appointment of a commissar/dictator, the usurpation of state power, or the dissolution of some 
state functions, by virtue of ‘special authority’ such as under Article 48. Thus, while the realm 
of ‘ought’ (value-judgment) is of greatest importance for determining what constitutes a 
political crisis, that of ‘is’ (form of authority) designates what counts as emergency powers. 
 Kelsen’s attempt to deal with the paradox of modernity and liberalisation and the AoH 
through liberal democracy is bolstered by his adoption of the EoR, while Schmitt chose to 
radicalise the EoC by resorting to the concept of the SoE.28 It then follows that the former 
believed that the response to the PCLD should be by confining emergency powers to ‘the 
formal aspect of reason’, namely formally legal-rational, machine-like technical authority or 
the Weberian iron cage of rationality, while the latter advocated ‘the dependence of values 
upon the will’ together with authoritarian emergency measures.29  Each scholar eventually 
conceived the other’s thesis as his defective antipode, in need of refutation. The details of the 
two ethics will be more comprehensively discussed later. What is important here is that, given 
their different views on the application of emergency powers, a conflict between them then 
arises. In particular, where extra-normative decisions on an emergency situation are deemed 
authoritative from the Schmittian perspective, they are illegal and lack authority from its 
Kelsenian counterpart. Realising this problem, I choose to use the term ‘emergency powers’, 
and strive to define it in a sufficiently inclusive way.  
 Kelsen and Schmitt realised that emergency powers lead to the re-allocation of political 
power, notably the consolidation of the executive power and security forces, thereby affecting 
the normal law-making process by Parliament and imposing greater restrictions on rights and 
freedoms.30 However, the term ‘emergency powers’ employed here is much broader than ‘state 
of emergency’, which merely encompasses situations in which an exigency is formally declared 
                                                          
 28 Dyzenhaus, Legality, p 14. 
 29 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (Talcott Parsons (tr), Dover 2003), p 
181; Simmonds, ‘Review’, p 195. 
 30 Carl Schmitt, Dictatorship (Polity Press 2014), p 150; See Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political 
(George Schwab (tr), UCP 2007), p 32 [‘the CoP’]; Kelsen, PTL, p 212. 
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by virtue of statutory laws (de jure emergency).31 Apart from emergency powers employed in 
a de jure emergency, there is also the situation of ‘de facto emergency’ in which these powers 
are applied without being declared an emergency situation and extra-normative practices, 
notably the sovereign’s emergency decisions, which liberals regard as lacking authority.32 Yet, 
the term does not include ordinary legislation which addresses a national security matter, 
notably the criminal code, but does not lead to the formal re-allocation of political power. 
Accordingly, I follow Ramraj and Thiruvengadam by defining ‘emergency powers’ as:  
 ‘coercive powers, claimed or invoked by or on behalf of the state [either in forms of 
powers enshrined in ‘laws’ or ‘extralegal means’ especially coups d’état together with a formal 
or de facto imposition of emergency], the purpose of which is to address [the PCLD] which, in 
the view of those who invoke it, cannot be addressed by ‘ordinary’ [measures].’33   
 In the next four sections, I strive to draw the full picture of Kelsen’s and Schmitt’s 
models of constitutional emergencies. 
3. The realms of ‘is’ and ‘ought’ underlying the Kelsen-Schmitt debate: the backbone of 
the competing models 
 From the above, the relationship between the two cores of this PhD thesis—emergency 
powers and the PCLD—is fundamentally based on the two key elements in Weber’s definition 
of politics, that is, (a) state authority to secure a social order and (b) competing value-judgments 
threatening such an order. Ostensibly, the fundamental problem associated with the PCLD is 
not simply whether emergency powers rest ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ the legal order, in particular, 
how these powers should be interpreted and applied in ways that respect a liberal constitutional 
order, nor the problem of the permanent state of emergency according to which emergency 
powers supposed to be temporary are perpetuated and normalised, thus making the norm-
exception dichotomy meaningless.34  
 Rather, the question central to the Kelsen-Schmitt debate is whether liberalism—liberal 
democracy and liberal constitutionalism—should constitute ‘the norm’ and therefore the 
guiding value of a social order—the state. Nevertheless, given a high level of social polarisation 
bred by the PCLD, its relation with emergency powers is, no doubt, antagonistic, thus 
vindicating the tension between the process of domination (claim-right) or facticity which 
                                                          
 31 Joan Fitzpatrick, Human Rights in Crisis: The International System for Protecting Rights During States 
of Emergency (Penn Press 1994), p 8. 
 32 Ibid, pp 11-15. 
 33  Victor V. Ramraj and Arun K. Thiruvengadam, ‘Introduction: emergency powers and 
constitutionalism in Asia’ in Ramraj and Thiruvengadam (eds), Emergency Powers in Asia: Exploring the Limits 
of Legality (Cambridge University Press 2010), p 2. 
 34 Greene, Permanent States of Emergency, p 33. 
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signifies ‘coercive enforcement’ and the process of evaluation (justification-right) or validity 
which concerns ‘rational acceptability’.35 To clarify this point, I turn to the empowerment and 
binding-ness perspectives of emergency powers. 
 The empowerment perspective is concerned with the exercise of state authority or 
facticity ‘is’. Recognising the essence of emergency powers and adopting the Weberian 
definition of politics, the problem Kelsen and Schmitt initially examined is: How can such 
powers be attributed to the state? To them, it is only because an enforcer of emergency powers 
is an authority that actions undertaken during a political crisis have binding force and generate 
a duty to obey.36 In other words, the pre-ordained source of authority enables the assertion of 
a claim-right—the entitlement ‘to press a demand with respect to something or other against 
another individual.’ 37  This perspective thus principally prioritises the right to impose an 
authority’s will.38  
 The assertion of claim-right parallels the duty of its addressees to perform or refrain 
from certain behaviour. The subjective wills about the merits of such imposition or value 
‘ought’ of these addressees underpin the binding-ness or justification dimension. The fact that 
the superior has a claim-right therefore involves the assertion of justification-right or ‘a 
response to the demand for the justification of their behavior’, i.e., that any particular 
emergency actions are justified by virtue of the maintenance of social peace or of the defence 
of the social order against destructive forces.39  
 The invocation of emergency powers in the PCLD, i.e., to press a claim-right, such as 
the Preussenschlag decree, normally preserves a particular regime or norms/values, thereby 
benefitting particular segments of society, and disadvantaging others. Given that the addressees 
(e.g., the Prussian government) hold an opposing political ideology, emergency powers cannot 
avoid the question from the justification-right dimension of whether they are genuinely applied 
in response to national security, or deliberately to suppress their enforcers’ political opponents. 
Emergency powers in the PCLD then encounter the problem of the AoH already bred by the 
confrontation between liberals and conservatives, causing a greater rift between facticity and 
validity. In other words, they have to struggle with disagreement over their ‘substantive merits’ 
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between enforcers and addressees, and therefore with the problems regarding (a) How should 
emergency powers be applied in light of the AoH already hastened by the PCLD? and (b) How 
should the AoH associated with emergency powers in the PCLD be dealt with? Kelsen’s and 
Schmitt’s positions in this light are based on the ethic of political conduct and the kind of 
political regime which they advocated. 
 In the broadest perspective, the tension between the empowerment and binding-ness 
perspectives of emergency powers signifies the neo-Kantian elements inherent in Weber’s 
thesis, that is, the distinction between (a) ‘what is’ or cognition, which is the sphere of actions 
and events taking place and capable of being experienced in the world; and (b) what ‘ought to 
be’ or ideal realm lying beyond natural and sociological facts.40 I seek to comprehensively 
examine the Kelsen-Schmitt debate in the light of these two realms. In the process, their 
competing theories of politics which focus on the arrangement of state power in the light of the 
AoH have to be examined in tandem with those of law which connote the legitimate use of 
such power. 
 Besides, from the above ‘is-ought’ distinction, two levels of conflict can also be inferred 
from the Kelsen-Schmitt debate. From the ‘what is’ dimension, I am speaking of what Kelsen 
and Schmitt actually proposed. Here, I therefore regard them as ‘theorists of political crisis’ 
and of ‘positivism’ and ‘anti-positivism’ respectively.41 Nevertheless, from its ‘what ought’ 
counterpart, rather than simply regarding them as legal and political theorists, the Kelsen-
Schmitt debate also mirrors an ideological/political conflict. Given that the PCLD—the 
legitimacy of a liberal democratic regime—constitutes its core, their debate represents raw 
conflicting interests and values, in that, their theses concern conflicting ideological positions: 
liberal democracy and right-wing conservativism, an antagonism which, as it becomes more 
intense, reaches the threshold of ‘political crisis’. 
 All the above distinctions constitute the backbone of this PhD thesis, and must be kept 
in mind when studying the Kelsen-Schmitt debate in the following three sections. Section 4 
concerns Kelsen’s and Schmitt’s competing positions on the norm-exception dichotomy in the 
Weberian perspective in relation to the problem of the AoH by turning to their competing 
theories of politics. Then, in Section 5, I consider their contrasting theories of law in the light 
of their divergent ethics of politics to draw the full picture of their constitutional emergency 
models. Here, I examine the overall structure of their models, including the opposing 
                                                          
 40 Max Weber, ‘Bureaucracy’ in Weber, From Max Weber, p 221. 
 41 Peter E. Gordon and John P. McCormick, ‘Weimar Thought: Continuity and Crisis’ in Peter E. Gordon 
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conceptions of ‘institution’, which involve how the authority in a matter of emergency powers 
should be wielded, and the SoE. Kelsen and Schmitt, I will show, disagreed over what can be 
deemed as the legitimacy of legality and the legitimacy of law.  
4. Liberalism as the centre of Kelsen’s and Schmitt’s competing theories of politics: the 
norm-exception dichotomy in Weberian perspective  
 At the outset, Kelsen and Schmitt, though mentioning it several times in their debate 
on the nature of Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution, recognised the volatile nature of an 
emergency situation. However, if meticulously reading their works and considering their 
background, we can at least derive what they preferred as normal politics or the norm and as 
the threat to a fundamental value guiding the response to the paradox of modernity and 
liberalisation or the exception. Their adoption of the EoR and the EoC to different degrees and 
to the exclusion of the other comprehensively explains why liberalism is/is not appropriate as 
‘the norm’ of the state. In this part, I turn to their competing views in this respect.  
  4.1 Kelsen and the EoR: political compromise and autocracy 
   Kelsen expressly championed Weimar democracy. Parliament, he wrote, is the best 
place where ‘the will of the state’ is fostered by including opposing wills of majority and 
minority, notably through ‘dialectical procedures’ which hinge upon ‘speech and counter-
speech, argument and counterargument’, and is expressed through the medium of law.42 Given 
the impossibility of a fully-fledged direct democracy in the modern world, political parties 
become prominent mediators between individual interests and the formation of the state’s will 
within Parliament. 43 Schmitt, as will be discussed, strongly criticised Kelsen’s theory of 
democracy for failing to provide any means for preventing ‘public enemies’ from legally 
participating in Parliament. By largely focusing on majority rule and parliamentary procedures, 
it has also been criticised as too procedural, thus failing to consider the moral values inherent 
in democracy, notably the issue of human rights.44  Nevertheless, it is more beneficial to 
examine the reasons why Kelsen saw liberal democracy’s potential for reconciling the PCLD.  
 Even against the backdrop of the PCLD in Weimar, Kelsen kept reminding the 
government of the importance of defending freedom and autonomy, considering this action 
necessary for facilitating peaceful coexistence among opposing interests. This also reflects his 
awareness of the risk of a political crisis engendered by autocracy. Inspired by Rousseau’s idea, 
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Kelsen, to start with, believed that liberal democracy is ‘a social form which protects every 
member and where every individual is connected to all the other members and yet remains as 
free as before.’45 Above all, he adopted Weber’s EoR as an ethical virtue suitable for political 
life. This ethic underlines a correspondence between political actions and their consequences, 
therefore, political actions always have to take into account and weigh ‘the end, means, and the 
secondary results’.46 It then imposes a responsibility on political actors to act in accordance 
with preordained rules, in particular, the law, and to be answerable for the foreseeable impact 
of their conduct. 47  Moreover, its call for weighing signifies that such an ethic presumes 
inevitable value conflicts in a disenchanted world, rather than bringing human behaviour into 
harmony with the ultimate conviction.48  
 Overall, Kelsen saw irreducible pluralism and the ongoing AoH in liberal democracy 
as an opportunity. He praised liberal democracy for providing the best hope for pacifying a 
volatile political situation caused by divergent and incompatible ultimate values and ends on a 
relatively enduring basis, through peaceful compromise among opposing interests, that is, 
through ‘a norm that neither entirely conforms with the interests of one party, nor entirely 
contradicts the interests of the other.’49 This political standpoint can be more theoretically 
described as follows. 
 Putting emphasis on political responsibility, answerability, and the polytheism of 
values, liberal democracy sets neither ‘friendly quality’ nor ‘absolute value’ which would 
justify any use of state authority to exclude interests for being ‘the others’, but recognises only 
political relativism which presupposes the human being as ‘the creator of his world’, thus 
recognising, in the process, their freedom and autonomy as fundamental elements of a political 
system. 50  By presupposing individual freedom/autonomy and relative truth and values, it 
subsequently implies the equality of all under the law together with tolerance and the mutual 
respect of different political opinions. 51  Liberal democracy then calls for the state’s 
responsibility to protect individual rights and freedoms, notably the rights of minorities and the 
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right to freedom of expression and political participation, and to establish legal mechanisms 
for guaranteeing the EoR, i.e., the lawfulness of the exercise of state authority.52 Accordingly, 
this regime leaves opposing interests a public space under which to voice, criticise and 
negotiate their views, and even to revise them in future, without fear of state or social 
repression, thus ensuring the opportunity of political compromise and reconciliation.53  
 Kelsen’s assertion that a compromise between/among competing interests is required 
for peacefully minimising political conflicts/crises on a relatively enduring basis 
simultaneously reflects his scepticism about replacing liberal democracy with autocracy. This 
part of his writing mirrors his position as a political thinker who provided an arsenal of 
arguments for defending liberal democracy. For him, autocracy is synonymous with 
dictatorship, despotism and totalitarianism. Contrary to liberal democracy, it subjects members 
of a social order to the ruler’s absolute authority, without allowing them to participate in 
determining the scope of its content and application, and therefore depriving them of individual 
freedom and equality.54 It then turns the state into ‘an absolute entity’ capable of imposing 
absolute values or ends at the expense of their opponents even through violent means.55 Given 
that it ignores the EoR, autocracy is prone to forge political repression, subjecting members of 
society to an absolute authority without providing remedies for the AoH. In the context of ‘the 
awakening of the self’ facilitated by modernity, this repression of political sentiments and 
values without remedies is likely to breed dissatisfaction against the regime among repressed 
interests, thus triggering resistance and exacerbating the PCLD.56      
  4.2 Schmitt and the EoC: political romanticism and political absolutism 
 Here, Schmitt’s approach to politics must be read in combination with a political faction 
with which he was affiliated. He joined first the conservative reactionary movement led by von 
Papen and von Schleicher, and later the Nazis, though he previously saw Hitler as a threat to 
the state and the rightist-conservative aristocrats. Schmitt believed that the abolition of the 
German monarchy constituted a state of emergency by diluting the concept of sovereign 
authority, and shared with right-wing conservative elites a great scepticism about 
Enlightenment philosophy and liberal-democratic values and institutions, notably the 
parliamentary system which reflects the polytheism of values and checks and balances, 
                                                          
 52 Hans Kelsen, ‘Who ought to be the guardian of the constitution?: Kelsen’s reply to Schmitt’ in Vinx 
(ed)(tr), The Guardian, p 195. 
 53 Kelsen, ‘The Nature’, p 72. 
 54 Ibid.  
 55 Kelsen, What Is Justice?, pp 202-203, 206. 
 56 Kelsen, The Essence, pp 50, 74, 92-96. 
15 
 
supporting instead the nationalist-authoritarian state.57 His writings, both those written pre- and 
post-Hitler’s rise to power, also consistently show that he did not hesitate to advocate that the 
Head of State (‘HoS’) be equipped with extensive emergency powers to suspend and abolish 
liberal democracy, thus turning him into a strong supporter of the ultra-conservative von 
Papen’s Preussenschlag decree. Overall, Schmitt’s scepticism about the iron cage of 
rationality fostered by the disenchantment and liberalisation process represents the rightist 
conservative’s standpoint against dealing with the AoH associated with liberalism by turning 
to what he called political romanticism. 
 To Schmitt, parliamentary democracy advocates the iron cage of rationality. Such a 
cage, he asserted, contributes to the loss of ultimate meaning, and facilitates political 
romanticism, that is, ‘[endless] discussions, through a struggle between different opinions’, on 
values and ends with no last words among political parties within Parliament on an equal 
footing.58 In a broader perspective, as political romanticism encourages ‘the private individual 
to be his own priest’, it then hastens ‘a turn towards the total state’.59 Here, the state is turned 
into ‘a scene of the pluralistic division of [every] organized social power.’60 This is prone to 
become more deeply embedded due to a call for the respect for such pluralism by liberalism 
itself, which results in the confinement of state authority to pre-ordained rules.61 By depriving 
the state of the means essential for preserving its survival against ideologies and groups 
threatening its genuine fundamental spirit, i.e., political unity, liberalism is prone to breed the 
PCLD, yet, fails to cope with the AoH associated with it.62 In short, Schmitt advocated the 
resolution of the PCLD by setting aside liberal democracy. 
 Against the backdrop of the PCLD, Schmitt then responded to political romanticism 
and a turn towards the total state created by the iron cage by adopting the key elements of 
Weber’s EoC. He embraced the standpoint that the criterion of a good political act here does 
not rest on respect paid to the responsibility to act in compliance with law, but is guided by 
‘political vision’ or ‘ultimate value(s) or good(s)’.63 Furthermore, by presuming the existence 
of ‘ultimate value(s) or good(s)’, it seeks to resolve political conflicts through bringing ‘human 
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behaviour … into harmony with [such] proper order of values given in the cosmos.’64 Adopting 
these key features of Weber’s EoC, Schmitt recrafted the term ‘democracy’ by detaching it 
from liberal pluralism, and uniting it with dictatorship, thus conceiving of a democratic regime 
with the strong HoS embodying political unity and capable of exercising extra-normative 
authority against threats to it known as the sovereign. 65  Democracy then presupposes 
homogeneity and, if necessary, the elimination of heterogeneity.66 It is this political condition 
which Schmitt regarded as normal.  
  4.3 Weber’s purposive-rational/instrumental type of action 
 Kelsen and Schmitt, through the lens of Weber’s ethics of politics, provided competing 
intellectual reference points vis-à-vis the virtues and defects of liberalism and its replacement 
with dictatorship. For them, what constitutes ‘the norm’ is a regime/political practice which 
helps pacify the problem of the AoH, while that which precipitates this problem constitutes 
‘the exception’. Their works therefore respectively presume or deny liberalism as a prevailing 
shared norm or value underpinning the state. In a broader perspective, their adoption of one 
ethic to the exclusion of the other rests on the Weberian purposive-rational/instrumental type 
of action as Kelsen and Schmitt developed their theories according to their own/solitary value, 
and to achieve their preferred/purposive end.67  The next task is to explore the model of 
constitutional emergencies they advocated or rejected. Thus, apart from considering the scope 
of the PCLD, we have to explore that of its response—emergency powers.  
5. The Kelsenian and Schmittian models of constitutional emergencies: institution, 
legality, law, and the SoE   
 As indicated earlier, Kelsen and Schmitt acknowledged that emergency powers in the 
PCLD are hardly morally neutral, and therefore cannot avoid struggling with the problem of 
the AoH. Embracing Weber’s definition of politics, they addressed emergency powers in the 
PCLD by basing their constitutional models on the closed, self-referential system of state 
authority/institution.68 That is to say, they similarly relied on the monopoly of, and the attempt 
to rationalise, political power, and on the transcendental possibility for the legal and political 
order—Kelsen’s concept of the grundnorm and Schmitt’s concept of the political (‘CoP’) 
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respectively—to explain the nature and use of emergency powers in the PCLD. Theoretically, 
this fundamentally reflects the competing conceptions of ‘institution’ and the SoE.  
  5.1 Institution and the SoE: the legitimacy of legality vs the radical legitimacy 
of law 
 According to Croce, the term ‘institution’ can be generally defined as an organisation 
founded ‘to provide public, stable, durable behavioural patterns which are meant to guide 
human conduct and to mould the social environment.’69 Two more specific senses of this term 
can be further derived from such definition. First, it reflects ‘all the beliefs and modes of 
behavior instituted by the collectivity’.70 Secondly, it also connotes ‘a specialised instrument 
belonging to the specialised field of society’. 71  Schmitt’s notion of democracy qua 
homogeneity clearly indicates that he preferred defining ‘institution’ not as ‘a specialised 
instrument’, but as ‘the basic structure of society independent of its particular members.’72 By 
contrast, Kelsen resisted such extra-normative authority in response to the PCLD as he put it: 
sovereignty only connotes ‘the sovereignty of a legal order’.73 However, despite following 
Weber’s EoR that the modern state cannot avoid espousing legal-rational domination—an 
administration through the medium of impersonal laws enacted and promulgated in accordance 
with the formal legal process, he saw law not as part of social fact but as a specialised 
instrument governing its own creation.74 More specifically, Kelsen and Schmitt each applied 
their own position on ‘institution’ to address the connection between legality and the SoE.  
 The term ‘SoE’ appears in Schmitt’s Political Theology—in his famous quote: 
‘Sovereign is he who decides on the exception.’75 An analytical reading of this book reveals 
the two main dimensions from which Schmitt derived such a term—the SoE qua the factual 
circumstance and the SoE with respect to the legal order.76 I base my analysis here on these 
dimensions.  
 At the outset, Schmitt defined the SoE as ‘an extreme emergency’—a factual 
circumstance which threatens ‘the existence of the state order’.77 The SoE in this sense then 
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leads to the norm-exception dichotomy. As I mentioned earlier, the PCLD in Weimar, in 
Kelsen’s and Schmitt’s views, constituted an emergency, though Kelsen did not use the term 
‘SoE’. Yet, they disagreed over what constitutes a high-priority value of the state which helps 
alleviate the problem of the AoH (i.e. the norm) and its threat (i.e., the exception). What I still 
have not comprehensively explained is the relationship between the SoE, law, and legality.   
 Kelsen and Schmitt discussed the SoE as the presence in fact of the suspension of 
normativism or the doctrine of legal imputation, according to which law functions to bestow 
‘legality’ upon state power, to deal with the PCLD (i.e., the SoE as an extreme situation).78 Put 
another way, the SoE, in this sense, designates the apparent emptiness (cognition ‘is’) of 
normativism (legal ‘ought’), in particular, imposed through ‘the specific activities’—
emergency powers.  Also, they similarly strove to address the SoE through the juridical order, 
i.e., either the legal system or the concrete-order framework. Nevertheless, what they disagree 
about is the focal role of the doctrine of legal imputation, namely whether any extreme threat 
to the state’s survival necessitating the use of emergency powers involves a deviation from this 
doctrine.79 Kelsen and Schmitt addressed this problem differently by relying on the legitimacy 
of legality and the radical legitimacy of law respectively.  
 On the one hand, by conceiving law as ‘a specialised instrument’, Kelsen proposed a 
scientific theory of law—the Pure Theory of Law (‘PTL’)—which explores ‘what the law is 
and how [it] is made’.80 His primary concern is then the clear and constitutive legal order rather 
than its substantive quality. Thus, Kelsen’s primary focus is the legitimacy of legality, that is, 
the process whereby law and thereby decisions in the name of the state are produced, rather 
than their ultimate legitimate content.81 For him, there is no SoE which can legitimately lead 
to the total suspension of law, and extra-normative emergency powers cannot legitimately be 
imputed to the state. Nevertheless, his position on the connection between legality and the SoE 
has to be carefully approached as Kelsen spoke of the legal system in terms of a dynamic 
system of norms. The dynamic system of norms means that while the higher-level legal norm 
determines the process and sometimes the range of contents, such as the list of non-derogable 
rights and liberties, by which its lower-level alternative is created, such determination is 
incomplete—‘a range of discretion’ based on political considerations is still preserved by the 
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higher-level norm for state officials to assert contents of its lower-level counterpart. 82 
Acknowledging the impossibility of specifying every detail of law to be put into practice in 
advance, Kelsen’s thesis provides a resource for responses to ‘indeterminacy’ pertaining to 
exceptional political incidents. This point also signifies that Kelsen tacitly agreed with Schmitt 
that emergency legislation is structurally unable completely to anticipate the SoE qua an 
extreme situation, and that its content is partly governed by an area of penumbral uncertainty—
an area where the law is uncertain/silent and instead governed by ‘something extra-legal’.83 
However, the only difference here is that Kelsen sought to contain a penumbra of uncertainty 
under the umbrella of the doctrine of legal imputation which functions as a frame providing 
authoritative force.84  
 On the other hand, Schmitt’s theory of law contrasts with Kelsen’s positivism, and is 
based on an anti-liberal form of legal realism. Nevertheless, where the U.S. legal realist 
tradition (arguably the dominant version) not only argues that ‘law is politics’ as a matter of 
fact, but also that law should be liberal politics as a matter of normative commitment, Schmitt 
is however a realist in quite a distinct sense since he was antagonistic to liberalism.85 More 
precisely, he opposed the legitimacy of legality which focuses on the process, namely the 
doctrine of imputation qua the basis of emergency powers, and instead celebrated extra-
normative emergency authority. Schmitt’s support for sovereign decisions, I will more 
comprehensively explain below, is derived from his notion of ‘institution’ qua the homogeneity 
of the people. Accordingly, it can be said that Schmitt preferred the legitimacy of law which 
concerns the legitimate content of particular state decisions.86 However, his version of such 
legitimacy is anti-liberal and radical because it is applied to justify emergency powers 
transcending the contents of positive law provisions and legality.87  
 Having explored the competing conceptions of ‘institution’, the SoE, and the contesting 
legitimacy between legality and law, I next strive to elaborate the full picture of Kelsen’s and 
Schmitt’s models of constitutional emergencies.  
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5.2 Kelsen’s project of authority: the legislative accommodation model of 
constitutional emergencies 
 For Kelsen, who strove to lessen as much as possible the level of violence produced by 
emergency powers in Weimar through the EoR, liberal democracy and constitutionalism offer 
the best opportunity for addressing the AoH associated with those powers through reconciling 
the will of the subjects of such powers (subjective value) to the state’s de jure monopoly of 
force (objective authority). He therefore applies his theories of law and politics to explain how 
public order can be maintained by subjecting different interests and values under the same 
unified order of positive law which constitutes the state regarded as the ultimate point of 
imputation. Let’s call this as the project of authority (‘PoA’).88  
  5.2.1 Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law: the doctrine of legal imputation in 
application  
 Kelsen, I already indicated, regarded dictatorship as creating the risk of unconstrained 
and violent emergency powers to protect only a limited range of interests. Against Schmitt, the 
HoS acting as the sovereign cannot justify the exertion of extensive emergency powers by 
simply claiming that he/she stands above party politics and embodies the homogeneity of the 
people. Kelsen criticised this for providing no guarantee for the prevention of any abuse of 
emergency decisions made by such a person.89 For him, Schmitt’s attempt to apply this claim 
to turn ‘the dictator’ into ‘the guardian of the constitution’ also undermines the essence of 
parliamentary democracy and precipitates a paradox within the constitutional order. Where ‘the 
dictator’ may wield emergency powers in such a way that transcends parliamentary rule and 
violates a written constitution, ‘the guardian’ performs a role in defending it.90 By contrast, 
under the PoA, all branches of government have to cooperate to deal with an exceptional 
political situation guided by the assumption of constitutionality, while the extra-
normative/metaphysical character of emergency powers is denied.91 This idea is based on his 
famous PTL. Although Kelsen did not use the term ‘PTL’ to defend Weimar democracy, its 
seeds, notably the is-ought dichotomy and the ideas of legal hierarchy and constitutional 
legality, are conspicuous in his critical engagement with Schmitt’s ideas. It is also beneficial 
to assess his debate with Schmitt by simultaneously considering his more developed, post-1932 
contributions, notably the Reine Rechtslehre and the General Theory of Law and State.     
                                                          
 88 I borrow this term from Loevy. See Loevy, Emergencies, p 31. 
 89 Kelsen, ‘Who ought’, pp 181, 208-209. 
 90 Ibid, pp 219-220. 
 91 See Ibid, p 174. 
21 
 
 The PTL emphasises the stringent separation between cognition/rationality (‘is’) and 
ideal entities (‘ought’). In the process, it robustly distinguishes between (a) legal norms which 
are ‘imperatives’ or ‘commands’ and (b) legal ‘ought’ which concern ‘legal proposition’ or a 
hypothetical judgment by which the science of law attributes a ‘legal meaning’ to particular 
conduct.92 The former are prescriptions by the legal authority, while the latter connotes the 
doctrine of legal imputation which constitutes the validity of legal norms and therefore an ideal 
entity (or extra-cognition) paradoxically originating in reason.93 Put more theoretically, the 
latter is ‘a unified system of legal norms, and thereby the possibility of creating [and describing] 
a priori the object, law, as an object of enquiry in legal science.’94 Accordingly, where the 
issuance of legal norms and their content cannot totally be detached from politics or value-
judgment, the objective realm of legal ‘ought’ must be severed from subjective values towards 
whether the content of a law is good-bad, right-wrong, or just-unjust. This means that legal 
validity is not dependent on moral/value ‘ought’ and concrete factuality ‘is’, and that legal 
norms are valid and binding only because they belong to the objective, closed, self-referential 
system of legal ‘ought’.95 This ‘is-ought’ distinction aims to prevent deriving the validity of 
law from the ruler’s autocratic ability to wield power.96 
 Having thought that the Schmittian position allows the state to encroach upon 
individual rights and liberties at will without prior objective legal authorisation, Kelsen urged 
that the identity thesis—state officials act qua state and derive their authority solely from law—
must be observed under all circumstances.97 It therefore follows that he advocated liberal 
constitutionalism which regards a constitution as an essential instrument which establishes 
institutional mechanisms for controlling state authority in order to protect individual rights and 
liberties.98 In this fashion, the PTL then constructs a dynamic system of hierarchical norms 
whereby ‘the higher-level norm governs [the process of creating] the lower-level 
norm’. 99 Accordingly, all emergency legislation must be issued by a competent official 
authorised by a higher-level law and must respect the doctrine of imputation. For Kelsen, the 
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grundnorm or the basic norm constitutes the ultimate, yet, hypothetical norm which unifies the 
legal system.100 However, given that the grundnorm is constructed upon ‘the transcendental-
logical’ presupposition (and is therefore ‘the constitution in the transcendental-logical sense’), 
the making and application of emergency legislation, in reality, is ultimately governed by a 
written constitution which is the most fundamental positive law.101  
 Interestingly, despite recognising ‘indeterminacy’ inherent in the legal system, Kelsen 
noted in his comment on the Preussenschlag judgement that when an emergency provision 
containing an area of penumbral uncertainty is invoked, its application still needs to uphold 
objective criteria determining the constitutionality of any emergency action, that is, the basic 
organisational principles of a written constitution. 102  Thus, when speaking of legal 
authorisation, he did not merely speak of a positive law, but also of principles inherent in it. 
Kelsen believed that a liberal democratic constitution facilitates the strict legal interpretation 
and application of emergency powers in the PCLD. 103  It also helps set liberal 
constitutionalism—including the respect-to-rights principle, notably the rights to liberty and 
autonomy, freedom of expression and political participation, and the essence of political 
compromise (pluralism and broadmindedness)—as the organizational principle of the 
constitution and ‘intangible limits’ constraining the use of such powers.104 Moreover, officials 
legally authorised to implement emergency measures are required by this type of constitution 
to adhere to the proportionality principle, in that, they must be applied in accordance with the 
objective of the higher norms, and in such a way that they can resolve a public emergency 
without causing excessively onerous effect on individuals.105  
 Overall, Kelsen’s PoA parallels Gross and Ní Aoláin’s legislative accommodation 
model of constitutional emergencies which is premised upon two basic assumptions. First, it 
emphasises the separation between normalcy and exception—emergency measures must be 
distinguished from ordinary legal rule. 106  Secondly, it rests on ‘the assumption of 
constitutionality’ according to which ‘whatever responses are made to the challenges of a 
particular exigency, such responses are to be found and limited within the confines of the 
constitution’.107 
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  5.2.2 The constitutional court as the guardian of the politics of reconciliation    
 To ensure full and practical compliance of emergency powers, especially those 
‘immediate to the constitution’, with a liberal democratic constitution, Kelsen further supported 
the internalisation of constitutional review of Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution by a 
centralised constitutional court. Put more theoretically, he regarded a constitutional court as 
the guardian of liberal constitutionalism and the politics of reconciliation as its key function is 
to ensure that emergency powers in the PCLD are not applied to subvert ‘the institutional room 
for … mutual respect without committing us to epistemic abstinence and curtailment of public 
debate.’108 This thesis is based on the following theoretical ideas. First, it is naïve to expect the 
legislature or the executive to invalidate an emergency law they themselves have created.109 
This mirrors Kelsen’s strong support for separating the political branches of the government 
from the judiciary. Judicial impartiality and independence are key instruments, allowing the 
constitutional court to police the aforesaid full compliance. 110  Yet, and secondly, Kelsen 
applied his PTL to indicate the impossibility of a sharp separation between legal and political 
decisions and between adjudication and legislation. Seeing legal ‘ought’ as a frame, every 
judicial decision rendered by the constitutional court, which also constitutes the making of legal 
norms, is discretionary and political.111 Due to such inseparability, Kelsen therefore justified 
the judicialisation of politics, that is, the ‘reliance on courts and judicial means for addressing 
… political controversies’, by denying that the role of the constitutional court in policing the 
constitutionality of emergency powers in the PCLD constitutes the encroachment upon the 
realm of politics.112  
 For Kelsen, the Preussenschlag decree exemplified how an emergency power was 
exploited during the PCLD to eliminate the principle of liberal democracy. It deprived the 
government of the Prussian state of its democratic functions, and replaced them with the 
authority not democratically chosen by/from and answerable to the populace, thus inaugurating 
an authoritarian turn.113 Furthermore, the Preussenschlag decision reflected the court’s failure 
to adopt the principle of proportionality to examine whether the emergency measure employed 
by the Federal government exceeded what counted as necessary to resolve the political 
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turmoil.114 By upholding the constitutionality of the Preussenschlag decree yet recognising its 
potential constraint, Kelsen also criticised the Staatsgerichtshof for oscillating ‘between 
formulations that give a wholly unfettered discretion to the president and formulations that 
seek, to a greater or lesser degree, to limit that discretion.’115 Put another way, in his view, this 
confusing outcome would not have happened, if a full-time constitutional court had been 
established in Weimar. Besides, Kelsen thought that Article 48 itself reflected the legal-
technical deficiency of such a constitution given that it contained ‘a legal space that is 
obviously too narrow’ due to the presence of its ambiguous wording which granted the 
Reichspräsident a wide discretion, notably ‘public order/security’, without providing any clear 
criteria for their interpretation.116  Apart from a ‘defective’ emergency decree such as the 
Preussenschlag decree, Kelsen suggested bestowing upon a constitutional court an authority 
to issue a cassation order against acts proclaiming to be the exercise of sovereign decisions 
which abolished liberal democratic constitutionalism as they are also ‘acts immediate to the 
constitution’.117   
5.3 Schmitt’s sovereign authority: the anti-liberal realist model 
 Against Kelsen, Schmitt saw the iron cage of liberal constitutionalism and political 
romanticism as unconstitutional, and therefore the source of the PCLD, given that they induce 
a pluralist fragmentation imperilling the political unity of the state. Embracing the radical EoC, 
he supported the extensive use of Article 48, including the enactment of the Preussenschlag 
decree, and sought to deal with the AoH associated with emergency powers in the PCLD by 
advocating the elimination of threats to political unity, especially through such powers 
themselves. However, to understand Schmitt’s politics of exclusion, his theory of law must be 
first explained. 
  5.3.1 Schmitt’s Three Types of Juristic Thought: prioritising concrete 
factuality over abstract validity  
 In general, Schmitt’s theory of law comprises three elements—normativism, 
decisionism, and the concrete-order thinking. For him, by viewing legal norms merely from 
the perspective of normativism, that is, as a sum of impersonal norms which impose limits on 
the exercise of state authority, Kelsen misconceived their character.118 As already mentioned, 
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Schmitt attacked the EoR underlying the PTL for turning law into a pre-ordained, technical 
apparatus functioning merely to describe factuality, and eventually equating it with lifeless 
statutes.119 More precisely, he asserted that emergency provisions are, in reality, simply ‘a fig 
leaf of legal justification’ for any invocation of ‘sheer powers’ by the executive, while, on the 
flip side, rigid and ex ante legal constraints prevent state officials from resorting to intrinsically 
necessary, but not legally prescribed, means for preventing the collapse of a concrete order.120 
He instead advocated ‘mobilization of the forces of ‘life’—the power of political facts and 
historical ideas over the sober, rational, often seemingly shallow technicality of positivism.’121 
Put simply, Schmitt challenged Kelsen’s PTL, notably its strict separation between cognition 
and value when describing law, by including two other elements—decisionism and concrete 
order.  
 According to Schmitt, law qua decisionism connotes ‘a decision on the political form 
of the state’, including a measure and an executive decree, i.e., ‘as a matter of political and 
social forces’ unconstrained by legal statutes.122 Unlike Weber who, as a liberal, strove to 
balance the EoC with the EoR (i.e., the legal-rational authority and bureaucracy), Schmitt 
however combined Weber’s idea of plebiscitary leadership (i.e., a charismatic president 
directly elected by the people) with Sieyès’s notion of constituent power—the power of the 
unified collectivity of the people to create the constitution.123 Schmitt also supplemented his 
radical version of the EoC with Hobbes’s Leviathan—a strong state capable of imposing peace 
within a polity by bringing its members out of chaos.124 He saw the state’s ability to protect the 
aforesaid collectivity as vital—‘if [such] protection ceases the state too ceases’.125 In brief, to 
cope effectively with an exceptional political situation, he advocated legislative power united 
and even subsumed by its executive alternative.126  In other words, although, like Kelsen, 
Schmitt recognised the state’s role in protecting individuals, the latter took a contrary position 
as, for him, the liberal approach inherent in the PTL implies ‘that individuals gain protection 
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from the state but escape the responsibilities they should have towards the state.’127 Thus, by 
giving priority to the state over its subjects, individual rights and freedoms, and even liberal 
democracy, can be extensively compromised and suspended during a political crisis in order to 
protect political unity.128  
 Prioritising ‘concrete factuality’ and ‘an authoritarian interventionist state’ over 
‘abstract validity’, Schmitt recrafted Weber’s plebiscitary leader into the sovereign capable of 
setting normativism aside in an emergency and political crisis especially one created by 
pluralism entailed by liberalism.129 Combining plebiscitary leadership with constituent power, 
Schmitt’s sovereign is however a mere representative and delegate of the true sovereign—the 
sovereign people standing prior to a written constitution, and thus constituting the unity of a 
state which is the ultimate concrete order understood as the constitution in the absolute sense.130 
The sovereign is entrusted by the sovereign people to release the latter from the iron cage in 
times of crises by using modern ideas, notably the concepts of a modern state and democracy.131 
Such authority is premised on the ability to ‘represent the invisible’, i.e., the unity of the 
people.132 As the embodiment of political unity, the sovereign is then capable of making the 
following legal and legitimate decisions in the name of the state, namely: (a) whether a situation 
counts as the PCLD; and (b) whether emergency powers should be invoked to resolve it.133  
 This stance of decisionism leads to the (mis-)conclusion by some liberal scholars such 
as Dyzenhaus, Greene, and Kennedy that Schmitt preferred placing emergency powers outside 
the law. 134  Gross and Ramraj even conclude that Schmitt advocated the total divorce of 
emergency powers and the legal order.135 By contrast, Agamben argues that Schmitt strove to 
place the sovereign’s decisions within the juridical order because he tied them to ‘the problem 
of the SoE’ or an extreme emergency situation which raises the question of whether the 
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constitution should be suspended to resolve this problem, thus defining ‘the threshold of the 
law’.136 Notwithstanding their different views on the relation between the sovereign and the 
juridical order, these scholars however all think that the invocation of emergency powers in the 
PCLD in Schmitt’s view does not stem from law, but is a pure political matter. They 
accordingly fail to distinguish between the liberal and concrete order perspective of law, or 
more precisely, between the legitimacy of legality and the legitimacy of law. Schmitt had 
recognised this distinction in his justification for the Preussenschlag decree where he sought 
to derive the legality of emergency decisions from the existential unity of the people, but clearly 
used the term ‘concrete order’ in his On the Three Types of Juristic Thought published in 1934.  
 For Schmitt, emergency decisions which contravene constitutional/legal provisions do 
not stem from nothingness or a political vacuum, but from the institution qua the concrete-
order thinking which connotes ‘a standardized conduct that the members of a social group … 
[expect] to maintain’ as the ethos of that society.137 From the perspective of this concrete-order 
thinking, ‘extra-normative’ emergency powers are therefore not ‘extra-legal’.138 In his view, 
the state qua the unity/homogeneity of the sovereign people is the ultimate concrete order and 
its legal substance—an institution which must be stabilised and protected to ensure the security 
and continuity of a communitarian life.139 Put simply, the decisions mentioned deriving their 
authority from law qua the concrete order then function as ‘the custodian of social reality and 
as a condition of possibility for institutions to subsist and flourish.’140 They are therefore a 
selective tool that excludes practices considered to threaten the survival of the state.141  
  5.3.2 The HoS as the guardian of the politics of exclusion 
 As we have seen, Schmitt connected democracy with Weber’s plebiscitary leadership, 
or more precisely, dictatorship, and accordingly replaced liberal pluralism with the concept of 
the political (‘CoP’), which concerns how politics within the state is defined. Here, the 
distinction of political friends from enemies is the core basis for his concrete-order thinking 
which constitutes the political unity of the state qua the situation of normality and, in turn, 
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defines the CoP. 142  The two concepts together presuppose the democratic conception of 
equality and the existential concept of constitution.143 Under the democratic conception of 
equality, a genuine equality does not lie within an equal right to political participation. Instead, 
insofar as everyone holds ‘a similar quality of belonging to a demos’, they are all genuinely 
equal. 144  Meanwhile, for Schmitt, Kelsen relativised the constitution by treating every 
provision of a written constitution as a constitutional provision, and was therefore unable to 
explain the substantive task of the constitution, that is, in terms of the inherent homogeneous 
quality of the people.145 Ultimately, we can describe Schmitt’s version of democracy qua 
homogeneity as the identitarian version of democracy, according to which the aforesaid 
homogeneous quality helps bind the people as one, and therefore fosters the unified will of the 
people—the community of friends or the state—as distinct from their political enemies, which 
represents the genuine and existential constitution or the constitution in the absolute sense.146 
 For Schmitt, political enemies are ‘public enemies’ posing threats to the homogeneity 
of a state classified as an emergency.147 This notion therefore links political unity and the 
existential constitution of a state with ‘the jus belli, i.e., the real possibility of deciding in a 
concrete situation upon the enemy and the ability to fight him with the power emanating from 
the entity.’148 Overall, two types of political enemies exist for Schmitt. The first type is an 
enemy in the institutional sense which concerns a regime or structure to be opposed. As a 
reactionary conservative, Schmitt deemed liberal pluralism to be an enemy in this sense. Given 
its preference for dehumanised legality, openness, and equal opportunity, he saw this regime 
as inviting antagonisms among self-interested, egotistic, politicians—leading to disagreements, 
crises and eventually disunity, yet, limits the state’s factual authority necessary for protecting 
itself from such fragmentation.149  It even leaves open the possibility that emergency legislation 
is exploited by enemies in the second sense to subvert a concrete order. The second type of 
enemy is an enemy in the concrete sense which concerns ‘the others’ or ‘the strangers’, that is, 
a collectivity of people holding substantive qualities, including a political ideology, posing a 
threat to the homogeneous medium and therefore the continuity of a homogeneous political 
                                                          
 142 Mariano Croce and Andrea Salvatore, ‘Ethical Substance and the Coexistence of Normative Orders’ 
(2007) 36 J. Leg. Plur. 1, p 5; Schmitt, The CoP, pp 114, 116.  
 143 Schmitt, Three types, pp 78-79, 88. 
 144 Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, p 258. 
 145 Ibid, pp 4-5. 
 146 Ibid, pp 59-64, 382. 
 147 Schmitt, The CoP, pp 27-28, 34, 38, 71. 
 148 Ibid, p 45 (emphasis added). 
 149 Dyzenhaus, ‘Legal Theory’, p 125. 
29 
 
unity.150 This second sense, to an anti-liberal like Schmitt, encompasses pro-democracy or 
other leftist movements.151 Connecting the friend-enemy dichotomy with his anti-political 
romanticism, the term ‘the people’, for Schmitt, does not connote ‘active reasonable citizenry’ 
possessing, in principle, untrammelled freedoms, but instead refers to ‘passive people’ who 
hold the obligation not to exercise ‘their right to resistance’ against the state.152 Consequently, 
anyone questioning state authority implicitly declares himself as an enemy.153   
 Importantly, to Schmitt, this idea of political homogeneity helps tackle the AoH 
associated with emergency powers in the PCLD on a more permanent footing. He denied the 
jurisprudence of the Staatsgerichtshof in the Preussenschlag case, or more generally, the PoA 
on two main grounds. At the outset, by subsuming the concept of crisis, which is 
‘unpredictable’ by nature under legal jurisdiction, Schmitt believed that this would embroil a 
constitutional court in making political decisions, a function different from the application of 
legal norms, thus resulting in the politicisation of the judiciary, violating the separation of 
powers.154  Meanwhile, Schmitt’s second arguments against Kelsen are premised on their 
different conceptions of democracy and constitution. The attempt to reconcile the AoH under 
the umbrella of liberal democracy clearly perpetuates a pluralistic disintegration.155 Besides, 
by supporting a constitutional court’s role in making political decisions related to the PCLD, 
which concerns the survival of a social order as a whole, Schmitt indirectly criticised Kelsen’s 
approach for letting a legal organ, which does not represent the unity of the people, usurp the 
constituent power. 156  To ensure this unified will, Schmitt advocated emergency powers 
wielded by the sovereign to distinguish friends from enemies. Regarding the people as the true 
sovereign in a modern, disenchanted society, the remaining question is who Schmitt regarded 
as its representative.  
 As I briefly mentioned, Schmitt regarded the HoS, the Weimar Reichspräsident, as the 
guardian of the constitution—a status which constitutes the basis for bolstering their sovereign 
authority—given the quality of a pouvoir neutre, i.e., the quality of one who stands above party 
politics in Parliament.157 However, he did not speak of the guardian of the constitution as the 
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guardian of liberal constitutionalism, but the Reichspräsident as the guardian of political 
homogeneity.158 For him, the Reichspräsident was a pouvoir neutre due to three main qualities: 
neutrality, stability and democratic mandate. Initially, the Reichspräsident was neutral with 
respect to party politics as he was not an MP or derived his power from the Reichstag.159 Nor 
was his status as the HoS terminated by dissolution of Parliament.160 Nevertheless, although he 
was independent from parliamentary party politics, he did not have ‘non-political political 
independence’ as his constitutional authority was based on his capacity to embody the people 
qua political friends.161 The German Reichspräsident could claim the latter capacity because 
he was directly elected.162  
 Applying the above qualities, Schmitt turned the guardian into the sovereign who 
embodies the homogeneity of the people.163 Although the Reichspräsident was directly elected 
by the people, the friend-enemy dichotomy, as mentioned earlier, limits the role of the people 
merely to acclaiming the president. Schmitt later radicalised this thesis after Hitler rose to 
power. Rather than underlining ‘direct election’, he more rigorously emphasised the 
homogeneous people’s acclamation as the basis of the Führer’s sovereign authority.164  This 
radical turn was used to justify Hitler’s murders and other suppressions of non-Nazi 
conservatives, communists, Jews, and social democrats through emergency powers together 
with the total abolition of the fictions of liberal democracy in Weimar after the Preussenschlag, 
as sovereign decisions necessary for defending national homogeneity.165 Notwithstanding such 
radicalisation, Schmitt maintained his conclusion that political exclusion through sovereign 
authority is essential for resolving the AoH associated with emergency powers in the PCLD 
given its aim of ensuring the homogeneity of friends by excluding political enemies, in 
particular, liberal democracy which intensifies the AoH and individuals who oppose 
substantive merits of state authority, including emergency powers.166  
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6. Key theoretical assumptions and asymmetry in Kelsen’s and Schmitt’s models 
 Having described the contours of the Kelsenian and Schmittian constitutional 
emergency models, our next task is to identify the assumptions underlying both. I do so 
primarily by reconsidering the methodology employed by Kelsen and Schmitt to construct their 
arguments. Understanding these assumptions is important for identifying the asymmetry 
inherent in the Kelsen-Schmitt debate. 
6.1 The assumptions underpinning the PoA 
 As obvious, Kelsen constructed his constitutional emergency model by combining his 
PTL and his political writings on liberal democracy, using them to contest Schmitt’s sovereign 
decisionism and his CoP. However, this ‘antagonistic’ methodology rests on a much more 
profound institutional structure and ethos than appears on the surface. I argue that the synthetic 
reading of Kelsen’s theories, which may be applied to construct the PoA, reflects the 
paradoxical relationship between his positions as a legal and political scientist. As a legal 
theorist, Kelsen intended the PTL to be a general theory of legal authority applicable to every 
political regime.167  Yet, as a pro-democracy theorist, this theory is relative given that he 
preferred liberal democracy to autocracy in realising the identity thesis and therefore the PoA. 
It is only through a comprehensive understanding of such a paradox that we can identify 
assumptions underlying Kelsen’s PoA and comprehend why they need to be presupposed. This 
requires us to shift our reconsideration of Kelsen’s grundnorm from the issue of its 
transcendental status as do most scholars to that of its application in reality in the context of 
emergency powers in the PCLD.168 
 According to the PTL, the grundnorm provides rules governing the making and the 
objective validity of lower-level legal norms, and unites them under a unified legal system.169 
Underlining a strict ‘law-politics’ separation, Kelsen therefore regarded the grundnorm and 
other lower-level legal norms as ‘a frame’ to be filled by ‘politics’.170 Regarding the basic norm 
as a hypothetical norm/a form of thought, it is then for the supreme positive law—the written 
constitution—to express a state’s formal governing regime, which can be either democratic or 
autocratic.171 The PTL however is not concerned with why a particular regime is chosen, and 
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how it is established, which are political matters by nature. It is through this approach that 
Kelsen, as a jurist, crafted his general theory of law/legal authority.  
 Due to the aforesaid separation, emergency legislation containing authoritarian 
elements is still valid under the PTL, if prescribed in accordance with higher-level legal 
norms.172 This approach, in effect, also recognises the validity of an authoritarian military coup, 
if it successfully overthrows an incumbent basic norm and establishes a new one and therefore 
a new legal order which are, by and large, effective.173 Dyzenhaus and Caldwell accordingly 
share with Schmitt that Kelsen’s grundnorm confuses the relation between 
normativism/positivism and decisionism/realism, in that, while it is interpreted as the ultimate 
point of legal imputation, the content of such a norm itself is determined by a fact.174 This 
Kelsenian approach would then fail to prevent the Preussenschlag and the later Nazis takeover 
due to its inability to distinguish qualitatively between the legal order of liberal democracy and 
that of autocracy since the choice of a political regime is a political decision unanswerable by 
reference to law.175  
  Here, a conflict between Caldwell’s and Dyzenhaus’s comments on the one hand and 
Kelsen’s attempt to defend his PTL as a general legal theory on the other leads to two radical 
suppositions. Adopting the former, political relativism as advocated by Kelsen would be 
merely assumed as the worm in his apple rather than a useful means for reconciling the AoH 
associated with emergency powers in the PCLD. However, if reading the PTL in tandem with 
its political alternative in such a way that liberal democracy is seen as an ultimate value and 
end, this would obviously run counter to Kelsen’s intention to create a general theory of law. 
The synthetic reading of Kelsen’s legal and political theories, I argue, makes most sense if it is 
understood as the balance between the two readings, and only through such a balance can we 
identify the assumptions the PoA presupposes and why.  
 Given that we cannot avoid conceding that the choice of a political regime and how 
emergency authority should be structured are political matters, what I instead propose is the 
need stringently to recapture the distinction between a defective regime and an ideal one—
between Kelsen’s distaste and what he anticipated. An autocratic legal system and authoritarian 
coups establishing such a system should be read with reference to Kelsen’s theory as a 
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downside of the failure to respect the identity thesis.176 They connote ‘defective instances’ that 
a legal system is exploited/overthrown to subvert ‘the claim to obedience on the basis of a 
claim to legality.’177 However, though regarding liberal democracy a necessary condition for 
enabling the PoA to flourish, a strict ‘is-ought’ separation prevents Kelsen from elaborating in 
his legal theory the political conditions which facilitate liberal constitutionalism. Owing to this 
limit, he then had to make the following assumptions.  
 As mentioned, for Kelsen, the identity thesis is a focal point of his whole project.  He 
had to assume that emergency officials accept that any exercises of emergency powers or of 
state authority related to such powers can only be justified by a commitment to democratic 
constitutionality. Without ‘the normative priority of legality’s autonomous value’ or ‘the 
legitimacy of legality’ and the belief in ‘democratic values’ notably pluralism, tolerance and 
broadmindedness, the PoA is fictitious.178 The ‘is-ought’ separation further means that he, as 
in his lucid comment on the Preussenschlag decision, had to presume the ‘technical 
sufficiency’, that is, a democratic constitution which includes the unambiguous conditions for 
limiting rights and freedoms, in particular, those necessary for democratic politics mentioned 
earlier, which establishes an independent constitutional court with full competence to quash 
any emergency action undermining liberal democracy. 179  Yet, given that constitutional 
conflicts concern the judicialisation of politics and affect pluralistic interests within society, 
judicial independence, for Kelsen, does not mean the total separation of the appointment of 
judges from politics. Instead, he maintained that Parliament, political parties and the executive 
should compete for nominating and selecting constitutional court judges, seeing this as part of 
building compromise and preventing ‘authoritarianism’ within society. 180  Kelsen also 
presumed that constitutional court judges understand their role as guardians of the constitution. 
That is, they are expected to take a robust stance in rejecting legally unbounded emergency 
discretion, and to defend liberal democracy by taking the restrictive interpretation of 
emergency action bearing in mind the primacy of individual freedom over its restriction, yet, 
are simultaneously required not to stray into the realm of policy-making by replacing executive 
discretions with their own.181 By ruling that the Preussenschlag decree was justified as a means 
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to restore public order, yet, could not be exploited permanently to compromise the Prussian 
state’s autonomy, Kelsen criticised the Staatsgerichtshof for failing to meet this expectation as 
the judges left the opportunity for the exercise of a wholly unfettered discretion by the Prussian 
commissioner. 182 
 Overall, the successful implementation of the PoA assumes a stable, entrenched 
democracy, with liberal-democratic institutions, a commitment to liberal democratic 
constitutionalism and political compromise among competing political interests as its dominant 
culture and ethos. 
6.2 The assumptions underpinning Schmitt’s preferred model 
 As discussed, Schmitt’s constitutional emergency model combines sovereign authority, 
in particular, the SoE, with the CoP. He intended permanently to sustain the friend-enemy 
dichotomy in order to facilitate the sovereign’s emergency powers to suppress its enemies and 
create a pacified political unity. However, as in the case of Kelsen, we should be careful when 
approaching this issue. Schmitt linked the terms ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’ generally to ‘a 
substantial sameness of themes or issues having a political significance.’183 In other words, 
they are concerned with ‘a homogeneity from the perspective of one crucial point that 
constructs political identity and provides the basis for order’, thus still leaving some space for 
pluralism.184 The friend-enemy dichotomy, to Schmitt, is then a basis on which all political 
action and motives are based.185 Thus, these terms neither concern the ‘intrinsic political ideal’, 
that is, why or for what political reason particular individuals commit themselves to a 
‘homogeneous medium’, nor are they specifically affiliated with a particular political 
regime.186 Yet, as a staunch anti-liberal, he connected them with the state, and strove to apply 
the CoP to undermine liberal parliamentary democracy. Like Kelsen, he then had to distinguish 
between the ideal and defective regime. 
 Clearly, for Schmitt, liberal democracy is defective. From the perspective of the CoP, 
it is defective because the type of homogeneity it entails is that of ‘market-oriented egotistic 
and hedonistic human beings’.187 Such homogeneity is self-destructive because it results in 
political romanticism and ‘a turn towards the total state’, having equated a state’s general will 
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with mere competing antagonisms among self-interested, egotistic party interests entering 
politics for private gain. 188  Nevertheless, to Schmitt, liberal democracy is also self-
contradictory given that where it regards autocracy as its opposition, attaching elements of 
‘political’ and ‘sovereign decisionism’ to liberal democracy to enable it to assert its own truth, 
it contradicts the liberal ethos of compromise and reconciliation.189 Put simply, he believed that 
liberal democracy in Weimar failed because it ‘[shuttled] back and forth between these [two] 
alternatives.’ 190 Moreover, while Kelsen retained his faith in the ability of ‘normativism’ to 
constrain emergency powers and of the Constitutional Court to reconcile the AoH associated 
with them in the PCLD, the realisation of Schmitt’s model rests on the assumption that a 
normatively-bound response to emergency powers hampers the use of extra-normative 
measures necessary for resolving the PCLD and presupposed the politicisation of the judiciary.  
 Regarding political romanticism as the source of the PCLD and given his scepticism 
about the normatively-bound response to emergency powers and the politicisation of the 
judiciary, the initial presumptions underlying Schmitt’s thesis are therefore the presupposition 
of the political and the view that politics has to perpetually engage in jus belli given that any 
liberal effort to make it peaceful and safe would ultimately result in ‘a turn towards the total 
state’.191 Yet, as  this would constitute the antithesis of liberal democracy, the meaningful 
implementation of his theory has also to presume the presence of concrete media, notably 
ideology, myth, and belief, which help construct ‘an anti-liberal democracy based upon 
homogeneity directed by a dictatorial power’, also defining who belongs to such a group and 
who are to be excluded. 192  In reality, Schmitt’s presumptions were fully and forcefully 
actualised by the Nazis, and he opted for Hitler rather than the chaos he believed stemmed from 
Weimar’s liberal and parliamentary fictions.193   
  6.3 Individualism/collectivism, scepticism, and hostility: the Weberian 
straight-line and the theoretical asymmetry in the Kelsen-Schmitt debate 
 Now, to identify the asymmetry inherent in the Kelsen-Schmitt debate, I have to 
conclude the connection between the above assumptions underlying their theses and the basis 
of each constitutional emergency model—the ‘is-ought’ distinction. Apparently, the above 
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assumptions reflect the instrumental role of the grundnorm and the CoP in determining the 
relation between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ together in each constitutional emergency model. 
 On the level of authority ‘is’, the grundnorm ensures that emergency norms are abstract 
entities within the ideal realm of legal ‘ought’, thus only created by legally-authorised officials 
and deriving their validity from a higher-level norm. Kelsen believed that by conceiving legal 
‘ought’ as the category of imputation, emergency authority in the PCLD is committed to the 
identity thesis. On the other hand, the CoP is premised on concrete-order thinking, and 
embodies the closed, self-referential system of politics, thus ultimately functioning to replace 
the Kelsenian version of the ‘is-ought’ distinction with ‘is’ and ‘not-is’ (i.e., the friend-enemy 
dichotomy).194  
 In a broader perspective, it follows that both the aforesaid ‘is-ought’ separation and 
fusion are based on value ‘ought’—the liberal-democratic and anti-liberal value espoused by 
Kelsen and Schmitt respectively. The grundnorm and the CoP are the transcendental category 
qua the channel through which the preferred value of the closed, self-referential system is 
presupposed. Accordingly, the realisation of the PoA and the anti-liberal realist model is 
grounded in what I call the Weberian straight-line, that is, Weber’s distinction between 
ideological goal (value ‘ought’) and means to realise it (‘is’) which comprises two elements—
authority and interest. As discussed in Section 2, the imposition of state authority, according to 
Weber, involves the straight-line, that is, the endorsement or rejection of value which exists 
because an interest in a particular object exists. The presumption of the value that makes 
Kelsen’s PoA and Schmitt’s realist model effective, put simply, is then derived from an interest 
or disinterest in liberal constitutionalism and democracy.  
 From the above, I speak of Kelsen and Schmitt qua jurists/theorists. In this capacity, to 
repeat, both scholars embraced Weberian instrumental rationality, and each developed and 
defended their own line of arguments and assumptions and considered them an appropriate 
legal and political basis for the use of emergency powers in the PCLD in the Weimar Republic. 
Their positions, I argue, can therefore be explained through the normative perspectives— 
individualism/collectivism, scepticism, and hostility. I modify the two latter terms used by 
Steven Greer to identify contemporary normative perspectives on human rights.195 
 Since Kelsen believed that ex ante legal authorisation and philosophical relativism 
which presume individuals as equal and rational beings whose rights and freedoms help prevent 
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absolutism and realise the politics of compromise, I consider this Kelsenian project 
individualist. This normative perspective reflects an idealistic endorsement as the realisation 
of the PoA depends on valuing ‘the normative priority of legality’s autonomous value’ and ‘the 
politics of reconciliation’ which assumes an individual as ‘the creator of his world’, and, on 
the flip side, adopts the stances of scepticism and hostility towards autocracy.  
 By contrast, Schmitt’s attitude towards the relationship between liberal democracy and 
constitutionalism shifts from scepticism to hostility, that is, from their ‘partial endorsement’ to 
‘total rejection’. I use the term ‘shift’ because Schmitt, on the one hand, did not totally reject 
‘the basic organisational structure’ of liberalism, notably the modern state, popular sovereignty, 
the concept of the constitution, per se, but sought to reinterpret them ultimately to serve his 
anti-liberal realist project. As Seitzer describes, his technique symbolises ‘a neutron bomb 
which destroys life but leaves untouched the structures that house it.’196 On the flip side, this 
shift simultaneously reflects its own version of collectivism, i.e., that the realisation of the anti-
liberal realist ideology requires valuing it based on ‘disinterest’ in liberal democracy and the 
radical form of communitarianism, namely the CoP).197 
 Nevertheless, the Kelsen-Schmitt debate also represents raw conflicting interests and 
values (both material and symbolic) in the PCLD between those denying and advocating liberal 
ideal. In case of the Preussenschlag, their arguments provided a theoretical support for the 
Prussian social democrat government (Kelsen) and von Papen’s emergency decree (Schmitt). 
This eventually results in the theoretical asymmetry between ‘Kelsen and Schmitt as 
jurists/theorists’ and ‘Kelsen and Schmitt as representatives of raw conflicting interests’. The 
former is static, while the latter is dynamic, in that, where the theoretical conflict connotes both 
jurists’ solitary adoption of the Weberian straight-line to refute each other’s arguments, its 
ideological alternative reflects the contestation and collision between liberal and anti-liberal 
views on law and politics. It is hardly possible that supporters of each constitutional emergency 
model would fully endorse its opposite as the primary guiding line for the use of emergency 
powers. By adopting the Weberian straight-line to assert the legitimacy/superiority of their 
models, Kelsen and Schmitt did not address how and to what extent each of their own models 
should accommodate the presence of its opposite, including supporters of each.  
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7. The Kelsen-Schmitt debate in Thailand?  
 From the last section, the following conclusions can be further derived. Firstly, both the 
original Kelsen-Schmitt debate and contemporary commentaries are mainly centred on the role 
of Kelsen and Schmitt as jurists/theorists, thus largely failing to address the problem of the 
theoretical asymmetry I assessed earlier. Secondly, it is also obvious that Kelsen’s 
constitutional emergency model is premised on the dominance of liberalism and Enlightenment 
rationality, while its Schmittian counterpart seeks to challenge them. As jurists/theorists, each 
however asserted the superiority of his own theories. Given the rise of authoritarianism in 
Weimar, especially in the 1930s, and the Nazi takeover, it appears that Kelsen, by adopting the 
Weberian instrumental rationality to defend his arguments, was unable to acknowledge the 
inferiority of his liberal model. In this thesis, I extend the analysis of the Kelsen-Schmitt debate 
beyond the scope of these limits and those of the Weimar experience illustrated by lessons from 
emergency powers in the PCLD in post-absolutist Thailand. 
7.1 From Weimar to Thailand 
 Just as in Weimar, Thai democracy is deeply unstable. More importantly, Thailand’s 
turbulent politics, resulting in the use of emergency powers, reflects the application of the 
Kelsenian and Schmittian competing conceptions of political authority and their relationship 
with society. In fact, given the hegemonic status quo of the right-wing conservatives, Thai 
politics, like Weimar, reflects the de facto dominance of Schmitt over Kelsen.  
 On the one hand, there are the attempts by some nobles, senior bureaucrats, and top 
military officials to preserve the Thai-ness tradition—the idea of the Buddhist nation embodied 
by the virtuous monarch qua the HoS—against the emergence of liberal forces, in particular, 
through coups and martial law, an approach which Schmitt was a staunch supporter. Although 
these emergency powers never led to civil war, from the perspective of the royalist-
conservative elites, the rise of liberal forces to a level that challenges Thai-ness was still 
regarded as a political crisis, typically justified as such in its coup announcement.198 Coup-
makers have further sought to discredit liberal democracy by citing political romanticism and 
the corruption it entails.199 
 By contrast, the Thai experience also reflects recurring demands for Kelsenian liberal 
constitutionalism, seeking to subject political competition and state authority, including 
emergency powers, to democratic constitutional laws/constraints. Kelsen’s theory was 
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explicitly adopted in the 1997 Constitution drafted after the mass uprising in 1992, notably his 
constitutional court model and his negative attitude towards extra-legality. 
 Yet, significant differences between the two contexts are also conspicuous, and can be 
addressed from two main angles—the dominance of Schmitt over Kelsen and the challenge 
against Schmitt by Kelsen. I will later apply these instances to construct the alternative 
normative perspective for reading Kelsen and Schmitt—the pragmatic hybrid—and conclude 
the binary-star conception of emergency powers. 
 Firstly, the drafting of the Weimar Constitution and the Kelsen-Schmitt debate took 
place in the modern European context in which liberalism and Enlightenment rationality 
constituted dominant lines of thought. 200  Committing to such predominance, the social 
democrats (the SPD) chose to resist the Preussenschlag decree by taking ‘the legal path’, that 
is, by asking the Staatsgerichtshof to grant an injunction rather than by resorting to violent 
means.201 Secondly, Weimar reflected an eventual overthrow of liberal democracy. Succeeding 
in purging the SPD in Prussia, a bastion of liberal democratic values, the Preussenschlag 
facilitated the Nazi takeover. Weimar’s downfall was simultaneously galvanised by the stab-
in-the-back myth mentioned in the Preface which prevented the rise of pro-democracy activists. 
Given such collapse, Dyzenhaus regards this as Schmitt’s professorial triumph over Kelsen.202  
 In contrast to Weimar and post-French Revolution Europe, we should primarily keep 
in mind that in Thailand, liberalism and Enlightenment rationality have never been 
predominant norms. Where the SPD committed to the liberal ethos to ensure Weimar’s 
survival, such a firm commitment is generally lacking, if not absent, in the Thai context. As I 
will show in Chapter 3, there were occasions that governments claiming to champion liberal 
democracy cited its protection to justify invoking authoritarian emergency statutory powers 
against political opponents. The Thai experience therefore reflects how the fulfilment of the 
PoA is compromised by the Schmittian logics, notably the radical legitimacy of law over that 
of legality. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the lack of a strong liberal culture, the Thai 
democratic experiment, though unstable for more than 85 years, is not a total failure. Although 
recurring royalist coups reveal the dominance of the Schmittian model, the permanent 
overthrow of liberal democracy and constitutonalism is hardly possible. As I will show later, 
the greater the division between the pro-democracy and the right-wing conservative factions is 
entrenched, the more these political actors are unable to resist the legitimacy of liberalism. Put 
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more theoretically, while Dyzenhaus observes that the collaspe of Weimar connotes Schmitt’s 
triumph over Kelsen, the Thai experience reveals the graver tension between ‘waning but still 
dominant’ traditional ‘Schmittian’ authority and ‘more legitimate but still weaker’ pro-liberal 
‘Kelsenian’ forces with, as yet, no absolute winner. Here, the latter also addresses the dificiency 
associated with Kelsen’s adoption of the Weberian instrumental rationality as it reflects how 
the rise of mass politics and political actors struggling in the real-world political arena help 
realise the ‘inferior but sturdier’ PoA.  
 Nevertheless, due to its turbulent politics, there may be ‘scepticism’ about the 
possibility of establishing a legal theory of emergency powers based on the Thai experience. 
Yet, the attempt has been made. Next, I examine literature attempting to theorise emergency 
powers in Thailand.  
7.2 Theorising emergency powers in Thailand? 
 In his chapter Emergency powers with a moustache, Andrew Harding mainly considers 
the theorisation of emergency powers in Thailand to be ‘highly problematical’ given its 
authoritarian/anti-liberal realist culture especially in security and emergency contexts which 
marginalises the intrinsic rationality of law. 203 As his chapter was finalised in 2008, he does 
not assess the problem/perception of ‘double standards’ with respect to the Constitutional 
Court’s subsequent intervention during the invocation of emergency powers by the Red 
government against the Yellow protesters which I will explain in Chapters 3 and 4. Such 
problem appears to further undermine the rationality of the law, especially its role in controlling 
emergency powers, as it is turned into a mere pawn in a political game.  
 Nevertheless, I argue that it is too crude to totally reject conceptualising the nature and 
use of emergency powers in the PCLD in Thailand. Explicitly, by thinking of 
law/constitutionalism beyond the context of its immanent rationality (state authority), my 
thesis is going to illustrate that the Thai exigencies reveal the tense relationship between it and 
the sphere of unreason (value-judgment), or more precisely, between law, politics, and society. 
This, arguably, reflects the struggles to enforce and undermine the mechanism for legally 
controlling emergency powers to achieve a factional political interest. And, it is from this 
perspective that I must turn to Victor Ramraj’s work as it reflects the most prominent attempt 
to theorise emergency powers in fledgling democracies through the lens of the Thai experience, 
recognising this as the emergency powers paradox (‘EPP’).  
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 Ramraj criticises some of contemporary works on emergency powers for limiting their 
studies to entrenched liberal regimes. In contrast to Harding, Ramraj recognises the possibility 
of theorising emergency powers through the lens of the limits of law/legality. He uses the Thai 
case as one example alongside those of Malaysia, Singapore, and Timor-Leste to theorise 
emergency powers in fledgling democracies. According to the EPP, where emergency powers 
are invoked in established rule-of-law states to ‘preserve constitutionalism’, they are more 
prone to function to ‘establish basic conditions of relative stability’ out of a political crisis in 
fledgling democracies such as Thailand than elsewhere where the main challenge remains how 
‘effective mechanisms’ for ensuring the accountability of such powers are to be created.204 As 
a liberal, Ramraj urges that only through the establishment of a liberal-democratic 
constitutional order, can abuses of emergency powers be prevented.205   To enhance such 
establishment in a society like Thailand, political struggles are un-avoidable.206 These two 
tasks of emergency powers are acknowledged by both Kelsen and Schmitt. Favouring the 
legislative accommodation model, Kelsen argued that the task of maintaining social order must 
respect the preservation of legality, while, for an anti-liberal realist like Schmitt, the former 
trumps the latter.  
 This PhD thesis is partially inspired by Ramraj’s above suggestion that it is possible to 
theorise emergency powers in Thailand from the perspective of the limit of law. The application 
of the Kelsen-Schmitt debate to the Thai context however exposes the flaw of the EPP, and 
provides an alternative theoretical understanding for studies on emergency powers. As a liberal, 
Ramraj values liberal constitutionalism over ‘Schmittian’ realism and ostensibly limits his 
study largely to the challenge of implementing liberal constitutionalism in emergencies in 
nascent democracies. 207 Accordingly, the EPP does not comprehensively assess the effects of 
‘the gravitational relation’ between the liberalisation process and the dominance of the 
‘Schmittian’ model on the use of emergency powers in the PCLD in Thailand. Besides, 
although Ramraj mentions the colour-coded crises in his work, his EPP is largely concerned 
with the cognition ‘is’ perspective, that is, with the imposition of state authority. It therefore 
fails to account for the conflicting views (value-judgment ‘ought’) on what counts as ‘the norm’ 
                                                          
 204 Victor V. Ramraj, ‘Constitutionalism and Emergency Powers’ in Clauspeter Hill and Jörg Menzel 
(eds), Constitutionalism in Southeast Asia (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung 2009), p 66; Ramraj, ‘EPP’, p 36. 
 205 Victor V. Ramraj, ‘Emergency Powers and Constitutional Theory’ (2011) 41 HKLJ 165, pp 194-196. 
 206 Ibid. I also assess his argument in Chapters 3 and 4. 
 207  Victor V. Ramraj, ‘Constitutional Tipping Points: Sustainable Constitutionalism in Theory and 
Practice’ (2010) 1 TLT 191, p 194. 
42 
 
and ‘the exception’ exposed by the PCLD. The synthesis of the Kelsen-Schmitt debate in the 
light of the Thai experience in this PhD thesis addresses all these deficiencies.  
 There are, however, other works concerning emergency powers in Thailand notably 
some LL.M. theses written in Thai, which I will assess in detail in Chapter 3. Nevertheless, 
these works do not consider the legal philosophies behind emergency powers, and how 
struggles for political power between the royalist-conservatives and the pro-democracy 
movements affect the nature and characteristics of Thailand’s emergency powers—a key issue 
which helps identify how the Kelsenian and Schmittian emergency models might be modified. 
My study attempts to fill these gaps. Chapters 2 and 3 will explore a historical perspective on 
the use of emergency powers in Thailand.   
  7.3 Beyond the Weberian instrumental rationality and dominant liberal 
democracy: theoretical framework for synthesising Kelsen and Schmitt 
 Overall, I argue that the Thai experience challenges the theoretical asymmetry inherent 
in the Kelsen-Schmitt original debate as it reflects how both models compete with each other 
with no absolute winner, and are accordingly forced to adapt themselves to accommodate each 
other. In contrast to the assumptions underlying Kelsen’s and Schmitt’s theses, there has been 
an absence of consensus on whether the Kelsenian approach or its Schmittian counterpart 
should constitute the hegemonic model for dealing with the AoH associated with this situation, 
in particular, after the occurrence of the colour-coded crises in 2006. There is also a greater 
tendency that emergency powers are imposed by those stigmatised as ‘public enemies’ against 
others declaring themselves to be members of ‘friends’ of the state.   
 As already indicated, the aim of this PhD thesis is to apply the Kelsen-Schmitt debate 
to the Thai context which, in turn, provides an opportunity for reassessing assumptions and 
elements in the original Kelsen-Schmitt debate. The Thai experience invites us to revisit and 
synthesise Kelsen’s and Schmitt’s theories of law and politics, and other key elements related 
to their application in the context of emergency powers in the PCLD, namely their competing 
conceptions of emergency authority, their debate on the scope of emergency powers in political 
crises, and their contrasting conceptions of legal and political accountability of the invocation 
and use of emergency powers together with the AoH. This also poses the question of how, and 
of so to what extent, the Thai experience suggests an alternative normative perspective for 
reading Kelsen and Schmitt based on the Weberian straight-line and, more specifically, a 
normative framework for comprehending them alternative to individualism/collectivism, 
scepticism, and hostility. 
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 My final task in this chapter is to conclude the theoretical framework for synthesising 
Kelsen and Schmitt to answer my research questions based on what I characterise as the 
internal and external perspective of the constitutional emergency model. These perspectives 
are constructed on the logic of the tension inherent in emergency powers in the PCLD—the 
tension between claim-right and justification-right.  
 On the one hand, the internal perspective connotes the imposition of each model or ‘its 
claim-right’, that is, the (re-)assertion of its legitimacy and authority. Based on this logic, given 
that Kelsen and Schmitt each were originally more preoccupied with justifying their own 
arguments, neither of them assessed the extent to which each model should be adapted to 
defend and reassert its political legitimacy/hegemony against the challenge posed by its 
opposing political model and movements. This internal perspective focuses on this deficiency, 
in particular, how the efforts to reassert each constitutional emergency model affect Kelsen’s 
and Schmitt’s divergent conceptions of institutions, including their competing views of the 
legitimacy of legality and the radical legitimacy of law, and what their parallel effects are.  
 By contrast, the external perspective of the constitutional emergency model signifies 
‘justification-right’ and therefore the issue of the AoH. It asks us to reconsider the application 
and justification of the two constitutional emergency models in the context of the AoH bred by 
the direct ideological and physical collision between liberal and right-wing conservative 
movements and between the attempts to reassert the political legitimacy of the Kelsenian 
approach and of its Schmittian counterpart against each other with no absolute winner. Again, 
the adoption of the purposive-rational/instrumental type of action prevents Kelsen and Schmitt 
from addressing these issues. Both scholars also did not anticipate the problem of ‘double 
standards’ as in Thailand, whereby the success and failure of particular emergency powers 
depend on ‘who’ invoke them. This external perspective suggests that we revisit the two 
scholars’ positions on (a) the norm-exception dichotomy, in particular, its relation with the 
AoH associated with the PCLD; (b) the authority, the accountability, and the SoE, notably its 
key characteristics; and (c) the ‘is-ought’ structure of their models, including the role of 








Chapter 2: Emergency Powers in Thailand in Historical Perspective 
1. Introduction 
 In this chapter, I mainly aim to describe the uses of emergency powers in the PCLD in 
post-1932 Thailand and identify some of their key general features. For more than 80 years, 
intermittent periods of political instability, which precipitated the use of emergency power, in 
post-absolutist Thailand have always been the same story only with different actors (see 
Appendix 2). This constitutional saṃsāra results in the cycle of coups and emergency powers 
to overthrow parliamentary democracy considered by royalist-conservatives as the source of 
the PCLD.208 An interim constitution is drafted, followed by a new permanent constitution 
restoring electoral politics. Civilian authority then challenges the Thai-ness establishment, 
which, in turn, precipitates another coup and emergency powers. In particular, in 2008, 2013, 
and 2014, emergency powers were invoked by the purported pro-democracy ‘Red’ faction 
against the right-wing ‘Yellow’ faction. However, although I primarily focus on post-absolutist 
Thailand, it is important to examine the traditional view of emergency powers through the lens 
of the country’s political history before 1932 in order to understand the resemblance between 
it and Schmitt’s idea of an existential constitution and the reasons for this Schmittian approach 
over its Kelsenian alternative. 
 The study of emergency powers in the PCLD in Thailand, I argue, has strictly to be 
based on the ‘cognition-ideal entities’ dichotomy, that is, the tension between ‘authority’ and 
‘value-judgment’ discussed in Chapter 1. From the ideal entities (‘ought’) perspective, the Thai 
experience reveals the competing notions of political legitimacy between the traditional form 
of authority—Thai-ness—and contending struggles for liberal constitutionalism and 
democracy, resulting in the PCLD and therefore uses of emergency powers by both the 
‘Yellow’ and ‘Red’ factions to preserve what each understands as ‘the norm’. This, in turn, 
leads to the second tension, from the cognitive (‘is’) perspective, that is, between the relentless 
attempts to maintain sovereign authority under the mantra of Thai-ness and the struggles to 
ensure compliance of emergency powers with liberal constitutionalism. 
 This chapter has three main parts. The first part explains emergency powers in the 
traditional Thai constitutional/political theory, in the pre-1932 period. Here I aim to elaborate 
the general contours of the traditional Thai constitutional/political theory, and to explain why 
it constitutes the hegemonic conception of political authority in Thailand. The next two 
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consider the application of emergency powers in Thailand’s PCLD pre-1997 and post-1997, 
i.e., during the colour-coded crises between 2006 and 2017. I argue that the Thai experience 
reflects a growing shift from contestation to collision between the Red and the Yellow ideas. 
On the one hand, the pre-1997 period revealed that the traditional elites were successful at least 
in applying modern technologies, in particular, the modern state, the notions of (formalistic) 
constitutionalism and (identitarian) democracy to institutionalise Thai-ness, but had at the same 
time more greatly to accommodate the presence of rising liberal demands. By contrast, I argue 
that due to greater modernisation and liberalisation, 21st century Thailand is experiencing a 
direct ideological and physical collision between the two conceptions of emergency authority 
and political stability together with the role hugely important of the masses in influencing the 
direction of emergency powers. This collision results on the lack of consensus on the 

























   Part 1: Emergency powers in traditional Thai constitutional/political 
theory 
 Like Schmitt, the Thai royalist-conservative elites have long adopted a negative attitude 
towards liberalism and parliamentary democracy, criticising commitment to state neutrality for 
inducing political romanticism, thus producing the ever-present risk of political crisis. These 
ideas later provided the basis for the ‘Yellow Shirts’ movements in 21st century Thailand. Here, 
I ask: What are the ‘key features’ of emergency powers in Thai constitutional/political history? 
To answer this question, I should begin by recalling that Schmitt primarily based his concept 
of sovereign authority not on mysticism, but on Weber’s plebiscitary leader—a charismatic 
leader whose authority rests on popular acclamation. Nevertheless, Schmitt’s support for a 
tangible, concrete authority further reminds us of another neglected Weberian type of 
personalistic authority—traditional—which might be rationalised and modernised and 
incorporated into Schmitt’s thesis.  
 Weber distinguished two types of ‘traditional authority’: (a) that under which the 
relationship between ruler and ruled is based on personal authority; and (b) that under which 
this relationship is also related to control over land, namely feudalism.209 My primary focus 
here is on the first type—patrimonialism. Under patrimonialism, the traditional master (in his 
public capacity), typically the king, stands at the pinnacle of a social pyramid, with his position 
of authority secured not primarily through a legal code, but through ‘piety for what actually, 
allegedly, or presumably has always existed’.210 Unlike Schmitt, who developed his theory 
from his Catholic beliefs and advocated the sovereign authority of a strong plebiscitary 
President, the traditional view of emergency powers in political crises in Thailand is based on 
the patrimonial concept of the Buddhist righteous king or the Dhammaraja.211 Despite such 
differences, each nevertheless emphasises a concrete, flesh and blood leader/HoS, who 
embodies the homogeneous communitarian will, a resemblance increasingly apparent 
especially after the rightist conservative constitutional approach developed in Thailand in the 
1930s, witnessed particularly after 1947 and, especially from 1958 onwards. 
 I begin this chapter by exploring the key features of the Dhammaraja tradition, 
followed by its adaptation to accommodate the process of modernisation between the late 1850s 
                                                          
 209 Weber, Economy, pp 226-237. 
 210 Weber, ‘The Social Psychology’, p 296. 
 211 However, in modern Thailand, the legal-rational and charismatic types of legitimacy also bolster the 
monarchy. Andrew Harding, ‘Buddhism, Human Rights and Constitutional Reform in Thailand’ (2007) 1 AsJCL 
1, p 2.   
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and 1932, before lastly concluding with the key features of emergency powers in more recent 
Thai constitutional/political history.  
2. The Dhammaraja tradition: the basis of political stability and authority in Thailand 
 The tradition of ‘benevolent ruler’ which constitutes the traditional concept of political 
authority is largely shaped by the Mon-Khmer civilisation. The Thais borrowed from the 
Cambodians (Khmers) the idea of Devaraja (the God-like king), an incarnation of Hindu deities 
who stands at the centre of the cosmological order, and is paid tribute by ‘lesser divinities’.212 
This tradition has also been endorsed by Theravada Buddhist teaching received from the Mons, 
making it more compatible with Thai culture.213 As a result, the Thai monarch even today is 
generally considered to be the Dhammaraja, ‘the father of the family-nation’, expected to reign 
in accordance with Dhamma (Buddhist teachings). 214  What follows from this is that the 
Dhammaraja is subsequently viewed as a good person (Khon Dee).215  The Dhammaraja 
tradition is further based on the fundamental Buddhist teaching of Karma, under which past 
and present intentional actions are presumed to cause future consequences. Notwithstanding 
our inability to know his personal moral quality, due to his position, the Thai monarch is 
presumed to have accumulated the highest degree of good Karma within the kingdom, while 
those associated with or working in the name of the king are also supposed to accumulate good 
Karma.216   
 Overall, the traditional concept of political authority reflects the key characteristic of 
Weber’s patrimonialism, in that, it is a product of a traditional belief in a stratified authority 
rather that in individualism and humanism.217 
3. From the Dhammaraja tradition to Thai-ness 
 During the reign of King Chulalongkorn (1868-1910), Bangkok faced a serious colonial 
threat as the British and French endeavoured to bring Siam (Thailand’s name before 1939) 
under their control, forcing him rapidly to modernise the country. Together with the king’s 
successful foreign policy, the modernisation project was key to preventing Thailand from being 
formally colonised by European powers. However, the intervention of such powers, though 
                                                          
 212 Frank Darling and Ann Darling, Thailand: The Modern Kingdom (Donald Moore 1971), p 82. 
 213 The Mons are ethnic minorities in Myanmar. David M. Engel, Law and Kingship in Thailand during 
the Reign of King Chulalongkorn (U-M 1975), pp 2-4. 
 214 Ibid; Dhani Nivat (Prince), ‘The Old Siamese Conception of the Monarchy’ (1947) 36 Journal of the 
Siam Society 91, pp 94-96. 
 215 Thak Chaloemtiarana, Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism (SEAP 2007), p 3. 
 216 Ibid, p 83; Jack Fong, ‘Sacred Nationalism: The Thai Monarchy and Primordial Nation Construction’ 
(2009) 39 JCA 673, p 688. 
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providing Siam with new technologies, increasingly fostered a mild version of xenophobia 
among its ruling elites, which still exists and affects resort to emergency powers in the PCLD.  
 Before the late 19th century, Bangkok was just a city that dominated other weaker semi-
autonomous city-states. The king realised that even though he, in theory, stood at the zenith of 
the medieval administrative system known as Sakdina, the semi-feudal system of Phrai (human 
labour), in reality, this weakened royal authority as it bestowed an ability to control manpower 
on the nobility (Nai), and, in turn, hindered the king from modernising his country.218 King 
Chulalongkorn accordingly based his modernisation project, known among Western scholars 
as ‘the Chakri Reformation’, on the ‘nation-state policy’.219 In the process, new European-style 
ministries were created to replace Sakdina, and to initiate modernisation from the centre across 
the Thai polity. A salaried bureaucracy replaced the personal links between Phrai and Nai, 
leading to the need for an increasing number of bureaucrats, while a Western-style judicial 
system and the idea of ‘positive law’ were espoused to consolidate King Chulalongkorn’s law-
making power, and became vital tools for implementing modernisation, including the 
establishment of a standing army, in ways that were legal, legitimate, and in accordance with 
Western standards.220  
 Furthermore, realising the need to create a standing army to defend the nation-state 
from internal and external threats, King Chulalongkorn promoted the Military Service Act 1905 
formally to replace Phrai with a Western military conscription system. Besides, the Slave 
Abolition Act completely abolished slaves in Siam in 1905. The Military Academy had 
previously been founded in 1897 but was restricted merely to noblemen. The new standing 
army was not only essential for securing the nation from external threats, but also and more 
importantly enabled the king to exert his authority over his subjects throughout the nation-
state.221 The creation of the standing army also significantly bolstered the ‘social status’ of the 
military, enabling it to play an influential and dominant role in Thai politics from the very 
beginning of Thailand’s modern history. 222 
 Notwithstanding his progressive policies, King Chulalongkorn was also a conservative, 
especially in political matters, who saw excessive adoption of Western culture as a threat to 
                                                          
 218 Under Sakdina, the king granted Phrai Som (an ordinary person) to nobles who also performed a role 
in supervising Phrai Luang (labour working for the king and the administrative units). Chris Baker and Pasuk 
Phongpaichit, A History of Thailand (3rd edn, CUP 2014), pp 41-42. 
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‘Thai identity’, including his absolute authority.223 Thus, to maintain monarchical absoluteness 
in the era of nation-state formation, he sought to transform the Dhammaraja into the 
embodiment of the modern Thai nation. 224  His son, King Vajiravudh (1910-1925), 
subsequently made the three pillars of Nation-Religion-Monarchy (‘the sacred trinity’) into 
official state ideology, which constitutes Thai-ness, political stability and unity, and to identify 
who holds sovereign authority.225 The sacred trinity functioned as a vital tool for ‘[directing] 
the people’s loyalty to [the throne] rather than the cultural geopolitical state’, and did not 
traditionally concern an expression of loyalty to legality.226  Also, Thai-ness has been an 
instrument for binding the military and bureaucrats (except the civilian and military cliques of 
the People’s Party) to the monarchy even nowadays. 
 Above all, modernisation in Thailand did not stem from a decline in traditional culture 
as in the West but was instead produced by traditional aristocrats. By focusing on growing 
bureaucratisation, Weber and Kelsen did not consider that an attempt might be made to 
refashion and rationalise traditionalism, as in Thailand, where Thai-ness was set as ‘[the] 
underlying conceptual commitments of the legal order.’227 As the sacred trinity became firmly 
entrenched as a part of the modernisation process in a relatively short time, it became difficult 
for modern state officials and ordinary people to totally discard it despite the eventual downfall 
of absolutism in 1932. As I will show, Thai-ness nevertheless remains vital for preserving the 
monarchy under the guise of parliamentary democracy. Having examined the key 
characteristics of this tradition, our next task is to link it with political stability and emergency 
powers.  
4. Emergency powers and political stability in Thai history: liberal democracy as a threat   
 Having explained the key features of the Dhammaraja tradition and Thai-ness, I next 
consider the relationship between them and emergency powers. Before the Chakri Reformation 
took place, the medieval law called the Thammasat bestowed upon the king the authority to 
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enact a royal decree (Rajasat) called ‘the Law of Treason’ (‘the Phra Aiyakan Krabotsuek’).228 
This law may be regarded as the source of medieval emergency powers given its aim of 
prohibiting any threat to the throne through special means, notably the use of deadly forces.229 
However, its application was subject to one de facto exemption. If the king was incapable of 
unifying his kingdom, he would no longer be able confidently to claim the Dhammaraja status. 
Precipitating political instability and an emergency situation, such circumstances would permit 
a coup, as a de facto exception of the Phra Aiyakan Krabotseuk, to be staged by a more 
powerful contender declaring himself to be the new Dhammaraja.230 Overall, standing at the 
centre of Thailand’s traditional political establishment, political stability under the Thai 
tradition is therefore dependent on the security of the monarchy, whilst the Buddhist righteous 
king was a legitimate source of emergency powers.231 Above all, the Theravada Buddhist 
concept of Karma however planted the seeds of the SoE within the Thai constitutional tradition, 
thus making the rules governing entitlement to rule flexible.232  In a broader picture, this 
flexibility was premised on the fundamental Buddhist idea underscoring that change and 
impermanence (Anatta) are undeniable universal truths.233 
 The traditional view of emergency powers in political crises struggled with the new 
threat of European imperialism and Siam’s engagement with globalisation in the late 19th 
century. As mentioned, despite considering Western technologies essential for modernising the 
country, the traditional elites were deeply suspicious of the fully-fledged transplantation of 
‘Western culture’, in particular, liberalism and parliamentary democracy, which would replace 
traditional Thai social stratification with pluralism, rule-bound legalism, and formal equality. 
This suspicion was allied with the fact that the Chakri Reformation was initiated by the nobles. 
In short, it can be said that Thailand could successfully avoid being formally colonised by 
labelling, from the outset of its modernisation process, liberalism as ‘the exception’ threatening 
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the state’s fundamental value, namely the three pillars of Nation-Religion-Monarchy. This then 
makes Thai and Weimar situations worth comparable. In Weimar, the right-wing 
conservatives, including Schmitt, sought to react against the prevalence of liberalism and 
Enlightenment rationality.234 However, due to the success of the Chakri Reformation, such 
predominance has never genuinely existed in Thailand. Rather, the Thai case is an example of 
‘modernisation without full disenchantment’, and the conservative argument against the 
paradox of modernity and liberalisation, i.e., the notion that modernisation and liberalisation 
lead to the polytheism of values, as Schmitt believed, prevailed in Thailand from the very 
beginning of its modern history. Therefore, the challenge to the Kelsen-Schmitt debate drawn 
from the modern Thai history is how to the two forces—‘dominant but increasingly challenged’ 
authoritarianism and ‘emergent but still weaker’ liberalism—struggle against each other. Pre-
1932 Thai history, I again note, helps readers gain insight into this complex struggle in 
contemporary Thailand and its problem of constitutional saṃsāra. 
 In 1885, led by Prince Prisdang, a group of seven noblemen, working at the Royal Thai 
Embassies in London and Paris, decided that the model of ‘nation-state’ was essential for 
preserving national integration but preferred a transition to constitutional monarchy. For the 
first time in Thai political history, the notions of popular sovereignty, a parliamentary system 
consisting of elected representatives, a bureaucratic legal-rational regime together with 
equality before the law, and cabinet government, were proposed before the royal court.235 The 
prince accepted that, insofar as political power at the time was concentrated in the hands of the 
monarch, no civilised person could and should believe that justice could be maintained in the 
kingdom. King Chulalongkorn nevertheless resorted to the Dhammaraja tradition to reject the 
petition, asserting that since, unlike absolute monarchs in Europe, he was not repressive nor 
unduly short-sighted—his status did not therefore hinder Siam’s security and prosperity, whilst 
any limitation of his royal authority would halt the process of reform Siam needed.236 In short, 
King Chulalongkorn was concerned that the abolition of the absolute monarchy would create 
chaos, emergencies, and a political crisis. The absolute regime was again threatened shortly 
after his death in 1910.  
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 Later, in 1912, during King Vajiravudh’s reign, a coup was planned by a group of 
soldiers against ‘the abuses of absolutist power’.237 Some demanded constitutional monarchy 
and a written constitution.238  However, the plan was leaked, and the plotters were rounded up. 
For the conservative royalists, the 1912 incident constituted a threat to the monarchy inspired 
by increasing demands for liberal democracy, and therefore constituted an emergency.239 In 
response to emergencies entailed by potential liberal movements, the government passed the 
Martial Law Act 1914 which grants the king absolute power to sanction martial law 
declarations throughout, or in some parts, of the kingdom in response to threats to the nation’s 
stability.240 Within any martial law area, military officials have superior power over their civil 
counterparts with respect to national security.241 The 1885 and 1912 incidents significantly 
inspired the plotters of the 1932 Revolution. 
 In sum, from the commencement of the modernisation process, among Thai 
conservatives, liberal democracy was deemed to be an exception to the rule needing to be 
repressed by emergency powers. They criticised it for accumulating bad Karma as its 
implementation would compromise royal authority and facilitate endless negotiations between 
leaders of factional interest groups (including the holding of ideologies inimical to political 
unity) whose minds are riddled with greed, selfishness and egotism.242 Meanwhile, the Martial 
Law Act also enabled the military to intervene in times of crises without being subject to legal 
constraints, in particular, to protect the throne. It remains in force today, and has become, 
particularly since 1957, a vital tool for coup-makers dealing with perceived threats to Thai-
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Part 2: Emergency powers in Thailand between 1932 and pre-1997 
 When King Prajadhipok (1925-1935) succeeded his elder brother, King Vajiravudh, in 
1925, political power in Thailand was still monopolised by the royal clan and some members 
of top aristocratic families, causing dissatisfaction among the expanding middle-class and 
culminating in the Revolution on 24 June 1932 mentioned briefly in Chapter 1. The Revolution 
was relatively peaceful notwithstanding minor violence. The People’s Party captured 
approximately 40 members of the royal family together with their aides. To avoid bloodshed, 
military personnel and armoured vehicles were then deployed to block roads in the centre of 
Bangkok, where the royal family was detained. King Prajadhipok agreed to a transition to a 
constitutional monarchy.  
 Nevertheless, as Ferrara observes, unlike revolutions in Europe and the U.S., the 1932 
incident ‘took place well before the emergence of any working-class movement, or [for] that 
matter, any form of mass mobilization.’243 The weakness of non-bureaucratic social forces 
together with a deeply embedded royalist culture simultaneously militated against sufficiently 
strong popular resistance to the royalist-conservatives’ counter-revolutionary potential and 
other forms of authoritarianism. Shaken by the abortive counter-revolution in 1933, the 
People’s Party, in particular, its military faction led by Field Marshal Plaek Phibunsongkhram 
(‘Phibun’) strove to deal with political conflict through harsh emergency powers instead of 
bolstering mass mobilisation, thus retarding both developed liberal democracy and the 
formation of an active citizenry.244 At the same time, for the royalist-conservatives, ‘the loss 
of royal prestige’ constituted an exception and a political crisis, thus leading to attempts to 
restore Thai-ness hegemony. With assistance from the military, emergency powers—coups 
together with impositions of martial law—have been vital tools for the royalist-conservatives 
in securing their hegemony over electoral politics, and in establishing their version of political 
stability, especially since the late 1950s.  
 In this part, I primarily explore the project Pridi Banomyong, the civilian leader of the 
People’s Party, sought to entrench in post-1932 Thailand which provided a milestone for the 
way for the explicit adoption of Kelsen’s theory in 1997. I then consider the ‘Thai-ification’ of 
Schmitt’s constitutional logic and approach by examining the key feature of the emergency 
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regime called the Thai-style democracy before exploring its struggles with rising liberal forces 
since the late 1960s. 
5. Pridi Banomyong and liberal constitutionalism: the milestone for ‘Kelsen’ 
  Criticising the absolute regime for placing a monarch above and unbound by law, 
which, in turn, bestowed power on him to suppress his political opponents, and for its 
incompatibility with the Enlightenment ideas of humanism and rationalism, Pridi sought to 
establish institutional stability through law. He decided to move Thailand forward to greater 
endorsement of the legal-rational state by adopting the ideas of constitutionalism and 
meritorious bureaucracy, and sovereign power transferred from the king to the people. Despite 
his education in France and not explicitly stating whether or not Kelsen was an influence, his 
legal and political ideas, nevertheless, largely parallel the Kelsenian outlook, probably due to 
the shared liberal leftist background and to the influence of Rousseau’s views on freedom each 
embraced. The fact that Pridi’s project became a milestone in the constitutional reform of 
Thailand in 1997, significantly influenced by Kelsen’s thesis of democratic constitutionalism, 
further makes their ideas worth comparing.245 
 Initially, Pridi took part in drafting the first three Thai constitutions—the 1932 Interim 
Constitution promulgated on 27 June 1932, the 1932 Constitution promulgated on 10 
December 1932, and the 1946 Constitution. Nevertheless, his political life was not a bed of 
roses. To ensure the survival of the new regime after the 1932 Revolution, Pridi had to rely on 
the military faction of the Party’s Party led by Phibun, who exploited the rhetoric of liberal 
constitutionalism as a justification for defeating the old nobles, only to undermine the spirit of 
liberalism itself. His conflict with the royalist-conservatives, and later with Phibun, forced Pridi 
to escape into exile twice in 1933 and 1946, in France and China respectively. After failing to 
overthrow Phibun’s dictatorship in 1948, Pridi was compelled to live in permanent exile until 
his death in 1983. After being ousted by Phibun in 1947, Pridi criticised the military practice 
of declaring emergencies and martial law for disregarding the rights and freedom of the people 
guaranteed by a written constitution.246 Despite its outward brevity, this comment, if read in 
combination with provisions enshrined in the aforesaid three constitutions, his books and 
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articles written both before and after 1948 and other secondary literature, provide a fuller 
picture of his ‘ideal’ project of constitutionalism.  
 Having advocated the core of liberal constitutionalism, that the constitution is the 
supreme law, Pridi, like Kelsen, intended to make it ‘a new focus of public loyalty’ by 
vigorously urging every Thai, through radio broadcasting, ‘to love the nation and [to] preserve 
the constitution’ since it ‘fuses [everyone] as one unity.’247 As with Kelsen, given that he 
wanted every faction to participate in a political life of the state on a formally equal footing, 
Pridi also advocated a permanent constitution to foster peace and compromise between 
different interests, in particular, between Thai progressives and royalist-conservatives.248 His 
brief view on emergency powers further mirrors his distaste for authoritarianism, notably 
resulting from their exercise without prior legal authorisation and without paying due respect 
to individuals’ rights and liberties.249  Like Kelsen, Pridi believed that any ‘unconstitutional’ 
emergency decrees which disrespected individuals’ rights and freedoms cannot be regarded as 
legitimate state action.250  
 Despite the relatively peaceful takeover in 1932, the traditional elites strove to restore 
the monarchy’s political power.251 In October 1933, King Prajadhipok’s cousin and a military 
commander, Prince Boworadej organised a counter-revolutionary force aimed at restoring 
absolutism. Fierce battles were fought between the prince’s troops and the state military led by 
Phibun, before the rebellion was eventually overcome, indicating that without the military 
faction, the People’s Party would not have remained in power.252 In turn, the domination of 
the military clique put Pridi’s constitutional project and his intension to compromise with the 
royalist-conservatives in jeopardy as many of the former faction did not share his commitment 
to constitutionalism, but merely intended to claim its protection to maintain authoritarian 
practices by stealth. For the People’s Party, the counter-revolution movements constituted a 
political crisis jeopardising the survival of the new regime. Thus, it was necessary to have an 
emergency law, which ‘[promoted] a belief in the constitution, [provided] protection for its 
principles, and [helped] the people understand the notion of constitutionalism.’253 The Act for 
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the Protection of the Constitution (‘the 1933 Act’), consisting of merely six articles, was 
drafted in 1933 to serve these purposes. Under Articles 4 to 6, preventive detention without 
trial, for up to ten years, could be imposed by a committee of five officials appointed by the 
government against anyone suspected of conspiring to overthrow the constitutional regime. 
Before this committee, the defendant had no guaranteed right to legal representation, and its 
verdict could not be appealed or reviewed by the judiciary. Such power was deemed essential 
for suppressing the royalist-conservatives—many of whom were banished and detained in a 
remote, malaria-infested area in the South. 254   
 Yet, regardless of the number of military takeovers the country has experienced in the 
past eighty years, it is still obvious that Pridi at least succeeded in making the concept of 
constitutionalism, especially the principle of legality, parliamentary democracy together with 
popular sovereignty, irresistible in Thai politics. 
6. Sarit Thanarat’s despotic paternalism: the Thai-style Schmittian model of 
constitutional emergencies 
 As briefly discussed in Chapter 1, between 1932 and 1946, the monarchy was at its 
nadir. However, the traditional notion of authority was successfully restored in the late 1950s 
with the assistance of Sarit Thanarat, who became the PM in 1958 through two coups in 1957. 
To comprehend the successful restoration of Thai-ness under Sarit’s rule which significantly 
cultivates constitutional saṃsāra, I need to first explain elite infighting between the following 
main factions: (a) Pridi Banomyong’s civilian, pro-democracy wing of the People’s Party; (b) 
its ultra-nationalist military clique of the People’s Party led by Phibun; and (c) the royalist-
conservative camp led by some old princes and top bureaucrats. This also involves the 
embracement of right-wing constitutional theory. Then, I explain the key features of the royal 
authoritarian regime implemented by Sarit.  
  6.1 The 1947, 1957, and 1958 coups: Thai-ness restored 
 Phibun assumed his premiership in 1938. Inspired by the rise of far-right politics in 
Europe, he later presented himself as a charismatic Buddhist leader uniting every Thai (Phu 
Nam or Führer), jettisoning the People’s Party’s aspiration of establishing liberal 
constitutionalism in Thailand. In this respect, given the long-entrenched Thai-ness tradition, 
the anti-monarchist Phibun did not totally negate the elements of ‘nation’ and ‘religion’ 
(Theravada Buddhism), but sought to replace that of ‘the monarchy’ with Phu Nam. The Asia-
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Pacific War broke out in 1941. Phibun allied Thailand with Japan. Pridi dissented and formed 
a secret alliance with the Allies and the anti-Japanese royalist-conservative groups. Following 
Japan’s defeat, the Allies recognised Pridi’s resistance, forcing Phibun to temporarily step 
down, paving the way for Pridi’s premiership and the restoration of liberal democracy in 1946. 
However, the political crisis matured when King Ananda (1934-1946) was mysteriously found 
dead in his bedroom in June 1946, and King Bhumibol (1946-2016) succeeded his elder 
brother. With Phibun’s support, the royalists, sceptical of Pridi’s leftist ideology and the 
growing number of leftist political parties, turned against Pridi accusing him of planning 
regicide and forced him to resign. This culminated in a coup in 1947 led by Phibun’s military 
clique and the royalist-conservatives, ousting the succeeding government of Pridi’s right-hand 
man, Thawan Thamrongnawasawat. Pridi went into exile in China, while Phibun reassumed 
the premiership in 1948. 
 The 1947 takeover was the first time that the conservative elites allied themselves with 
the military to undermine liberal democracy, criticised for having bolstered interests of corrupt 
politicians and political romanticism. Yet, due to the presence of anti-monarchist, Phibun, the 
former chose to attempt to harmonise democracy with royal hegemony. Most importantly, the 
coup fundamentally altered Thailand’s public law landscape by leaving legacies essential for 
restoring and maintaining royalist dominance/the hegemony of Thai-ness. From 1949 onwards, 
every Thai constitution has consistently declared that Thailand adopts ‘the Democratic Regime 
with the Monarchy as the Head of the State’ (‘the DRMH’). This provision is based on a logic 
of Thai-ness which accommodates room for ‘good men’ who stand ‘on top of the realm of 
politics’ to oversee the usual political life of the nation deemed as corrupt and partisan.255 
According to Thongchai, the DRMH functions as ‘a euphemism for royalist dominance over 
the regular government, be it a democracy or military rule’.256 Above all, as McCargo observes, 
the DRMH in Thai politics in 1947 was reinforced by the building of a network of conservative 
elites, including top military personnel, senior bureaucrats, and retired senior judges, within 
the constitutional institutions, notably the Senate.257 For seven decades, some of these elites 
have attempted to reinforce the traditional concept of authority and stability by asserting tacit 
political influence over modern institutions, especially the military, and played a key role in 
reminding them of their allegiance to Thai-ness and in condemning politicians as corrupt. 258   
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 Sarit played a vital role in helping Phibun and the traditional elites topple Pridi and 
Thawan, and was later appointed as Commander of the Royal Thai Army in 1954. Having been 
aware of the rising power of the royalist-conservatives and their attempt to institutionalise the 
DRMH, Phibun relentlessly sought to minimise their role in politics. For example, he strove to 
reinforce his popularity through liberal democratic means, including by permitting political 
parties’ activities and rigging a general election in February 1957. Phibun won but this 
malpractice severely damaged his legitimacy, leading to strong popular disquiet. The royalist-
conservative elites saw this as an opportunity to overthrow Phibun’s government by forming 
an alliance with Sarit.  Backed by the royalist clique, Sarit claimed that the rigged election and 
the security of the throne justified a military putsch and a declaration of martial law, ousting 
Phibun on 16 September 1957. King Bhumibol was later asked for a royal proclamation to 
appoint Sarit guardian of the capital. Sarit mounted another coup d’état, and declared an 
emergency on 20 October 1958, which eventually replaced parliamentary democracy with the 
regime of ‘despotic paternalism’ known among scholars as the Thai-style democracy (‘TSD’), 
which is the militarisation of the DRMH, by prioritising stability and unity embodied by a 
strong leader over pluralism, the protection of human rights and the principle of legality. 
  6.2 The key features of despotic paternalism 
 To implement the TSD, Sarit later issued the 1959 Constitutional Charter, comprised 
of merely 20 Sections, subsequently approved by the king on 28 January 1959, which left the 
Privy Council intact.259  The Charter not only abolished the parliamentary system and all 
political rights, but also included Section 17 (‘M-17’) which established an emergency regime 
aimed at protecting national unity under Thai-ness. This provided:  
 ‘During the application of this Charter, in the case where [the PM] contemplates the necessity to prevent 
or repress any threats to national security or the throne; or other threats which undermine, disturb, or imperil 
peace either occurring inside or stemming from outside the Kingdom, he, through Cabinet resolution, shall hold 
an authority to issue any order or act whatsoever. Such an order and act are deemed to be lawful …’ (my 
translation) 
 In general, it was apparent that the TSD was largely inspired by the rightist ideas of 
‘collectivism’ and ‘strong leadership’ embraced by Phibun, also highly compatible with the 
mindset of his new patrons the conservative royalists, that liberal ideas contradict the traditional 
Thai concept of the nation—the tradition of benevolent ruler. 260  His closest advisor, an 
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architect of the TSD and one of Phibun’s former confidants Luang Wichitwathakan (‘Wichit’), 
was critically aware of the modernisation process and therefore recognised that the European 
rightist constitutional theory, the school with which Schmitt was strongly associated (though 
Wichit neither invoked Schmitt’s name, nor was intentionally ‘Schmittian’), would be useful 
and compatible with Thai-ness, especially for dealing with enemies of the state particularly the 
radical leftists.261 Another key legal advisor, Yud Sang-Uthai, who served as the Secretary 
General of the Council of State, was in fact a former student of Carl Schmitt during his time in 
Berlin, and formally used Schmitt’s constitutional thought to articulate the Thai concept of 
constitutional law.262 The wordings of M-17 also originated from those of Article 16 of the 
1958 French Constitution, which was inspired by Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution.263 I, 
therefore, agree with Draper that Sarit’s rule reflected the essence of Schmitt’s approach, 
though with slight differences, and that such ‘Schmittian’ political logic, as Connor observes, 
has been cultivated within the Thai constitutional order. 264  The fact that both Schmitt’s 
approach and the Thai tradition of ‘benevolent despotism’ each favour a realist stance enables 
them be combined. Here, four key features of the TSD can be summarised. 
 Firstly, similar to Schmitt’s ideal, the true spirit of the constitution, under the TSD, 
concerns ‘a strong state’ qua the political unity of the (Thai) people. Meanwhile, popular 
sovereignty, as Dressel notes, ‘[is] not exercised by the people directly but “realized” through 
the modernized state.’265  Put simply, this reflects the traditional Thai view that a written 
constitution constitutes merely a set of rules, which even possibly hinder the task of 
safeguarding national security undertaken by a person of great virtue.266  
 Accordingly, and secondly, the TSD parallels Schmitt’s CoP and his concept of 
concrete order, in that, it similarly advocates extra-normative authority to distinguish ‘friends’ 
from ‘enemies’ to realise political homogeneity. Sarit applied Thai-ness to indicate who and 
what counted as public enemies. In this fashion, a coup d’état together with martial law 
declaration, were then justified as acts carried out with good intention or, in the Buddhist term, 
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‘good Karma’. The TSD, we can conclude, implies two types of political enemy—the anti-
Thai and the un-Thai.267 Put another way, Thai-ness played a crucial role, as in the context of 
European imperialism in the mid-19th century, as an institution in determining the existence of 
a normal situation by distinguishing ‘what is identified as Thai’ (the positive identification of 
Thai-ness) from ‘otherness’ (the negative counterpart).268 The term ‘anti-Thai’ signifies any 
foreign ideologies threatening political unity under Thai-ness, in particular, liberalism and 
parliamentary democracy. Meanwhile, the term ‘un-Thai’ connotes Thais who pose a challenge 
or repudiate Thai-ness. Only Thais who accept or do not outwardly oppose such unity belong 
to the community, whilst those expressly sceptical about ‘sovereign authority’ declare 
themselves to be enemies. In the 1960s, Sarit employed M-17 to detain without trial and even 
order the public execution of his leftist, pro-democracy political rivals, accusing them of 
potentially instigating political instability and even of being communist.269  
 Nevertheless, Sarit was quite aware of the irreversible process of modernisation in 
Thailand. Due to the 1932 Revolution, a return to the pre-1932 regime would have meant 
formally bestowing political power upon mere persons or factions, thus undermining his effort 
to legitimise the 1957 and 1958 coups through popular acclaim. 270  Meanwhile, given 
Thailand’s sympathy with the Capitalist Bloc during the Cold War, it was almost impossible 
for the right-wing conservatives absolutely to negate liberalism. Moreover, since the Thai-ness 
tradition was resurrected in the presence of nascent democracy and electoral politics, popular 
disquiet could be anticipated—protest against Phibun’s rigged election in 1957 for example. 
Recognising these developments, Sarit followed King Chulalongkorn’s approach seeking to 
preserve Thai-ness by connecting Karma to the increasing disenchantment of the world, 
particularly the nation-state together with its constitutional order and the existential concept of 
democracy. This reflects the third and fourth features of the TSD. 
 With respect to the third feature of the TSD, Thak observes that by portraying the 
monarchy as the embodiment of Thai-ness, Sarit and his supporters then asked the king for a 
royal proclamation (though he was not involved in a coup plot, and it was Sarit who initially 
declared an emergency and wielded M-17) to legitimise his authority.271 In this fashion, a 
prominent Thai constitutional scholar, Borwornsak Uwanno then regards the monarch as the 
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sovereign who wields sovereign authority in the name of the Thai people.272 Accordingly, Sarit 
could legitimately assert a democratic mandate when royal approval was granted on their 
advice to the 1957 coup and the installment of the TSD in 1958-59.  
 However, and fourthly, the nascent seed of liberalism forced Sarit to employ the vestige 
of the liberal technique—the concept of constitutionality—to stabilise his authoritarian rule. 
Thus, according to Yano, where Pridi sought to implement ‘constitutional idealism’ and ‘liberal 
constitutionalism’ in 1932, Sarit reduced it to merely ‘formalistic constitutionalism’ when a 
written constitution was turned into merely a document for legitimising his authority.273 The 
latter clearly decided to constitutionalise the TSD shortly after his coup, rather than to rule 
exclusively under the mandate of the king’s royal sanction and coup decrees, through the 
promulgation of the 1959 Charter. This denotes the importance of a closed and impersonal 
system of legal norms in rationalising and stabilising Thai-ness, and in offering a legal-
technical cloak of legitimacy insulating the regime itself and any emergency powers invoked 
from any legal challenges by liberals. 
 Sarit held the office of PM until his death in 1963 and left an important legacy. His 
revival of Thai-ness largely bolstered the monarchy’s political status, and has turned the Thai 
military into what Chambers and Napisa call a ‘monarchised military’, playing a predominant 
role in protecting Thai-ness through coups and martial law.274 Nevertheless, given that this 
tradition was restored after 1932, it can no longer resist its democratisation and 
constitutionalisation. While the previous section and this section examine the attempt to 
entrench liberal democracy and constitutionalism and the restoration of Thai-ness respectively, 
the next section is concerned with their contestation in post-Sarit era and the role of the 
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7. The politics of gravitational pull and the King as the supreme arbitrator in times of 
crises 
 Due to rising and recurring demands for liberal democracy/constitutionalism and 
electoral politics among the rising middle-class, fostered by Sarit’s economic policy, his 
successors, as illustrated in Table 1, were forced politically to acknowledge the legitimacy of 
electoral politics.275 
Table 1: Coups and the restoration of liberal democracy in Thailand 
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Coups and 
martial law 






1. The 1958 Coup Sarit Thanarat Thanom 
Kittikachorn/the 
1932 Constitution 
(amended in 1952) 
The 1959 Constitutional 
Charter 
The 1968 Constitution/general 
election in February 1969 




The 1972 Constitutional 
Charter 
- The 14 October 1973 
Uprising led to the 
promulgation of the 1973 
Constitution restoring another 
experiment for parliamentary 
democracy in January 1974  




-  The 1976 Massacre  









1976 Constitution  
The 1977 Constitutional 
Charter 
-  Semi-liberal democracy 
under the 1978 Constitution   
- Fuller liberal democracy 
restored in July 1988 




1978 Constitution  
The 1991 Constitutional 
Charter 
- The 1992 Black May incident 
- The 1997 Constitution  




1997 Constitution  
The 2006 Interim 
Constitution 
The 2007 Constitution/general 
election in December 2007  




2007 Constitution  
The 2014 Interim 
Constitution 
The 2017 Constitution/general 




 From Table 1, between 1968 and pre-1997, Thailand oscillated between (a) coups and 
military dictatorial rule under the TSD in 1971, 1976, 1977, and 1991; and (b) a multi-party 
parliamentary democracy. Here, two main features can be concluded.  
  7.1 The pull of gravity between liberalism and authoritarianism: the internal 
perspective of the constitutional emergency model  
 I initially argue that the landscape of emergency powers in the PCLD in Thailand 
reflects the pull of gravity between liberalism and authoritarianism. To begin with, coups and 
martial law were convenient means for the right-wing traditional elites and the military to 
repress greater demands for liberal democracy. In this fashion, four coups together with martial 
law declarations were imposed in 1971, 1976, 1977, and 1991, leading to the banning of 
political gatherings and political parties and restrictions upon press freedom. The traditional 
elites and the military also claimed the existence of ‘public enemies’, notably radical leftists 
and communists (1971 and 1976) and corrupt politicians (1971, 1976, 1991), to justify their 
actions, in particular, by criticising liberal democracy for its inability to address this problem.276  
Meanwhile, rather than choosing to rule through sovereign decisions, they also applied written 
constitutions, both interim (i.e., the Constitutional Charters of 1972, 1976, 1977, and 1991) and 
permanent which outwardly restored weak parliamentary democracy with a civilian coalition 
government deemed the source of political romanticism (i.e., the 1968, 1978, and 1991 
Constitutions) to stabilise and institutionalise Thai-ness hegemony, thus preserving the 
possibility of a military coup. This attempt to build ‘constitutionality’ will be more 
comprehensively analysed in the next chapter. However, as already mentioned, greater 
modernisation precipitated pro-democracy movements, particularly among university students 
displeased with almost three decades of right-wing military domination. Overall, my key point 
here is that the Thai experience asks us to consider what I mentioned in Chapter 1 as the internal 
perspective of the constitutional emergency model, that is, the growing need for the Schmittian-
type idea to accommodate greater demands for its Kelsenian counterpart and vice versa.   
 In 1971, the peculiar event of self-coup led by Sarit’s successor, Thanom Kittikachorn, 
overthrowing his own elected government, abolished the 1968 Constitution, and made a return 
of the TSD, fostered public discontent. This resulted in the mass protest against the junta in 
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October 1973 by university students and many middle-class people, demanding the restoration 
of liberal constitutionalism and electoral democracy. The political crisis reached its zenith on 
14 October 1973 when the military used martial law power sustained since the 1971 coup to 
disperse protesters, causing violence, acts of vandalism and deaths. Rather than appeasing the 
situation, the wielding of martial law in 1973 and the deployment of troops under the 
justification of the protection of Thai-ness enraged the protesters, resulting in one of the 
bloodiest conflicts between civilians and military officials in modern Thai history. Tanks, 
helicopters and rooftop snippers were sent to massacre protesters, causing more than 36 hours 
of chaos, whilst the people fought back using guns seized from some officers and ramming 
buses into the military.277  The 1973 uprising was the first time ‘that the government was 
overthrown by extra-bureaucratic forces through street politics, and not through clientelistic 
ties.’278 This incident made it obvious that permanent military rule no longer enjoyed popular 
legitimacy, and largely ‘shook the structure of relations of power in Thai society.’279  
 However, the heyday of liberal politics between 1973 and 1976, in turn, encouraged 
some leftist university students and politicians, dissatisfied with social and economic 
inequality, to agitate for greater political inclusion and democracy, causing protests and 
instability. Aware of the threat to their hegemonic position, some ultra-rightist conservatives 
eventually reacted harshly, resulting in the 6 October 1976 massacre. The communist triumph 
in Laos (May 1975), Cambodia (April 1975), and Vietnam (April 1975) had further heightened 
their fear that their leftist opponents would overthrow the monarchy. Aimed at antagonising 
their opponents, some right-wing elites were believed to support Thanom, now ordained as a 
Buddhist novice, to return to Thailand in 1976, causing thousands of university students to 
launch another protest. Regarded as ‘un-Thais’, these pro-democracy leftists were accused of 
being communists, and were eventually brutally attacked and killed at Thammasat University 
at 8.00 am on 6 October 1976 by far-right paramilitaries, using live rounds, bazookas and rocket 
launchers, especially Village Scouts and other far-right groups, and other state forces, notably 
the police. This incident paved the way for another coup and a declaration of emergency the 
same day, claiming the need to protect Thai-ness. Approximately 36 people were reportedly 
killed, while more than 3,000 were arrested.280 After the bloody massacre and an internal 
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conflict within the right-wing government established in 1976, which led to another putsch in 
1977, Thailand entered the era of ‘semi-liberalism’. By 1978, Thai conservative elites, noticing 
the decline of the communist threat and realising a growing public appetite for popular 
democracy, enacted the new constitution establishing semi-liberal democracy—multi-party 
liberal democracy under the tutelage of the network of the traditional elites, operating under 
Thai-ness hegemony. The former army chief, Prem Tinsulanonda, was appointed PM by the 
king in 1980. Prem initially enjoyed significant support from the bureaucrats, the military, the 
people, and the palace. Nevertheless, corruption scandals together with greater demands for 
fuller democracy forced Prem to dissolve Parliament in 1988. 
 After the general election in 1988, a civilian coalition government was formed by 
Chatchai Choonhavan. Chatchai’s attempt to take control of the military made his premiership 
vulnerable. The military eventually overthrew Chatchai and declared martial law in 1991, 
citing corruption and threats to Thai-ness as justifications.281 Greater demands for popular 
sovereignty, democratic constitutionalism and good-governance, supported by globalisation 
and the end of the Cold War, forced the junta to organise a general election later in March 
1992. However, the majority of the new Parliament chose as PM, Suchinda Kraprayoon, the 
member of the 1991 junta who intended to turn the clock back to semi-authoritarianism like in 
the 1980s. In May 1992, public discontent culminated in another mass demonstration in 
Bangkok, this time a crowd of approximate 200,000 people, and caused another emergency 
and political crisis.282 Between 17 and 18 May 1992, Suchinda deployed military forces to 
disperse protesters, resulting in violence, acts of vandalism and deaths, which enormously 
decreased the government’s legitimacy—52 were reportedly killed, while 293 went missing, 
and thousands more were arrested or injured, an incident notoriously known as Black May.283 
 In sum, it can be concluded that given the rise of the middle class, the more the military 
strove to prolong its ‘emergency regime’, the more it had to struggle with mass demands for 
constitutionalism and liberalisation. However, despite its demands, liberalism could not prevail 
due to the country’s strong tradition of Thai-ness. As Ferrara notes, it therefore appeared that 
the rhetoric of a threat to Thai-ness and the accusation of political romanticism  
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 ‘become politically activated when democracy begins to work as intended–that is, when elected 
governments begin to promote greater popular participation, expand their authority over matters, such as policy 
making and appointments, traditionally reserved for officials in the military and civilian bureaucracy.’284 
  7.2 The King as the ultimate arbiter  
 Another key feature of emergency powers in the PCLD in pre-1997 Thailand concerns 
the role of the king. On the one hand, since Sarit’s rule, coups d’état, recalling Borwornsak’s 
argument in Section 7.2, had to be endorsed by the king, deemed to be the embodiment of the 
Thai nation, on the advice of the leaders of the junta. In this fashion, the royal blessing, as 
Dressel puts it, therefore provides a ‘source of legitimacy and object of legitimation.’285 The 
failure to consult the king for his blessing significantly undermined a coup attempt. Two 
attempts to topple Prem’s government in 1981 and 1985 exemplified this. The coups failed 
after their leaders, though capable of taking control of Bangkok, were unable to secure a 
blessing from the king who, on both occasions, was advised by Prem to stay outside Bangkok. 
Also, it was King Bhumibol who intervened and halted the violence in 1973 and 1992. Despite 
the royal blessing to which Thanom referred to justify the 1971 coup, the king surreptitiously 
asked Thanom to resign and flee the country. Popular democracy was restored by the new 1974 
Constitution. Likewise, King Bhumibol ultimately intervened to prevent the country’s 
fragmentation in 1992 by summoning Suchinda and the protest leader, Chamlong Srimuang, 
asking them to compromise. The violence suddenly ended, and Suchinda resigned.   
 According to the aforesaid roles, McCargo rightly concludes that in Thailand, ‘the 
monarchy was the primary source of national legitimacy; the King acted as a didactic 
commentator on national issues, helping to set the national agenda’.286 Put simply, the above 
incidents confirmed the status of the monarchy as ‘the supreme political referee’. However, 
although royal sovereign authority could reinforce the implementation of the PoA, Thai-ness 
simultaneously reinforced by it was, in turn, exploited by some elites and the military to 
undermine liberalism. I will comprehensively assess this issue in Chapters 3 and 4 in the light 
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8. Contestation and institutionalisation 
 As we can see, a standard feature of Thai politics before 1997 mirrored the contestation 
between liberal and conservative forces, precipitating constitutional saṃsāra. Two main trends 
can be observed. Firstly, from the perspective of cognition/authority ‘is’, royally-blessed coups 
and martial law, rather than emergency legislation, were convenient means for the traditional 
elites and the military to resolve what they deemed to be the PCLD. Secondly, from the realm 
of value ‘ought’, the anti-liberal conservative regime however had to accommodate a greater 
space for liberal democracy. This led to a growing connection between the two realms. Given 
the recurrence of coups at the presence of greater liberal demands, it was also apparent that 
these elites nevertheless succeeded in:  
 (a) connecting Thai-ness with modern ideologies, in particular, the modern state, the 
notions of (formalistic) constitutionalism (i.e., the constitution-making process) and 
(identitarian) democracy; and 
 (b) institutionalising Thai-ness and therefore ‘sovereign authority’ in the presence of 
struggles against liberalism. 
A resort to extra-normative measures guaranteed some level of political stability—at least in 
the sense that it did not counter-productively precipitate an anti-coup reaction. However, I will 
show in the next part that the greater the aforesaid liberal demands, the more the declining 


















Part 3: Emergency powers in Thailand and the colour-coded crises 
 Military brutality in the 1992 Black May incident galvanised a vocal demand for liberal 
democracy from the public in general, making constitutional reform inevitable. With strong 
popular support, the new constitution was promulgated in October 1997. The so-called 
‘People’s Constitution’ has therefore reshaped the contours of the PCLD and emergency 
powers applied therewith. Below, I initially explore the 1997 Constitution in the context of the 
Kelsen-Schmitt debate before discussing Thaksin Shinawatra’s premiership which triggered 
contemporary colour-coded politics. Then, in Section 12, I focus on the key provisions of the 
2007 Constitution imposed by the 2006 junta to reinforce Thai-ness, and ultimately explore, in 
Section 13, emergency powers invoked to deal with the colour-coded crises between 2008 and 
2014 
9. The explicit adoption of ‘Kelsen’ in 1997 and Thaksin Shinawatra’s premiership 
  Constitutional reform in 1997 has significantly redrawn the relationship between 
progressive and conservative forces, including the use of emergency powers, in Thailand. On 
the one hand, the 1997 Constitution preserved the hegemony of Thai-ness. Nevertheless, in 
essence, it also challenged the traditional establishment by explicitly adopting Kelsen’s theory 
of liberal constitutionalism, notably his model of a constitutional court, the legacy of which has 
lasted even after the constitutional text was shredded as a result of the 2006 coup. Below, I 
elaborate the key features of this constitution related to the issue of emergency powers. 
 The 1997 Constitution, on the one hand, preserved Thai-ness hegemony by outwardly 
declaring that the country adopts the DRMH, and declared that the Buddhist monarchy is the 
embodiment of the Thai people, occupying a position of revered worship which cannot be 
violated.287 However, it still left a network of traditional elites intact, allowing them to continue 
asserting influence on the bureaucracy, the military, and the judiciary.288 It also explicitly 
stipulated that every Thai citizen is under a duty to uphold the DRMH, and prohibited any 
motion of constitutional amendment altering it.289  The 1997 Constitution also reflected a 
mistrust of politicians—its drafters accused the country’s past coalition governments of 
generating political romanticism or an endless bargaining for political power among different 
interests that, in turn, facilitated ‘under-the-table’ corruption.290  
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 Notwithstanding its conservative elements, the 1997 Constitution introduced numerous 
positive innovations into Thailand’s constitutional landscape, significantly affecting the status 
of a military putsch. As mentioned, its drafters held conservative concerns about the lack of 
good governance associated with party politics, which had provided a justification for military 
takeovers abolishing liberal parliamentary democracy since 1947. But, given that the 1992 
incident reflected rising anti-military attitudes in combination with greater demands for liberal 
democracy, the 1997 Constitution simultaneously and explicitly accommodated a greater 
commitment to a Kelsen-type liberal constitutionalism. Its drafters then sought to kill two birds 
with one stone.  
 Above all, the new constitution created a full-time Constitutional Court based on the 
Kelsenian model, assigned not only with the task of ensuring the constitutionality of Acts of 
Parliament, but also with hampering future coups and uses of emergency powers, which 
constitute a violation of the democratic constitution according to Kelsen’s theory. 291  Put 
simply, the 1997 Constitution sought to entrench in full the PoA—the creation of the 
institutional condition under which the conformity of exercises of state power with a written 
constitution and its basic organisational principles is ensured. For the first time, these actions 
were declared under Section 63 as attempts to acquire political power by extra-normative 
means, and the Thai people were granted the right to resist such action. I will assess the role of 
the Thai Constitutional Court under this provision during the colour-coded crises in full in the 
next chapter. At least, we can observe that the reform in 1997 has dramatically altered the 
profile of what counts as ‘norm’ and ‘exception’ as the 1997 Constitution, though retaining 
royal hegemony and failing to prevent the coup in 2006, has significantly enhanced anti-coup 
and anti-aristocratic sentiments and raised public consciousness of liberal-democratic ideas 
among broader sections of Thai society.292 
 By encouraging both stable politics and the sense of popular sovereignty, the 1997 
Constitution facilitated the rise of Thaksin Shinawatra in 2001. Thaksin’s populist policies, 
notably, universal healthcare, village-managed development funds, and a debt moratorium for 
agriculture, attracted significant public support. 293  His Thai-Rak-Thai party (‘TRT’), 
comprising a number of progressive intellectuals and politicians, was re-elected in 2005 with 
an absolute majority in the House of Representatives. However, Thaksin was simultaneously 
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criticised for his assertive and bold style of leadership and was afflicted by numerous 
corruption scandals. As Ferrara notes, he tended to favour unconstrained authority—an idea 
rooted in Thai-ness.294 He was also accused of having used his wealth to turn smaller political 
parties, the Senate, and other independent bodies such as the Election Committee, into his 
‘stooges’. During Thaksin’s premiership, the phenomenon of ‘husband-and-wife Parliament’, 
whereby spouses and relatives served as members of either the Lower or Upper Houses, 
occurred.  
 Thaksin’s premiership is however paradoxical, and graphically illustrates the clash 
between the Schmittian ideology and its Kelsenian alternative in contemporary Thailand. 
Though popularly elected and seeking to justify his rule through the rhetoric of 
constitutionalism, his assertive style of leadership has preserved the core ideology of the TSD, 
namely strong and unchecked authority, within Thailand’s constitutional landscape.295  Yet, by 
drawing his legitimacy ‘from below’ and from the 1997 Constitution, Thaksin reinforced the 
status of liberal democracy as the basis for political legitimation, supporting a growing concern 
for it among vast segments of Thai society.296 The popularity of Thaksin has challenged royal 
hegemony, worrying the royalist-conservative elites and many middle-class people in 
Bangkok, many of whom, such as Chamlong Srimuang, turned against the very ‘liberal 
aspirations’ they fought for in 1992 fearing that liberalism strengthened the interests of the 
uneducated, short-sighted rural masses, who supported Thaksin’s premiership.  
 In short, a post-1997 stable political environment, or the Nirvana of constitutional 
saṃsāra, was merely temporary.297  The anti-Thaksin alliance was a starting point for a series 
of colour-coded political crises and numerous uses of emergency powers in response to 
political unrest, marking a return of constitutional saṃsāra. The next section will explore these 
as a raw conflict of political interests between those inclining to advocate Schmittian and 
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10. The ‘colours’ in Thailand: the external perspective of the constitutional emergency 
model 
 The conflict between Thaksin and the traditional elites is normally, yet superficially, 
seen as the cause of Thailand’s contemporary colour-coded politics, which began in 2006.298 
These incidents mirror a series of political crises between the royalist ‘Yellow’ and the pro-
democracy ‘Red’ factions. The Yellow faction is conspicuously pro-monarchy and anti-
Thaksin. It comprises an alliance of the royalist-conservative elites, senior technocrats, and the 
military, several MPs of the liberal-conservative Democrat Party (‘DP’), and the upper middle 
classes in Bangkok and the South. Its masses were known as the People’s Alliance for 
Democracy (‘PAD’) or the Yellow Shirts between 2006 and 2008 and as the People's 
Democratic Reform Committee (‘PDRC’) between 2013 and 2014. 
 By contrast, the Red faction or the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship 
(‘UDD’) is viewed, especially by the PAD, as the pro-Thaksin faction since many of its 
supporters are former TRT politicians and the rural masses especially from the TRT’s base in 
the North and the Northeast, and some urban poor. The conflict between the Yellows and Reds 
led to periods of political instability, mass protests, violence, and acts of vandalism against 
each other. Emergency powers, including two coups in 2006 and 2014, were vital tools used 
by both the Red and Yellow factions and by the Yellow military to restore stability. 
 Nevertheless, describing the political crises in this way limits our focus almost 
exclusively to the realm of politics and political interests, and ignores the issue of competing 
values concerning legal authority. Besides, the Red faction also comprises other groups, 
notably leftist scholars, not affiliated with Thaksin, while there are also movements other than 
the UDD struggling for liberal constitutionalism.299 Thus, it is more beneficial to describe the 
Red and the Yellow factions in the light of two competing conceptions of state authority and 
political crisis.  
 Using the key slogans, ‘Thaksin sells the nation’ (i.e., Thaksin is ‘evil’), ‘We will fight 
for the monarchy’, and ‘Returning sovereignty to the monarchy’, the Yellow faction attempted 
to ensure royal hegemony. Many of them even labelled liberal democracy as the source of 
political instability and supported the imposition of royalist coups and martial law to topple the 
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Shinawatra camp and other UDD supporters.300 By contrast, the Red faction supported Pridi 
Banomyong’s aspiration in 1932. It is related to recurring demands for the protection of rights 
and liberties by a democratic constitution such as the 1997 Constitution, and to anti-coup 
sentiment. Yet, as I will later show, such a position has also appealed to the Yellow Shirts, 
especially when emergency powers were imposed upon them.     
 The reiteration of these competing conceptions is vital as it prompts us to rethink the 
absence of consensus in the Thai political landscape. As analysed in Chapter 1, a successful 
implementation of Kelsenian liberal constitutionalism visibly requires members of any given 
society, by and large, to see liberalism as a value with intrinsic worth. Likewise, a shared belief 
in ‘homogeneity’, i.e., collective identity, is essential for the realisation of the Schmittian 
existential concept of the constitution. Ostensibly, the coup culture signifies the absence of the 
former in Thailand. But, as the trends of liberalisation and democratisation have increasingly 
been felt in Thailand, especially after Sarit’s death in 1963, there has, in turn, been a 
corresponding decline in sympathy for military rule, and, since the 2006 coup, of Thai-ness. 
The Red-Yellow conflict however deepens the lack of consensus. Accordingly, the colour-
coded crises ask us to consider what I mentioned in Chapter 1 as the external perspective of 
the constitutional emergency model, that is, the application of emergency powers in the light 
of the AoH bred by the direct ideological and physical collision between liberal and right-wing 
conservative movements and between the attempts to reassert the political legitimacy of the 
Kelsenian approach and of its Schmittian counterpart against each other with no absolute 
winner. To clarify this point, I need to explain how the 2006 coup, ousting Thaksin, was unique 
compared to its predecessors.  
 The mass protest against Thaksin by the PAD began in January 2006. Meanwhile, Prem 
Tinsulanonda, a former PM and the current President of the Privy Council, made several 
speeches emphasising the military’s loyalty to Thai-ness. Notwithstanding the presence of the 
anti-coup provision enshrined in the 1997 Constitution, the tension between the Yellow camp 
and Thaksin eventually culminated in the abolition of the 2006 election by the Constitutional 
Court (see Chapter 3) and another bloodless coup d’état on 19 September 2006 led by General 
Sonthi Boonyaratglin. Like his predecessors, Sonthi cited a threat to Thai-ness posed by the 
‘Thaksin regime’ to justify his action, and abolished the 1997 Constitution, forcing Thaksin to 
escape into exile. Interestingly, Sonthi further justified the coup by castigating the subversion 
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of the 1997 Constitution by Thaksin.301 Yet, although the 2006 coup toppled Thaksin’s regime 
which had some authoritarian features and claimed to restore liberal democracy, given its 
intrinsic aim to reinforce the authoritarian culture and notion of political stability, it was a ‘non-
democratic’ rather than a ‘democratic’ coup d’état.302  Accompanied by Prem, Sonthi then 
asked King Bhumibol for his blessing. Later, the junta established an ad hoc Constitutional 
Tribunal to deal with charges filed by the prosecutor, accusing the TRT of providing funds for 
smaller parties to compete with it in the 2 April election. The Tribunal found the executive 
members of the TRT guilty, and ordered its dissolution in May 2007.303  
 However, unlike its predecessors, the 2006 takeover meant to ensure Thai-ness 
hegemony counter-productively galvanised an anti-establishment movement (the Red Shirts), 
formally created in October 2006—its ‘leftist’ individual members even professing anti-
monarchy sentiments. 304  The Red Shirts declared themselves to be ‘the guardians of 
democracy’, and labelled the traditional elites, especially Prem, as ammat (‘evil’ aristocrats). 
 My point here is that the colour-coded crises have reflected the fact that Thailand is a 
deeply divided society. Unlike the pre-1997 period, the more the traditional elites and the 
Yellow Shirts attempted to solidify Thai-ness hegemony, particularly through harsh emergency 
powers, the more they were opposed by ambitious liberal demands. Media and social media 
have become vital for dispersing political ideas and even for inciting hatred. Contemporary 
Thai political crises can be interpreted in terms of a direct collision between ‘Kelsenian’ and 
‘Schmittian’ notions of political legitimacy, not just at the ‘interest’ level, but also the 
‘ideological’ one, with a total lack of consensus on what should constitute the hegemonic model 
of political legitimacy. In the next section, I observe Thailand’s political landscape after the 
2006 coup, especially the uses of emergency powers in response to the aforesaid direct 
collision, which led to mass mobilisation and atrocities. 
11. The 2007 Constitution: reinforcing Thai-ness in a deeply divided society 
 Following the 2006 coup, the military similarly promulgated the 2007 Constitution on 
19 August 2007. This constitution clearly intended to reinforce the Thai-ness tradition against 
the rise of the Red faction. Between 2008 and 2014, intermittent efforts by the Red faction to 
amend the 2007 Constitution were hampered by their Yellow opponents. Accordingly, rather 
than pacifying the PCLD, it instead exacerbated social polarisation between the Red and the 
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Yellow, resulting in a series of mass protests and recourse to emergency powers between 2008 
and 2014. Before exploring the uses of emergency powers in the colour-coded crises, it is 
important to examine some key provisions of the 2007 Constitution which orchestrated what 
counts as the norm and the exception in Thailand’s constitutional landscape. 
 Firstly, where the 1997 Constitution, for the first time introduced a Senate with 200 
members directly elected by the people in each province nationwide, the 2007 Constitution 
undermined the development of liberal democracy by partially re-introducing the royally-
appointed Senate of 74 members (other 76 members were directly elected in each province 
nationwide).305  Since 1947, the appointed Senate appeared in every permanent constitution of 
Thailand, with the exception of the 1952 and the 1997 versions.306 Unlike in the West, where 
the Upper House is typically subordinate to the House of Representatives, the appointed Thai 
Senate is normally considered as ‘an anti-politician stronghold’, that is, as an institute 
functioning to implicitly castigate the Lower House as a nest of pluralistic party politics with 
disintegrating tendencies, thus, in effect, imprinting within the Thai constitutional landscape a 
picture of liberal-democratic, electoral politics as a source of political instability and even 
crisis.307 The comprehensive study on the Thai Senate is beyond the scope of this PhD thesis. 
The relevant point here is that the conservative elites normally claim that the reintroduction of 
a royally-appointed Senate was important for preventing the phenomenon of ‘husband-and-
wife Parliament’ as in 1997.308 In practice, most of the appointed Senators, chosen from among 
elites closely related to the palace, military officials and some influential Yellow Shirt activists, 
played a vital role in ensuring royalist influences over the appointment of members of the 
‘watchdog’ agencies, notably Constitutional Court judges, and in countering the ‘evil’ 
politicians of the ‘Red’ faction.309 As we will see, they also played an active role in intervening 
in the administration under the Red government, thus indirectly affecting uses to which 
emergency powers were put.  
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 Secondly, the 2007 Constitution also highlighted the growing importance of the 
judicialisation of politics. The 2007 Constitutional Court judges held their authority under 
Section 68 (previously Section 63 of the 1997 Constitution) to decide, especially during 
political crises, on what counts as an act threatening the DRMH. No verdict had been based on 
Section 63 between 1997 and 2006. As I will show in the next chapter, unlike in 1997, the 
Constitution Court under the 2007 constitution was clearly antagonistic to liberal parliamentary 
politics as it was filled by ‘pro-Yellow’ judges.310 The extensive (re-)connection between the 
Constitutional Court and Thai-ness affects Section 68, and therefore emergency powers and 
political crises. In the next chapter, I will comprehensively compare the 2007 Constitution 
Court with its 1997 predecessor, in particular, the issues of the appointment system and how 
this was intended to insulate the court from political bias. More importantly, its judgments 
during the colour-coded crises will also be assessed. Having explored how the 2007 
Constitution sought to reinforce Thai-ness and contain the Red faction, what we must explore 
next is their uses in the colour-coded crises. 
12. Emergency powers and the struggle between the Red and Yellow factions 
 As already indicated, the Red and the Yellow factions represent two contesting political 
interest groups, holding significantly opposite notions/values about political authority and 
legitimacy—the liberal-legalistic approach and its anti-liberal realist alternative. Though the 
latter still dominates Thailand’s constitutional order, influential demands for liberalism have 
rendered coups based on the Thai-ness justification illegal and also illegitimate among large 
sections of society. Accordingly, despite the attempts by the Yellow faction to reinforce royalist 
dominance after the 2006 coup, their enemies—Thaksin’s proxy political parties—won two 
general elections in 2007 and 2011, causing more frustration among traditional elites, revealing 
that the right-wing conservatives had increasingly become ‘a minority’. Such a loss, notably in 
2008 and between 2011 and 2014, later resulted in a struggle, including the formation of an 
alliance with political pressure groups (the PAD/PDRC), to reassert their hegemony by 
labelling liberal democracy as a cause of political instability/crisis, provoking the use of 
emergency powers by the ‘Red’ government claiming democratic legitimacy. Nevertheless, 
when the ‘Red’ governments were rejected by the Constitutional Court leading to the military-
backed ‘Yellow’ government in 2008, and by a coup in 2014, the UDD and other liberal-
leaning groups denounced these acts as the mark of autocracy worsening the contemporary 
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political crises. Their public protests against dictatorship were normally met with actions 
authorised by emergency powers, drawing legitimacy from the Thai-ness tradition.  
 In total, Thailand has witnessed periodic Red- and Yellow-shirted protests against each 
other’s government, causing occasional uses of emergency powers: (a) the PAD against the 
‘Red’ government in 2008; (b) the UDD against the ‘Yellow’ government in 2009 and 2010; 
and (c) the PDRC against the ‘Red’ government between 2013 and the 2014 coup. The 
approximate number of protestors in each protest in Bangkok (and nationwide in 2010) ranged 
between 50,000 to more than 100,000. Three main forms of emergency powers were used to 
deal with these incidents, namely the Internal Security Act 2008 (‘ISA’), the 2005 Emergency 
Decree on Public Administration in State of Emergency (‘the 2005 Decree’), and a coup 
together with martial law. I will not go into comprehensive details especially of the first two 
pieces of emergency legislation at this moment, but will only mention their general aims. Table 
2 summarises the uses of emergency powers during the colour-coded crises. 




































































   X = emergency powers used 
   O = emergency powers not used 
In this section, the main focus is rather on the general circumstances in which they were 
applied, and upon the key actors during these crises, namely (a) the palace and the military, (b) 
the government, (c) the Constitutional Court, and (d) the protesters.    
12.1 The PAD protests against the two ‘Red’ governments in 2008 
 Despite the attempt by traditional elites and the military to purge Thaksin between 2006 
and 2007, the TRT’s successor party—the People’s Power Party (‘PPP’)—still won the general 
election in December 2007, proving Thaksin’s massive popularity with many Thais. Samak 
Sundaravej and his successor, Somchai Wongsawat, became PM in January and September 
2008 respectively. Regarding their governments as Thaksin’s puppet, the PAD reassembled. 
Each PM declared an emergency in September and November 2008 which ended after the 
Constitutional Court had dismissed Samak and Somchai and dissolved the PPP. The Yellow 
Shirts declared their victory and also dissolved.  
 Provoked by Samak’s attempt to disqualify the banning of Thaksin and other TRT 
executive members by the 2006 junta, the Yellow Shirts reunited in May 2008. Compared to 
the pre-2006 period, the PAD’s political standpoint grew more conservative after proposing 
what they called ‘New Politics’, emphasising the traditional authority under Thai-ness and the 
replacement of liberal democracy and electoral politics with a ‘selectoral democracy’—thirty 
percent of MPs would be elected from constituencies, one per province (76 in total), and the 
rest would be selected from different occupations and associations.311 The latter part of the 
proposal intended to maintain the traditional elites’ influence within Thai politics. Though 
appealing to less middle-class followers, the ‘New Politics’ campaign formed a strong alliance 
between the PAD and the traditional elites and the military.312      
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 On 26 August 2008, the protesters rallied and successfully occupied Government House 
in Bangkok, openly defying the government’s order to leave, vowing to exercise their 
constitutional right to ‘peaceful and unarmed protest’, and performing their duty to protect the 
three pillars of Nation-Religion-Monarchy.313 Within Parliament, the DP clearly supported the 
occupation, and demanded Samak’s resignation. Unable to reoccupy the House, the UDD 
eventually launched an anti-PAD protest, and warned the military not to stage another coup. 
Some Red Shirts ultimately clashed with the PAD guards on the night of 1 September, causing 
violence, clashes and acts of vandalism, reportedly injuring 43 people and causing 1 death.314 
Samak then declared a state of emergency invoking the 2005 Decree, allowing the government 
to disperse protests. Though appointed to deal with an emergency situation, Anupong 
Paochinda, the royalist army commander, refused to stage a coup and even refused to disperse 
the protesters. Claiming that the use of the 2005 Decree would respect the principle of 
democracy, he asked the two sides to rely on negotiation and avoid employing violent means.315 
 However, it was the Constitutional Court which provisionally pacified the situation. 
Shortly after its rise to power, the Election Commission and 29 appointed Senators accused 
Samak, who was also at the time hosting two television cooking shows, of violating the 
provisions of the 2007 Constitution banning the PM from being employed in the private sector, 
and asked the Constitutional Court to annul his premiership.316  
 On 9 September, during a tense confrontation between the government and the PAD, 
the judges unanimously considered Samak’s activity the work of an ‘employee’, thus 
contravening constitutional provisions against conflicts of interests.317  Samak had to step 
down, and Somchai was chosen by Parliament as a new PM. Somchai revoked the state of 
emergency on 15 September.  
 However, as Thaksin’s brother-in-law, Somchai’s premiership was not tolerated by the 
PAD from the start. The latter kept occupying Government House and demanded Somchai’s 
resignation. On 24 November, a convoy of the PAD proceeded illegally to occupy Bangkok’s 
two international airports, pressuring Somchai to resign. The 2005 Decree was re-imposed on 
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27 November. Somchai appointed Anupong to resolve the emergency. As in September, the 
latter declined to follow Somchai’s command.318  
 The Constitutional Court again chose to decide a petition lodged by the prosecutor 
against Yongyut Tiyapairat, an executive member of the PPP, who was accused of vote-buying 
in the 2007 general election. By virtue of Section 237 of the 2007 Constitution, if an executive 
member of a political party is found guilty of vote-buying, the political party with which they 
are affiliated shall be disbanded, and other executive members of that political party shall be 
banned from any elections for five years. This provision was a part of the attempt by the 
traditional elites to undermine Thaksin’s faction and to declare ‘liberal democracy’ as a source 
of the colour-coded crises. Yongyut was found guilty. The PPP was ultimately dissolved, whilst 
its executive members, including Somchai, were banned from general elections for five years, 
depriving him of his premiership.319 The state of emergency was revoked by deputy PM, 
Chaowarat Charnweerakul, on 9 December. 
12.2 The UDD protests against the Yellow government  
 According to the Red Shirts, after the dissolution of the PPP, the PAD disbanded, whilst 
the palace, notably Prem, and the military tacitly persuaded former coalition parties to choose 
the DP leader—Abhisit Vejjajiva—as PM on 17 December 2008. Between 1992 and 2007, the 
DP had been defeated in every general election, and had played a major role as the opposition, 
yet won a majority of seats in the ‘Yellow’ regions, namely Bangkok and the South. The UDD 
regarded Abhisit’s government as a puppet of the traditional elites and the product of ‘a silent 
coup’, and organised sporadic rallies throughout 2009, launching two massive protests against 
him in 2009 and 2010. 320   
  12.2.1 The 2009 Bloody Songkran incident  
 In March 2009, Thaksin made a live video broadcast, accusing the Privy Council 
President, Prem of engineering the 2006 putsch, and that he and the military were behind 
Abhisit’s rise to premiership. The UDD subsequently launched a protest in April in Bangkok, 
demanding Abhisit and Prem resign their posts. The protest became more chaotic after the Red 
Shirts rallied to Pattaya, a special metropolitan area in the eastern region of Chonburi, to disrupt 
the Fourth East Asia Summit. 321 As the security forces could not stop the Red Shirt protesters, 
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Abhisit cancelled the Summit, and invoked the 2005 Decree in Pattaya and Chonburi on 11 
April. The UDD returned to Bangkok, and started blocking roads, calling Abhisit to dissolve 
Parliament. The PM then invoked the 2005 Decree in the Bangkok metropolitan areas on 14 
April. However, unlike in 2008, using tear gas and live bullets, military officials were deployed 
to disperse protesters on the Thai New Year’s Day or Songkran day on April 13.322 The protest 
evaporated on 14 April after its leaders voluntarily surrendered themselves to the police.    
  12.2.2 The 2010 Savage May 
 Between September and November 2009, the Red Shirts launched sporadic rallies 
against Abhisit, causing him cautiously to invoke the ISA in old town Bangkok, intending to 
prevent violence rather than to dissolve the party as was the case with the 2005 Decree. 
However, another immense protest, between 12 March and 19 May 2010 in Bangkok, called 
upon Abhisit swiftly to hold a general election and to reinstate the 1997 Constitution. A failure 
to reach compromise between the two sides led to prolonged confrontations, violence, a state 
of emergency and military crackdown.  
 At the beginning of the protest, Abhisit refrained from invoking the 2005 Decree which 
would allow the government to disperse the protesters, but only employed the ISA, on 9 March, 
to control the protest, thus leaving a space for peaceful compromise. On 28 March, he offered 
talks with the UDD’s leaders, hoping for agreement.323 Yet, on 3 April, after negotiations failed 
to set an election date, the protesters scattered to occupy the downtown shopping district in 
Bangkok to put more pressure on Abhisit, who, in response, declared a state of emergency by 
virtue of the 2005 Decree on 7 April, handing the deputy PM, Suthep Thaugsuban and the 
military the authority to restore public order. The day after the declaration of the emergency, 
the UDD television channel was ‘blacked out’. 324  An attempt by the military to retake the 
protest site on 10 April led to more violence after explosions, tear gas and live bullets were 
used against the protesters, causing the deaths of a journalist, nineteen protesters and five 
soldiers.325 
 The crisis came to a head between 14 and 19 May. Further clashes, mysterious sniper 
attacks (presumed to have been undertaken by the military) and skirmishes followed. The 
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government and the military decided to end the protest after tanks and troops with live rounds 
were sent to disperse the protesters at 5.45 am on 19 May, leading to violence fighting, rioting, 
and more than 30 buildings burned.326 The operation claimed the lives of civilians, including 
six in a Buddhist temple, supposed to be a safe heaven, near the Red Shirts’ base, whilst an 
unspecified number of Red Shirt protesters were arrested and imprisoned. 327 Abhisit declared 
a curfew on the night of 19 May. In total, the crisis between March and May caused more than 
90 deaths and over 2,000 people injured, with Abhisit since stigmatised by the Red Shirts as 
‘an assassin’.328 Shortly after this incident, the Constitutional Court upheld the constitutionality 
of Abhisit’s invocation of the 2005 Decree, which, in effect, justified the UDD crackdown 
operation. I will critically analyse the details of this verdict in the next chapter.  
 In July 2010, Abhisit appointed a Truth and Reconciliation Committee (‘TRC’) 
responsible for investigating the 2010 incident, comprising 12 legal and political science 
scholars, and dissolved Parliament in May 2011. The TRC’s roles were limited to finding the 
truth about the 2010 crackdown and recommending a ‘reconciliation strategy’ and possible 
remedies. While finding that the military used live bullets and firearms to disperse the 
protesters, it simultaneously accused the Red Shirts of producing chaos and possessing lethal 
weapons.329 In reality, given the 2014 coup, the report has never been fully implemented. The 
Supreme Court also dropped murder charges filed by the public prosecutor on the request of 
the Department of Special Investigation, responsible for investigating national security-related 
matters against Abhisit and Suthep in August 2017, claiming that it possessed no legal authority 
to investigate public officials.330    
12.3 The PDRC protest against the Red government and the 2014 coup 
 Despite the above attempts by conservative elites and the military to deal with Thaksin 
and the Red faction, the DP was nevertheless defeated in a general election on 3 July 2011. 
Thaksin’s younger sister, Yingluck Shinawatra, became the first Thai female PM in August 
2011 after the PPP’s successor—the Pheu-Thai Party (‘PT’)—won, with the exception of the 
DP’s base in the South, a general election again by landslide.  
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 After two years of stable politics, in late 2013, the government attempted to pass an 
Amnesty Bill exculpating all political actors committing during political turmoil since the 2006 
coup. The Yellow camp believed that the Bill would effectively immunise Thaksin from 
corruption charges, while the Red faction and other liberals also blamed the Bill for exculpating 
Abhisit, Suthep and the military from criminal charges entailed by the dissolution of the UDD 
protesters in 2010.331 On 31 October, the PAD, refashioned as the PDRC, led by Suthep who 
resigned from the DP, organised yet another round of mass protest against the Bill, eventually 
pressuring Parliament to reject it.  
 However, the PDRC later transformed itself into the anti-Shinawatra protest, presenting 
itself as ‘the guardians of Thai-ness and the DRMH’ and therefore a group of good men, 
sparking another political crisis. Suthep proposed the replacement of electoral politics deemed 
as factional and corrupt with ‘the People’s Council’ consisting of appointed members—100 of 
whom would be chosen by the PDRC from technocrats and traditional elites considered as 
Khon Dee; the rest would be representatives of various professions—to ‘reform’ the country.332 
Undoubtedly, this goal could be achieved only through suspending the liberal democratic 
processes, that is, through another coup. The protest was further fuelled by the attempt by MPs 
of the PT to pass a constitutional amendment bill, replacing the partially-appointed Senate with 
an entirely elected one just as in 1997. The PDRC branded this bill an endeavour to ‘politicise’ 
the Senate.  
 The political crisis forced Yingluck to invoke the ISA between 25 November and 31 
December 2013 to control protests and to prevent violence. She also sought to compromise 
with the PDRC by dissolving Parliament and calling for a general election on 2 February 2014. 
Yet, the election was condemned by Suthep as an attempt to cleanse Yingluck’s tarnished 
image, while Yingluck also repeatedly criticised Suthep’s demand for the People’s Council on 
the ground of its unconstitutionality.333 The PDRC consequently ran anti-election campaigns; 
a number of protesters attempted to interrupt the candidate registration process, accusing 
Yingluck of exploiting the election process simply to legitimise her rule. 334  Protesters also 
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broke into and closed down several government ministries and offices. 335  The DP withdrew 
from the election, and brutal violence again erupted due to clashes between ultra-rightist 
university students and Red Shirt supporters in Bangkok’s suburbs, resulting in shooting which 
led to 4 deaths and 57 people injured on the night of 1 December. Suthep took this opportunity 
to escalate the protest, declaring it ‘the people’s coup’.336     
 Due to heightened violence, between 22 January and 22 March 2014, Yingluck later 
declared a state of emergency under the 2005 Decree around the Bangkok metropolitan area. 
However, like the events of 2008 but not those of 2010, the new army commander and staunch 
royalist, Prayuth Chan-ocha, relying on the police, had refrained from assisting the government 
in dispersing the PDRC, and also from staging a coup between December 2013 and May 
2014.337 Meanwhile, by contrast with 2010, the ‘Yellow’ television channels were not blacked 
out by Yingluck and kept broadcasting the protest leaders’ speeches. One day before the 
election, in outer Bangkok, there was street fighting between the Red Shirts, in favour of the 
election, and the PRDC supporters against it, leading to exchanges of gun fire, severely 
wounding 4 people.338   
 Again, in the midst of violence and the use of emergency powers, the Constitutional 
Court intervened in an attempt to steer the direction of the political crisis as follows.  Firstly, a 
military-appointed senator and other DP MPs asked the Constitutional Court to nullify the PT’s 
constitutional amendment bill discussed above. Although the 2007 Constitution required the 
Public Prosecutor to endorse any petition under Section 68 before it could be heard before the 
Constitutional Court, the judges bypassed this process and admitted this individual petition. On 
20 November 2013, the Court held that the amendment bill, re-establishing the fully-elected 
Senate, would politicise it, turning it from a non-partisan body into a ‘husband-and-wife 
Parliament’ just as in 1997. It then ruled that the bill was tantamount to an endeavour to usurp 
political power through unconstitutional means prohibited by Section 68 of the 2007 
Constitution.339 This decision outwardly provided a shielding mechanism to protect the sacred 
space of Thai-ness—the appointed Senate—from electoral politics.     
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 Furthermore, between November 2013 and May 2014, the Constitutional Court, again 
bypassing the Public Prosecutor’s supervisory authority under Section 68 of the 2007 
Constitution, continuously ruled against petitions by the UDD leaders and other PT ministers, 
asking the Court to declare the PDRC protest contrary to the aspiration of liberal democracy, 
thus flouting this provision.340 Later in February 2014, fatal clashes between riot police and the 
masses recurred. The militant guard of the PDRC even exchanged gunfire with them, while 
several explosives thrown from the protester’s site were reported, killing at least four civilians 
and one police officer and injuring sixty people.341 Following these incidents, the Civil Court, 
on 19 February, affirmed the Constitutional Court’s ruling by prohibiting the government from 
applying emergency powers under the 2005 Decree, in particular, to disperse assemblies and 
to dismantle barricades built by the PDRC.342  
 Besides, due to the PDRC’s disruptions, the election process could not be pursued in 
69 of 375 constituencies (18.4% of all constituencies). This made the PT unable to form a new 
government given that under the 2007 Constitution, the House of Representatives cannot 
convene if the Election Commission does not certify the election of MPs for at least 95% of all 
constituencies.343 The DP filed a petition before the Constitutional Court, asking it to void the 
election. On 21 March, the Constitutional Court declared the election unconstitutional on the 
ground that voting was not on the same day nationwide.344  
 Given that the invocation of the 2005 Decree could not facilitate Yingluck to organise 
the general election, and that her emergency authority to disperse protesters was prohibited, the 
PM had to re-impose the ISA between 19 March and 30 April 2014. However, the situation 
deteriorated after the Red Shirts reunited in Bangkok in April, re-asserting the anti-coup and 
anti-PDRC campaigns and condemning the Constitutional Court for striving to create a ‘power 
vacuum’ facilitating another coup.345 Yingluck was later accused by an appointed senator who 
was also a PDRC member, Phiboon Nititawan, of having abused her power by illegally 
transferring the national security advisor appointed by Abhisit’s government, Thawil Pliensri, 
and replacing him with a crony. On 7 May, the situation became even more volatile after the 
Constitutional Court ruled that the move was based on ‘patronage’, thus constituting an abuse 
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of power, and ordered Yingluck and the other nine ministers to resign.346 These verdicts created 
‘a power vacuum’.347 Without a permanent government, the army’s commander, Prayuth, 
intervened by imposing martial law throughout the Kingdom on 20 May.  
 Avoiding another coup, Prayuth held talks among conflicting interests, namely the 
PDRC, the DP, the PT and the UDD, claiming as the best possible way to avoid a coup.348 
Nevertheless, failing to find a compromise, another coup was staged on 22 May, abolishing the 
2007 Constitution and suspending parliamentary democracy, replacing it with the TSD under 
the 2014 Interim Constitution with Prayuth asserting the need to halt political romanticism bred 
by the prolonged colour-coded crises. He later formed a junta–the National Council for Peace 
and Order (NCPO), and asked from King Bhumibol his blessing.349 According to Suthep’s 
recent interview with the BBC, he and Prayuth discussed a coup plot shortly before the 
imposition of martial law.350    
 Interestingly, Prayuth included Section 44 (‘M-44’), containing a text in the 2014 
interim constitution almost identical to M-17 of the 1959 Constitutional Charter, allowing him, 
in the capacity of the Head of the NCPO, to issue whatsoever orders or act in response to threats 
especially to national security, unity, harmony and Nation-Religion-Monarchy.  
 Section 44 (M-44) of the 2014 Interim Constitution: 
 ‘[W]here the Head of the [NCPO] holds an opinion that it is necessary for [safeguarding] public unity 
…, or for [preventing] any acts threatening … national security [or] the throne …, [he] shall hold an authority 
to issue any order [for these purposes which] is deemed to be lawful and constitutional …’ (my translation) 
 The Interim Constitution also declared all actions related to the coup lawful and 
constitutional.351 In August 2014, Prayuth was later chosen by the junta-appointed National 
Legislative Assembly as the new PM. For a short-period, the 2014 takeover encountered anti-
coup protesters, especially the Red Shirts and some progressive students and middle-class, 
flouting the coup order banning public gatherings of more than 5 people, and leading to arrests 
and detentions. Though Thailand’s colour-coded political crisis is in still ongoing, we can at 
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least discern that while the 2014 coup was highly praised by the Yellow faction for helping 
protect Thai-ness, anti-coup movements argue that military intervention in politics is no longer 
and undisputedly acceptable in 21st century Thailand. The more Prayuth endeavoured to 
establish peace on the surface, especially through harsh measures under M-44 against pro-
democracy activists, notably orders summoning certain individuals, filing lèse-majesté 
criminal charges, arrests and detentions, and other forms of intimidation, the more he had to 
deal with a cauldron of repressed anger.  
13. From contestation to collision between the two forces 
 The colour-coded crises reveal both conflict over interests and values with a total lack 
of consensus on whether the liberal or conservative ideal should constitute the hegemonic 
political ideology/regime (value-judgment ‘ought’) and the basis for the use of emergency 
powers (authority ‘is’). Though the latter is still dominant, the former has become more widely 
acceptable in the modern context. Three main trends can be discerned from such crises and 
must be considered when applying them to the Kelsen-Schmitt debate. 
 Firstly, rather than pacifying the PCLD, the reinvocation of a military coup in 2006, in 
spite of the fact that it claimed to repress public enemies, in fact stirred up such enemies—pro-
liberal movements—and galvanised the AoH. In fact, coups and martial law powers tend to 
strengthen the popularity of those enemies as the Red faction kept winning in every general 
election since 2007. Its declining hegemony and the growing need to ‘co-opt’ the Red 
government also force the Yellow faction to think about how to respond to emergency powers 
invoked by ‘public enemies’ against the mobilisation of anti-liberal ideologies. The crises then 
mirror not simply a contestation but also a direct ideological and physical collision between 
the two forces. The Thai case eventually poses a question regarding which of them should 
provide the basis for legitimisation of political authority, especially of emergency powers 
imposed to deal with the PCLD. Meanwhile, although the traditional elites and the military 
prefer subjecting the role of the people to acclamation, they have increasingly realised the 
importance of mobilising royalist masses to preserve their hegemonic status. The colour-coded 
crises then suggest the importance of the masses in influencing the application of emergency 
powers and the problem of the AoH in Thailand associated with them.352   
 Secondly, given the presence of the Red faction and other pro-democracy groups, it was 
apparent that between 2008 and 2014, the Yellow faction became more politically aware of 
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staging another coup, and instead sought to deal with the PCLD through a legal-technical 
mechanism, namely the Constitutional Court and emergency legislation.  
 In parallel, and thirdly, this trend significantly challenged the effectiveness of 
emergency powers. It appeared that such effectiveness did not depend on whether emergency 
powers were in compliance with legality, but on ‘the colour’. The table below summarises the 
Constitutional Court’s verdicts which affected the direction of emergency powers in the PCLD 
between 2008 and 2014. 
Table 3: The Constitutional Court’s verdicts summarised 
Incidents/Decisions by 
the Court 
Government The Court upholding/paving 
the way for emergency powers 
The Court upholding the 
hegemony of Thai-
ness/intervening the invocation of 
emergency powers 
The 2008 PAD protest 
against 






- The Cooking Show verdict ending 
Samak’s declaration of a state of 
emergency 
- The PPP dissolution case ending 
Somchai’s declaration of a state of 
emergency   




- The Court upholding Abhsit’s 
declaration of the 2005 Decree and 
the UDD crackdown operation 
                                   
                          - 
 




- ‘Political vacuum’ created by the 
annulment of the 2014 election 
case and the Thawil case, paving 
the way for the 2014 coup and 
martial law 
- The Court confirming the 
constitutionality of the PDRC 
rallies, rendering the use of the 2005 
Decree to disperse the protesters 
unconstitutional 
 
According to Tables 2 and 3, the Constitutional Court was ready to intervene in the invocation 
of the 2005 Decree by the Red governments and other acts deemed to be a challenge what the 
Yellow faction counts as the norm, and to stigmatise the UDD protest as a threat to national 
security. Section 13 also indicated the military’s autonomy from civilian oversight as it might 
resist following commands issued under the 2005 Decree by the PMs of the Red faction or 
could even choose to stage a coup.353  By contrast, the Yellow government, with the military’s 
support, could maintain and even prolong a state of emergency, while the PDRC protesters’ 
freedom of assembly during the application of the 2005 Decree were preserved by the 
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Constitutional Court. Yet, it was simultaneously apparent that insufficiently harshly repressing 
the Red faction could not ensure the outward prevalence of its Yellow counterpart. The 
intervention of the Constitutional Court even paved the way for the silent coup in 2008 and 
another military coup in 2014. However, the politicisation of the judiciary and the 2014 coup 
generated, in combination, the feeling of ‘double standards’ among the Red faction, thus 
precipitating greater social friction. 
14. Conclusion 
 As I already mentioned, emergency powers in the PCLD in Thailand mirrors the pull 
of gravity between liberalism and authoritarianism, neither of which absolutely prevails over 
the other. Meanwhile, the analysis of this process has to take into account actors affiliated with 
the two factions, namely (a) the Yellow faction which comprises the palace, the traditional 
elites, the military, the Constitutional Court, and the PAD/PDRC; and (b) the Red faction which 
is composed of Thaksin Shinawatra and his allies, the UDD, and other pro-democracy/leftist 
movements.  
 On the one hand, it is clear that the core of the ‘Yellow’ view on political stability and 
security has been relatively consistent since before 1932, in that, the royalist elites were 
prepared to apply the Dhammaraja tradition to justify extra-normative emergency powers and 
the SoE invoked to eliminate any threats to the tradition itself. Since the political struggle in 
post-1932 Thailand is essentially between two competing conceptions of the source of political 
authority (Thai-ness or the constitution), it is being played out as a raw conflict of political 
interests and values (both material and symbolic). Emergency powers/martial law are very 
attractive to the Yellow faction as a way of maintaining their power against the rising challenge 
of liberal modernisers. The traditional elites, therefore, do not genuinely want such powers to 
be made legally accountable, because this would weaken their utility for this purpose. To justify 
this approach, they normally invoke the idea of traditional Thai-ness as embodied particularly 
in the monarchy, thus claiming the need to suppress political instability entailed by political 
romanticism associated with liberalism to sanction, in particular, banning political gatherings, 
press censorship and preventive detention of political opponents accused of incitement to 
violence and sedition. In other words, they claimed the right to invoke emergency 
powers/martial law, not just to deal with law and order crises, but to defeat any challenge, 
including peaceful political ones, to the traditional Thai status quo, effectively a Schmittian 
conception.  
 However, given the trends towards constitutionalism, modernisation, liberalisation and 
democratisation which stand sharply in contrast with pure military rule, the Thai experience 
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also suggests that the imposition of coups can no longer simply be placed beyond legal norms. 
In parallel with this fact, it was also obvious during the colour-coded crises that there were 
attempts to avoid staging coups and declaring marital law, while the Constitutional Court 
played a greater role in determining the direction of emergency powers in the PCLD. Besides, 
the Thai context simultaneously reveals how liberal constitutionalism is increasingly 
transformed into the contending source of ‘state authority’ within the political sphere—a trend 
which is important for ensuring liberal legality of emergency powers in the PCLD.  
 Overall, although neither liberalism nor authoritarianism can genuinely prevail as the 
norm in Thailand, it is at least apparent that there seem to be some attempts to liberalise the 
use of emergency powers in the PCLD.  My findings in this chapter therefore call us to revisit 
the effects of the hegemonic but declining realist model upon the efforts to put forward a 
commitment to liberalism, and vice versa. The related question is how the conflict between the 
‘Red’ and the ‘Yellow’ ideologies affects the characteristics/types of emergency powers 
invoked in response to the colour-coded crises. This also involves how the roles of the 








Chapter 3: Lessons from emergency powers in Thailand’s political crises 
1. Introduction 
 As illustrated in the previous chapter, Thai constitutional history reflects (a) the 
competing notions of normality and stability between royal hegemony and contending 
struggles for liberal constitutionalism and democracy, resulting in the PCLD and a series of 
emergency powers; and (b) the tension between the relentless attempts to re-invoke royalist 
coups together with martial law and the struggles to ensure compliance of emergency powers 
with liberal constitutionalism. In this chapter, I aim to address the first research question—To 
what extent do the views of the Kelsenian and Schmittian constitutional emergency models 
apply to the Thai experience? The answers here provide milestones for synthesising Kelsen 
and Schmitt in the next chapter. From the contestation which eventually leads to the collision 
between the liberal and conservative forces in Thailand, four theoretical questions can be 
identified. 
  The first two questions are related to the internal perspective of the constitutional 
emergency model discussed in Chapter 1 as I focus on the assertion of each particular model’s 
political legitimacy against the increasing contestation by opposing political movements. Their 
answers require us to consider not only the history of the uses of emergency powers in the 
PCLD both pre- and during the colour-coded crises, but also the development of relevant 
constitutional provisions drafted in both periods to ensure Thai-ness hegemony. To begin with, 
recurring coups and martial law declarations parallel the efforts to institutionalise Thai-ness in 
the context of rising liberal forces weakening anti-liberal realism itself. Therefore, I primarily 
ask: In a society such as Thailand long dominated implicitly, if not expressly, by a Schmittian-
type idea, yet experiencing the process of Kelsenian liberalisation, what means would facilitate 
the former to preserve its political hegemony? On the flip side, due to emerging liberal 
demands, the Thai case also exposes the attempt to liberalise emergency powers in light of the 
dominant politics of exclusion. Here, the question is therefore: Given the strong authoritarian 
culture in Thailand, what means would facilitate the efforts to liberalise emergency powers to 
assert political legitimacy and to be successfully institutionalised?  
 On the other hand, the third question is predicated on the key element of the external 
perspective of the constitutional emergency model, that is, the collision between the attempt to 
maintain a declining coup tradition and the growing importance of a legal-rational legitimacy. 
This scenario is related to the roles of the Constitutional Court during the PCLD. As Chapter 2 
showed, given the declining legitimacy of coups and martial law in Thailand, the Constitutional 
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Court played a greater role in determining the direction of emergency powers in the PCLD. On 
the one hand, this reflects the attempt to deal with this matter in a more liberal, legal-rational 
manner. Nevertheless, given the endeavour to reconnect the judiciary with the Thai-ness 
tradition, the Constitutional Court also played a vital role in either repressing the use of 
emergency powers by the Red faction or justifying/paving the way for emergency powers 
against it. Here, I therefore ask how the roles of the Thai Constitutional Court in regard to 
emergency powers in the PCLD should be understood. 
 The fourth question also draws upon the external perspective but is more concerned 
with the relation between emergency powers and the AoH. It mainly focuses on emergency 
powers in Thailand’s contemporary political crises, revealing a direct ideological and physical 
collision between the royalist-conservative Yellow and pro-democracy Red factions which 
started in 2006. The key question here is: How does the AoH bred by this collision affect the 
tension between royal sovereign authority and the attempt to put forward a commitment to 
liberal constitutionalism during emergencies?    
 In Chapter 2, I illustrated the growing connection between the Thai-ness tradition and 
legality. Section 2 of the current chapter seeks elaborates its development and paradox. In 
Section 3, I intend to assess two ways that facilitate the liberalisation of emergency powers, 
namely (a) from ‘above’ with support from the monarchy; and (b) from ‘below’ through 
political struggles. Then, in Section 4, the roles of the Thai Constitutional Court during the 
colour-coded crises and how its verdicts affected the direction of emergency powers applied 
therewith are considered. Lastly, I assess the substance of emergency powers invoked during 
the colour-coded crises.  
2. The ‘Yellow’ coups and the contrasting processes of liberalisation and democratisation 
 This section considers the extent to which the anti-liberal stance of emergency powers 
has been adapted to defend its political legitimacy against rising liberal forces in Thailand. 
Various analyses of Thailand’s coup culture have been offered by both legal and political 
scholars. Yet, many of them such as Borwornsak, Khīan, or Ukrist are not specifically 
concerned with the application of emergency powers, and avoid comprehensively assessing the 
relationship between the traditional elites and the military, and their anti-liberalism.354 These 
scholars prefer instead to focus on how factional conflicts within the military, or corruption by 
politicians, justified coups (Ukrist), on how a communist threat during the Cold War supported 
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authoritarian dictatorship in Thailand (Khīan), or, without assessing the aforesaid relationship, 
on how to firmly entrench liberal constitutionalism in Thailand (Borwornsak). Besides, there 
have recently been several brilliant contributions assessing how the Yellow faction-military 
alliance supports royalist coups, and their effects on Thai democracy, but not vice versa.355 
Overall, many contemporary works on Thai public law and politics do not seriously consider 
how Thai conservatives have ‘adapted’ themselves to the changing circumstances presented by 
liberal movements. Only by clarifying this question, can we determine how the ‘Schmittian’ 
model asserts its hegemony in the context of rising liberal legal-rational authority.      
 At the outset, the Thai experience reveals that the king’s blessing, in the form of a royal 
proclamation and/or an audience with him after a coup, gave coup-makers legitimacy. Any 
clear revocation of his support, such as in 1973 and 1992, signified that the use of emergency 
powers by the military to handle a political crisis was illegitimate. Due to such a role, the 
royalist-conservatives have normally concluded that the Thai monarch holds sovereign 
authority to resolve a political crisis.356 Kobkua and Ramraj even add that the king’s authority 
in political crises ‘is personal, non-transferable ... [, and therefore] cannot be 
institutionalized.’357 However, I gain note that we should bear in mind, as Kasien puts it, that 
royal hegemony in modern Thailand should be regarded as a resolution of the problem of ‘how 
best to manage the loss of sovereignty to commoner strangers/outsiders so as to preserve the 
vital interests and values of the palace and the nation.’358 According to Tom Ginsburg, growing 
demands for liberal democracy resulting in the 1973 and 1976 incidents at least fostered ‘a 
constitutional understanding’ among different factions within Thai society that a permanent, 
authoritarian rule under the guise of the TSD might provoke more popular disquiet which 
would further tarnish the military’s legitimacy.359  
 As I discussed in Chapter 2, where Sarit sought to ‘kill off’ the 1932 Revolution, post-
Sarit coup leaders, though still championing anti-liberal realist ideas, chose to ‘shift from 
repression to co-optation’, in particular, by ‘further [restructuring] or [broadening] the ruling 
coalition, and possibly [granting] some of the demands of newly mobilized constituencies’, 
                                                          
 355 E.g., Pavin Chachavalpongpun, ‘Thaksin, the military and Thailand’s protracted political crisis’ in 
Marcus Mietzner (ed), The Political Resurgence of the Military in Southeast Asia (Routledge 2012); Streckfuss, 
Truth; Thongchai, ‘Toppling Democracy’. 
 356 See Borwornsak’s argument in Chapter 2; McCargo, ‘Network monarchy’, p 501. 
 357  Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, Kings, Country and Constitutions: Thailand's Political Development 
1932-2000 (RoutledgeCurzon 2003), p 67 (emphasis added); Ramraj, ‘EPP’, pp 35, 37. 
 358 Kasian Tejapira, ‘The Irony of Democratization and the Decline of Royal Hegemony in Thailand’ 
(2016) 5 Southeast Asian Studies 219, p 226. 
 359 Ginsburg, ‘Constitutional afterlife’, p 88. 
95 
 
yet, still preserving the possibility of royalist coups.360 Accordingly, from the value-judgment 
‘ought’ dimension, the more authoritarianism has increasingly co-opted liberal democracy, the 
more, from the cognition/authority ‘is’ alternative, this increasingly calls for the 
institutionalisation/constitutionalisation of ‘coup mechanisms’, namely a coup together with 
subsequent resort to emergency powers themselves and their future possible uses. My argument 
here is also distinct from that of Eugénie Mérieau who, despite thinking that this sovereign 
authority can be institutionalised, considers that its institutionalisation took place only after the 
commencement of the colour-coded crisis in 2006 through judicialisation of politics, that is, an 
attempt to transfer royal authority to resolve political crises to the Constitutional Court.361 The 
term institutionalisation in her article appears to follow the Weberian idea of the routinisation 
of personalistic authority, in that, it concerns the replacement of ‘the rule by men’ with a ‘legal-
rational/institutional one’. 362  She nevertheless does not speak of the process of 
institutionalisation understood, in general, as the establishment of any particular tradition as 
the norm in a given polity. Given this deficiency, despite recognising the inclusion of 
constitutional provisions which built the constitutionality of a coup and other emergency 
actions, Mérieau does not assess them, or more precisely, their ‘evolution’, in tandem with the 
ongoing process of liberalisation and the seemingly limited authority of the monarchy, thus 
failing to see them as an attempt to institutionalise/constitutionalise royal emergency authority 
and Thai-ness hegemony in a retroactive manner. 363  Besides, she does not speak of the 
constitutionalisation of the DRMH in every Thai constitution from the late 1940s as a process 
for institutionalising a coup and pursuant emergency rule within Thailand’s constitutional and 
legal landscape. Below, I explain how the legal-rational technique plays several roles in 
constitutionalising ‘the coup mechanisms’.  
 I have already illustrated in the previous chapter (Table 1 in Section 8) that Thai 
political takeovers always resulted in the abolition of an incumbent constitution guaranteeing 
room for electoral politics and the promulgation of an interim constitution anchoring the TSD, 
and including provisions largely similar to M-17 of the 1959 Charter (with the exception of the 
2006 Interim Constitution), which granted the PM extensive emergency powers to repress 
threats to Thai-ness.364 Thus, where a coup and the following uses of emergency powers in 
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Thailand outwardly reveal sovereign authority, there is now a constitutional custom that the 
military needs to build the constitutionality of the TSD shortly after the period of rule by coup 
decree.  
 Nevertheless, according to the constitutional understanding observed by Tom Ginsberg, 
the changing circumstance after 1973 means that an interim constitution and the TSD are 
expected to be replaced later by a new permanent constitution, which not only outwardly 
restores electoral politics, parliamentary democracy and individual rights, but also excludes the 
‘M-17’ clause.365 Notwithstanding the revival of party politics, the drafting of new permanent 
constitutions, with the only exception of the 1997 Constitution, was normally initiated and 
influenced by the junta, thus undoubtedly retaining the traditional concept of emergency 
powers and political stability, including the system of weak parliamentary coalitions, which 
harboured the possible instigation of coups. In fact, what coup-makers, struggling with greater 
liberal movements after Sarit’s death, did beyond what Sarit had done previously was 
nevertheless to include within the 1972, 1976 and 1977 Constitutional Charters an amnesty 
clause, declaring the lawfulness of a coup and relevant action of the junta and others. This 
reflected the growing need to accommodate what counts as ‘unconstitutional’ to growing 
liberal demands. For instance, Section 21 of the 1972 Constitutional Charter stipulated that: 
 ‘Any acts or orders of the coup leader issued or done between the takeover date of 17 November 1971 
and the day this Constitutional Charter is promulgated in whatever forms and … forces … shall be deemed 
lawful.’366 (my translation) 
This clause held the status of a constitutional provision and was therefore not susceptible to a 
challenge to its constitutionality.  
 However, after years of experience with (semi-) electoral politics, greater demands for 
a liberal form of parliamentary democracy forced Prem to step down and organise a general 
election in 1988. The 1991 coup overthrowing the Chatchai government, though initially 
popular, had to contend more with liberal demands due to rising political awareness both within 
and outside Parliament, forcing its leaders to swiftly restore parliamentary democracy by 
promulgating a democratic constitution in 1991. 367   A more rigorous technique was 
accordingly required to build the constitutionality of the takeover even after the parliamentary 
system was restored. The 1991 Constitution then became the first permanent constitution which 
guaranteed, not just their lawfulness, but also the constitutionality of the coup and all related 
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actions, including all emergency orders issued by the military government under the 1991 
Constitutional Charter. Section 222 of which stipulated that: 
 ‘All declarations and orders of the National Peace Keeping Council … or other orders issued under 
Section 27 of the 1991 Constitutional Charter in whatever forces which are still effective until the day this 
constitution is promulgated shall be deemed effective and constitutional under this constitution.’ (my translation) 
This provision, in effect, ensures that despite the abolition of an interim constitution imposing 
the TSD and the restoration of parliamentary democracy, the constitutionality of the takeover 
cannot be disputed. The 1991 Constitution also confirmed the superiority of the DRMH over 
alternative political regimes as it was the first Thai constitution which prohibited a motion for 
a constitutional amendment having the effect of changing the DRMH. 368  However, these 
provisions could not resist more intense demands for liberal democracy and constitutionalism, 
in turn, making the building of constitutionality for coup mechanisms more indispensable after 
the colour-coded crisis of 2006. Accordingly, more concise wordings were employed to 
insulate the TSD installed after the 2006 coup. Section 309 of the 2007 Constitution, for 
example, stipulated that: 
 ‘All actions deemed by [the 2006 Interim Constitution] as lawful and constitutional, including actions 
and activities related to them performed prior to or subsequent to the date this Constitution is promulgated, 
shall be deemed constitutional according to this Constitution.’ (my translation)
  
This provision established a new constitutional practice by granting more extensive protection 
to coup-makers and their allies against any legal challenges by pro-democracy groups. It built 
the constitutionality, not merely of actions prior to the promulgation of the permanent 
constitution—notably the coup and other uses of emergency powers—but also, and for the first 
time, of future actions related to the takeover after Parliament was restored, particularly those 
associated with the enforcement of emergency powers, despite their encroachment on 
individual rights and liberties provided by the Constitution itself. A Section 309-like provision 
re-appears in the successor of the 2007 Constitution—the current 2017 Constitution to be 
considered in the final chapter.369  
 Overall, what is most obvious from the Thai experience is that the imposition of a 
military coup, given the contesting processes of liberalisation and democratisation, has 
increasingly been less exceptional in terms of the suspension of normativism. In other words, 
political stability can no longer be based exclusively on the social order, in particular, the Thai-
ness tradition, but has to increasingly conceive the importance of legal stability. This can be 
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explained in two ways. Firstly, extra-normative emergency powers need increasingly to 
consider legality as the referent of legitimisation. Secondly, legality is exploited as a means to 
preserve the possibility of their invocation. Ultimately, Thailand’s coup-culture results in a 
paradox, in that, the growing resort to legality to reserve a space for, to quote Harding, ‘what 
are strictly illegal means itself tends to undermine attempts to establish the rule of law as a 
binding principle.’370 Notwithstanding the absence of a strong liberal tradition which leads to 
the institutionalisation of anti-liberal realism compromising the implementation of the PoA, 
increasing demands for liberalism within Thai society however mean that this ideal can no 
longer been totally resisted. In the next section, I turn to means which advance the liberalisation 
of emergency powers in Thailand.  
3. The liberalisation of emergency powers against a Schmittian-type alternative 
 Despite not constituting a hegemonic political ideal, I showed in Chapter 2 that 
liberalism, at least, has become an undeniable contending rhetoric in Thailand. This suggests 
that we should not overlook the importance of examining a political condition facilitating the 
liberalisation of emergency powers in the context of Thai-ness hegemony. The Thai experience 
of emergency powers in the PCLD offered two possibilities for this process—from the above 
with the support from the monarchy and from below through the process of political struggles. 
3.1 Proceeding with liberal constitutionalism from the top: Pornsakol on the 
monarchy   
 As obvious from the 1973 and 1992 incidents, the king’s decision to revoke his support 
for the military government, including its use of martial law against protesters, outwardly ended 
the uprising, and restored electoral democracy and liberal constitutionalism. This fact 
persuades Pornsakol to conclude the following regarding the role of the monarchy in building 
liberal constitutionalism in times of crises: 
 ‘As the King is the fundamental institution of Thailand, it will be difficult to separate his role from the 
rule of law application. … [H]is involvement in politics [just as in 1973] does not appear to be negative on the 
rule of law in Thailand.’ 371 
 In other words, Pornsakol concludes that the king might assert his sovereign authority 
to police emergency powers and re-establish their commitment to a liberal-democratic 
constitution. Although this argument is right about the role of His Majesty during the 1973 
uprising, she fails to assess the conflict between Thai-ness as exploited by the Yellow faction 
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to justify coups and the attempt to implement liberal democracy and constitutionalism. The 
colour-coded crises clearly reveal the absence of consensus on what should constitute the 
hegemonic conception of political stability and authority. In Chapter 4, I will more 
comprehensively assess this in the light of the Kelsen-Schmitt debate.  
 Notwithstanding recurring coups and the country’s entrenched traditional form of 
authority, I need to recall observations made by Ginsburg on the constitutional understanding 
fostered by the 1973 uprising. The emergence of bottom-up demands for liberal democracy, at 
least, strengthens the contending rhetoric of ‘liberal constitutionalism’, making it undeniable 
and inspiring the 1992 Black May turmoil. In contrast to Pornsakol’s thesis, it is better to think 
of the Thai experience as requiring an ongoing struggle for liberal democracy and 
constitutionalism, regardless of by whom, in order for the PoA to take hold.   
 3.2 Political struggles for liberal constitutionalism  
 I begin this section by recalling the 1973 and 1992 uprisings, and the protests by the 
Red Shirts and other anti-coup activist groups between 2006 and 2017. For Ramraj and 
Harding, these incidents highlight the importance of political struggles against dictatorship and 
‘political opinion supporting democratic development, good governance and human rights’ 
among networks of middle-class people, notably civil society organisation, intellectuals, 
business associations, and opposition activists, who were deprived of a ‘democratic voice’, in 
the political arena in transforming the inherent authoritarian culture.372 They then share the 
view that successful legal constraints on emergency powers require ‘informal backups’, 
notably growing public awareness of authoritarian uses of emergency powers.373 The term 
political struggle here connotes what Prabhat regards as ‘legal mobilisation’, that is, a 
circumstance in which political actors purposely invoke legal norms, raise awareness of the 
importance of liberalism among the public, and make their moves ‘out of doors’, including in 
the form of bargaining/lobbying and mass protests, to realise their demands.374 Clearly, since 
1973, the modern trends towards constitutionalism, liberalisation, and democratisation 
significantly reinforce the aspiration for liberal democratic constitutionalism, making extra-
normative sovereign authority more and more politically outdated.  
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 A provisional conclusion drawn from this observation is therefore that, for liberal 
legality to move forward, ‘liberal aspiration’ and a struggle from below by pro-democracy 
movements are essential to transform it into a contending force within the political sphere.375 
Harding and Ramraj then implicitly embrace Moustafa’s conclusion that: 
 ‘When social forces engage state institutions from the bottom up, they inevitably transform those 
institutions in ways that were often not initially intended by central decision makers. As a result, authoritarian 
leaders frequently find themselves locked in conflict with the very institutions that were initially created to advance 
state interests.’376 
 While also recognising that political struggles are important, I nevertheless consider 
these arguments insufficiently comprehensive because they fail to consider the benefit of 
liberal democratic standards to the Yellow elites and their supporters. To make this case, I need 
first to explain, through the lens of the Thai experience, the key advantage of liberal 
constitutionalism as advocated by Kelsen.  
 The struggle for liberalism in public emergencies, no doubt, contributes towards 
making such rhetoric a component of political legitimacy against the anti-liberal realist regime 
in the ‘real-world’ political arena.377 Clearly, in contrast to Schmitt’s CoP, it prioritises the 
good of the people, notably their rights and liberties, over that of the state and its officials, thus 
providing a strong justificatory tool for people subject to those powers to oppose official 
abuses. In particular, in 1973 and 1992, struggles for liberal democracy and constitutionalism 
apparently led to ‘the lock’ Moustafa observes. The military government had to pay ‘a heavy 
price’ for stigmatising the protesters as threats to Thai-ness and employing harsh anti-liberal 
emergency measures to disperse them, notably the use of deadly force, and to force Thanom 
and Suchinda to resign—the former even having to flee the country. The political cost raised 
by the struggle clearly forced ‘regime insiders’, to democratise emergency powers to avert 
further damage to their image. The 1992 Black May incident also galvanised highly vocal 
demands for political reforms from civil society and even among many royalist-conservative 
elites aware of the ‘political cost’ of the military crackdown to the level that resulted in the 
draft of the 1997 Constitution explicitly adopting Kelsen’s PoA.  
 The beneficial aspect of liberal constitutionalism, however, also appeals to the more 
enlightened royalist-conservatives, notably where a self-proclaimed democratic government 
                                                          
 375 Ramraj, ‘EPP’, pp 48-49. 
 376 Tamir Moustafa, The Struggle for Constitutional Power: Law, Politics, and Economic Development 
in Egypt (CUP 2007), pp 41-42. 
 377 Cf Chen’s observation of emergency powers against student activists in South Korea. See Albert H.Y. 
Chen, ‘Emergency powers, constitutionalism and legal transplants: the East Asian experience’ in Ramraj and 
Thiruvengadam (eds), Emergency Powers in Asia, p 78. 
101 
 
gains power and uses emergency powers to repress its enemies. For example, the application 
of emergency powers by the People’s Party to repress the royalist-conservatives in the 1930s, 
justified by liberal constitutionalism, indicates that in a society experiencing the PCLD, but 
one lacking a firm liberal tradition of constitutionalism, even those purporting to advocate 
liberal democracy might not genuinely commit to its core ideal when wielding emergency 
powers in political crises themselves. Harsh emergency measures authorised by the 1933 Act—
such as preventive detention and deportation—enacted by the People’s Party to repress the 
monarchy subsequently created an opportunity for the traditional elites legitimately to reproach 
such conduct for betraying the liberal spirit of constitutional democracy.378 King Prajadhipok 
eventually abdicated in March 1935, reprimanding the People’s Party’s autocratic government. 
As a result, a heavy cost was incurred by the latter in justifying the liberal constitutionalism 
they purportedly championed. Given their failure, the royalist-conservative elites and the 
PAD/PDRC normally cite the king’s abdication speech, considered to be a condemnation of 
such repression, to label the People’s Party ‘usurpers of political power’ and ‘fake democrats’.  
 Likewise, the PAD and the PDRC were prepared to struggle for liberal legality when 
emergency powers were invoked by the ‘Red’ governments against them. The former groups, 
vowing to exercise their constitutional freedom of expression and political assembly, were 
ready to claim a failed commitment to liberal constitutionalism to undermine the latter’s 
political legitimacy and to mobilise masses. The PDRC protesters also benefited from the 
Constitutional Court’s orders declaring their protest a constitutional exercise of the freedom of 
expression and assembly, thus preventing the government from resorting to emergency powers 
to disperse them.  
 Meanwhile, the above facts also remind that not all self-proclaimed liberals in Thailand 
genuinely commit themselves to ‘liberal values’—this is also true in the case of some members 
of the UDD. It would be misleading to accuse Abhisit’s government and the military alone for 
causing the atrocity in 2010 as hardcore leaders of the Red Shirts such as Arisman 
Pongruangrong and Nattawut Saikua outwardly provoked their supporters to sow chaos, 
including by committing arson.379 Ironically, the latter group still claimed the protection of 
liberal democracy and constitutionalism to justify their violent actions and to discredit the state 
of emergency declared by Abhisit. Yet, as I showed in the previous chapter, the greater the 
Yellow government and the military vehemently disregarded liberal-democratic standards 
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when resorting to harsh emergency powers under the 2005 Decree during the crackdown 
operation, the greater they lost their legitimacy and have entrenched social polarisation.  
 Having discussed the political struggle for legality by liberals, Harding and Ramraj fail 
to recognise the liberalisation of emergency powers as a matter of self-interest without an 
intrinsic commitment to liberal value. Demands for putting Thai political authority, including 
emergency powers, under ‘liberal-legal constraint’ by all factions in Thailand share one 
common element, i.e., they result from ‘self-preservation’ which propels the rhetoric of 
constitutionalism into a contending force within the political sphere. More importantly, having 
limited a political struggle for legality in political crises to liberals, their arguments fail 
adequately to understand the general benefit of liberal constitutionalism—the priority of rights 
over good, thus adopting the Weberian straight-line which conflates ‘interest’ for liberalism 
(‘is’) with ‘liberal value’ (‘ought’).  
 In sum, the Thai context emphasises the need rigorously to separate conflicting views 
on ‘emergency authority’ from those on ‘value-judgment’ regarding what counts as ‘the source 
of the PCLD’. The Thai experience here gives a hint that: (a) the absence of an entrenched 
liberal-democratic culture makes liberal constitutionalism more prone to violation by both the 
civilian and military-backed government and the military; (b) supporting liberal legality is not 
advantageous merely to pro-democracy liberals; and (c) the right-wing conservatives might 
also ‘demand’ the use of emergency powers to commit to democratic constitutionality, notably 
when their political interest is threatened and they lose their firm grip power. 
 In the next section, I turn to the roles of the Thai Constitutional Court during the colour-
coded crises, considered in the separate section mainly because they reveal the conflict between 
the challenge posed by rising liberal forces and the attempt to maintain royal hegemony against 
them examined in Section 2. Such roles also reflect how the Yellow faction responded to 
emergency powers imposed by ‘public enemies’ against the mobilisation of anti-liberal 
ideologies. 
4. The Constitutional Court and emergency powers in the PCLD 
 Contemporary Thailand has struggled with two competing conceptions of 
constitutional review in national security matters. Given that the adoption of Western-style 
judicial procedures was initiated by King Chulalongkorn as a part of the Chakri Reformation, 
the royalist-conservative elites traditionally conceive the judiciary as the king’s servant and 
therefore the guardian of Thai-ness—a state of affairs which Pridi intended to replace after the 
1932 Revolution with the idea that judges hold a rigorous commitment to liberal-democratic 
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principles, but failed to achieve.380  The enactment of the 1997 Constitution significantly 
reinstated Pridi’s aspiration, yet, was again met with veto by traditional elites, using the 2007 
Constitution to re-emphasise judges’ loyalty to Thai-ness. Through the lens of the 
Constitutional Court’s verdicts between 2008 and 2014, I explore below how, and the extent 
to which, the clash between the two conceptions of constitutional review affects the direction 
of emergency powers in the PCLD. The findings here are important for reconsidering the 
application of Kelsen’s PoA in the context of royal hegemony and Schmitt’s original view on 
constitutional guardianship. 
4.1 Constitutional review of emergency powers in Thai political history   
 To understand contemporary constitutional review of emergency powers, Pridi’s view 
of the role of the judiciary must first be examined. Ostensibly, the wording of the 1946 
Constitution drafted by Pridi reflected his efforts to separate the judicial system, especially 
from the monarchy, by preserving an independent system of judicial recruitment and 
discipline.381 Furthermore, Pridi was the very first Thai politician to introduce the concept of 
constitutional review into the Thai constitutional system. In 1946, due to considerable 
suspicion among the royalist-conservatives that the new system of constitutional review would 
usurp their power to interpret law, he chose not to establish a permanent constitutional court. 
Instead, he set up an ad hoc Constitutional Tribunal based on the French Conseil 
Constitutionnel, comprising a legal expert who acted as its president with fourteen other judges, 
responsible for policing unconstitutional laws, including emergency decrees.382 Yet, for the 
traditional elites, this innovation was a symbolic challenge, in particular, to ‘their right to 
interpret the law and alter constitutional rules’ through extra-normative means.383 Owing to a 
strong royalist tradition, Pridi failed to execute his intensions in practice; yet, his Constitutional 
Tribunal is nevertheless a key milestone for the establishment of Kelsenian constitutional 
review. 
 The 1947 coup backed by the traditional elites, ousting Pridi and his allies, marked the 
beginning of the restoration of the traditional form of Thai-ness in Thailand by seeking 
explicitly in the written constitution to connect the courts with the monarchy by conferring 
upon the king a prerogative to appoint and remove judges.384 Since 1973, judges have had a 
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constitutional duty to pledge their loyalty to the sacred trinity and to swear faithfully to perform 
their duties in the name of His Majesty.385 The consequence of this monarchist turn is clearly 
that the sole political position, to which judges, from 1947 onwards, must commit themselves, 
is the DRMH, and that their role is to protect such a regime from any challenge.386 The gradual 
restoration of royalist politics therefore took the form of a new alliance between the judiciary, 
royalist elites and the military, paralleled by the court’s role in bestowing legal-rational 
legitimacy upon coups.387 However, given the traditional elites’ negative attitude towards the 
Constitutional Tribunal, before 1997, it was the Supreme Court that was entrusted with such a 
role, rigorously re-embraced by the contemporary Constitutional Court, particularly from 2007 
onwards. 
 In the Supreme Court decision no. 45/2496 (1955), the first time the Thai judiciary was 
asked to decide whether the first royalist takeover in 1947 was valid, the judges asserted that: 
 ‘Given that the junta had successfully seized state power in 1947, it then holds the authority to administer 
the country ... The 1947 Constitution [promulgated after the successful coup] was then a valid law.’ (my 
translation) 
As Harding observes, the first sentence of this decision followed Kelsen’s approach that a 
successfully committed coup begets the validity and effectiveness of a legal order established 
afterwards to justify it.388 However, Harding’s observation needs further explanation. The 1947 
coup was ‘a ruling class conspiracy’ to revive the Thai-ness establishment and the first coup 
directed against electoral politics. By accepting the reason propounded by the junta that the 
coup was necessary to restore peace and public order out of a volatile political situation, the 
court exploited Kelsen’s legalisitic approach to institutionalise royal ‘Schmittian’ hegemony. 
 Importantly, the verdict left a lasting precedent, namely the superiority of the DRMH 
over liberal democracy, after implicitly praising the former for helping restore political stability 
and accusing the latter of precipitating political romanticism and instability. Later decisions 
concerning the validity of a coup and related actions, including the implementation of the TSD 
and the validity of M-17, followed this decision, despite having been decided after 
parliamentary democracy was restored.389 However, the 1992 uprising, together with the trends 
                                                          
 385 The Constitutions of Thailand 1974 (Section 207); 1978 (Section 175); 1991 (Section 192); 1997 
(Section 252); 2007 (Section 201); 2017 (Section 191) 
 386 McCargo, ‘Readings’, p 33.  
 387 Mérieau, ‘The legal-military alliance’, pp 143-145. 
 388  Andrew Harding, ‘The Eclipse of the Astrologers: King Mongkut, his Successors, and the 
Reformation of Law in Thailand’ in Penelope (Pip) Nicholson and Sarah Biddulph (eds), Examining Practice, 
Interrogating Theory: Comparative Legal Studies in Asia (Martinus Nijhoff 2008), p 332. 
 389 See the Thai Supreme Court decisions no. 1512-1515/2497 (1956); no. 1662/2505 (1962); no. 
1243/2523 (1980). The same logic was also rendered to justify M-17 (Decision no.494/2510 (1967)).    
105 
 
of liberalisation and democratisation, significantly damaged the military’s image, and resulted 
in public demand for constitutional reform, leading to the establishment of the full-time 
Constitutional Court based on Kelsen’s model. This proved irresistible, even though the 
traditional elites saw the Constitutional Court as threatening the Thai-ness establishment. 
4.2 The 1997 and 2007 Constitutions compared  
 The 1997 Constitutional Court was composed of five Supreme Court judges, two 
Administrative Court judges, five legal experts and three political scientists.390  Names of 
sixteen experts were initially picked by a committee of political party representatives, judges 
and university deans.391 But only eight were ultimately chosen by the fully and directly Senate 
with 200 members.392 Following Kelsen’s theory, this was intended to keep party politics out 
of adjudication, while trying to balance law with politics, and theory with practice. Procedure 
was inquisitorial and the decisions of the Constitutional Court were binding to all political 
organs.393 Above all, it was entrusted with protecting liberal constitutionalism and putting an 
end to constitutional saṃsāra.394 It held the authority to determine whether a statute, including 
an emergency decree, contravened fundamental liberal-democratic principles,395 and under 
Section 63 of the 1997 Constitution, it could prevent future coups since anyone knowing of a 
coup plot could lodge a petition before the Public Prosecutor requesting a cessation order. 
However, this provision remained dormant for a decade until the birth of the colour-coded 
crises and the promulgation of the 2007 Constitution, Section 68 of which contained in wording 
almost identical to Section 63 provided    
 ‘No one shall exercise their rights … to overthrow [the DRMH] or to acquire political power by means 
[unauthorised] by this Constitution. 
 Provided an individual or a political party commits the [above] act, anyone knowing of [it can] request 
the Public Prosecutor to inspect and lodge a petition to the Constitutional Court for a cessation order...’  
It was actively applied especially between 2013 and 2014 during the mass protests, 
significantly affecting the use of emergency powers in the PCLD. 
 Here, it is important to recall the different conceptions of what counts as ‘the norm’ and 
‘the exception’ under the 1997 and 2007 Constitutions. With respect to the conception of ‘the 
norm’, the 1997 Constitution clearly sought to preserve royal hegemony. Despite exhibiting 
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scepticism about party politics, it simultaneously aimed to entrench a firm commitment to 
liberal-democratic values and constitutionalism. In reality, this aim was however undermined 
by the rise of Thaksin Shinawatra, and reflected the paradox of the role of the Constitutional 
Court as ‘democratic consolidator’. Shortly after Thaksin had won a landslide election victory 
in 2001, he was found by the National Anti-Corruption Commission (‘NACC’) to have 
deliberately concealed most of his assets and therefore submitted a false asset report. He 
registered most of his fortune in names of his security guard, driver, and housekeeper. 
According to the NACC, this misconduct constituted a manifest breach of the 1997 
Constitution aimed eliminating conflicts of interests. 396  Nevertheless, according to the 
Constitution, it was for the Constitutional Court to affirm the decision of the NACC—a 
confirmation would have resulted in an impeachment of Thaksin, banning him from politics 
for 5 years. 397 Despite the newly elected PM’s manifest dishonesty, the Constitutional Court, 
in the Decision no. 20/2544 (2001) on 3 August 2001, narrowly ruled in his favour, absurdly 
reasoning that ‘the failure to declare [his] assets was no more than an honest mistake.’398 
Clearly, this decision to allow Thaksin to reserve his premiership was largely fueled by the 
political climate at the time. Given a post-Black May enormous public appetite for popular 
democracy and constitutional reform, Thaksin’s disqualification, to quote Harding and 
Leyland, ‘would have in effect invalidated the result of the election with the prospect of 
political turmoil’.399 However, if considered this decision from a positive point of view, it 
reflects how the Thai Constitutional Court potentially plays what Ginsburg calls ‘the role of 
democratic consolidator [by] allowing a popular leader to take power’ and tacitly negating 
another military coup.400 Paradoxically, this role did not ensure that what Kelsen preferred as 
the norm prevailed over its Schmittian alternative. On the one hand, the above decision reflects 
how the doctrine of legal imputation—the function of law in bestowing legality upon state 
power—is undermined for the sake of political expediency. At the same time, the rise of 
Thaksin, as I discussed in Chapter 2, also facilitated the entrenchment of the Schmittian-like 
constitutional tradition. Given the supposedly neutral Senate under the 1997 Constitution, 
playing a key role in selecting judges, was, in practice, captured and politicised by Thaksin, 
                                                          
 396 Sections 291-293 
 397 Sections 295 
 398 Harding and Leyland, ‘The Constitutional Courts’, p 131. 
 399 Ibid, p 132. 
 400  Tom Ginsburg, ‘The politics of Court in Democratization: Four Junctures in Asia’ in Diana 
Kapiszewski, Gordon Silverstein, and Robert A. Kagan (eds), Consequential Courts: Judicial Roles in Global 
Perspective (CUP 2013), p 60. 
107 
 
the PoA was, in effect, compromised.401 The 2007 Constitution, by contrast, sought greatly to 
limit the space for electoral politics. Therefore, where the 1997 Constitution formally counted 
a military coup and subsequent uses of emergency powers as the exception, the Red Shirts, Red 
politicians, and an excessive demand for liberal democracy were tacitly regarded under the 
2007 Constitution as threats to Thai-ness. This difference is significantly related to the 
composition of the Constitutional Court under the latter. 
 The 2007 Constitutional Court comprised nine judges, three Supreme Court judges, two 
Supreme Administrative Court judges, two legal experts, and two political scientists. A 
selection committee, comprising the President of the Supreme Court, the President of the 
Supreme Administrative Court, the President of the House of Representatives, the Leader of 
the Opposition in the House of Representatives, and the President of an independent agency 
created under the Constitution, functioned to propose names of candidates for Constitutional 
Court judges to the Senate to approve.402 Under the 2007 Constitution, the Court was granted 
the new power to dissolve any political party, if one of its executive members commits election 
fraud, and to ban its executive members from any elections for five years.403 Resting on the 
Thai-ness tradition that liberal parliamentary politics is extremely corrupt, it further held the 
power to dismiss politicians, notably MPs and members of the cabinet, if found abusing their 
power or having conflicting interests.404 Put simply, contrary to the role of the guardian of 
liberal constitutionalism, the 2007 Constitution re-emphasised the oath of allegiance the 







                                                          
 401 A recent research by Dressel and Khemthong also shows that under the Thaksin administration, judges 
nominated by the government and having experience in the executive inclined to vote in favour of Thaksin’s 
policies. Björn Dressel and Khemthong Tonsakulrungruang, ‘Coloured Judgements? The Work of the Thai 
Constitutional Court, 1998–2016’ [2018] JCA 1, p 11. 
 402 Sections 206 
 403 Sections 204 and 237   
 404 Sections 102 and 182 
 405 See Jarun Pukditanakul’s interview in หทัยกาญจน์ ตรีสุวรรณ [Hathaikarn Treesuwan],‘ในหลวง ร.9 : “ตุลาการ
หมาย เลข  1” กับ  “แสง” แห่ง  วิกฤต  รธน .  2549’ [‘King Rama IX: ‘the no.1 judge’ and ‘the light’ shining amid the 
constitutional crisis in 2006’] (BBC News, 8 October 2017) <http://www.bbc.com/thai/thailand-
41521691?ocid=socialflow_facebook> accessed 9 October 2017. 
108 
 
Since then, the judges have become more involved in politics, and largely voted in favour of 
the royalist Yellow faction, in particular, when emergency powers were imposed. This was 
reinforced by the fact that some of the Constitutional Court judges were handpicked by the 
anti-Thaksin military-backed Senate. Two judges, Jarun Pukditanakul and Supot Kaimook, 
were key drafters of the 2007 Constitution and outspoken critics of ‘the Thaksin regime’.406 Its 
former president, Wasan Soipisut, as I will show below, even publicly admitted that the 
Constitutional Court’s decisions are partisan, and even once publicly expressed his 
conservative sympathies by labelling Yingluck ammat (evil aristocrat) in a press conference.407 
Another judge, Taweekiat Meenakanit, a former law professor who replaced Wasan in August 
2013, had praised the 2006 coup for purging Thaksin, and another judge, Nurak Marpraneet, 
previously advocated the dissolution of the TRT.408  
4.3 The Constitutional Court and emergency powers in the colour-coded 
crises 
 The Thai Constitutional Court is notorious among scholars for its partisan interventions. 
Recently, several scholars label its verdicts between 2008 and 2014 as part of the political 
attempts by the Yellow faction to repress the Red counterpart. As McCargo, Mérieau and 
Piyabutr observe, due to the politicisation of the Constitutional Court, it is not beyond 
possibility that its verdicts were partisan, and ‘made on the basis of political opportunity rather 
than legality’.409  
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Dressel and Mietzner also criticise these verdicts for severely compromising both the judges’ 
commitment to the rule of law and ‘the professionalism of [an] institution like the 
Constitutional Court’.410 Nevertheless, this PhD thesis goes beyond these contemporary works 
by assessing how the aforesaid politicisation affected the application of emergency powers in 
the colour-coded crises. Here, I avoid the term ‘constitutional review of emergency powers in 
the PCLD’ as most of the Constitutional Court’s judgments between 2008 and 2014 are not 
directly concerned with the constitutionality of emergency powers per se, yet, still affected 
their application and the landscape of the norm-exception dichotomy in Thailand.  
 At the outset, it is problematic to derive legal principles from their verdicts due to their 
partisan nature, But, by critically examining these judgements in light of Kelsenian and 
Schmittian ideas, I go beyond contemporary comments on the Constitutional Court’s roles 
during the colour-coded crises by dividing its verdicts into two groups. The first favours state-
ism and national security, while the second concerns those prioritising the respect-to-rights and 
democratic principles. These two alternatives also exhibit however the contrasting relationship 
between ‘law’ and ‘fact’. Table 4 below summarises the Constitutional Court’s decisions 
related to the application of emergency powers in the colour-coded crises. 
Table 4: The Constitutional Court’s cases during the colour-coded crises 
Incidents during which the 
cases were decided/names 
of the cases 
Cases against the Red 
faction 
Cases against the Yellow 
faction 
1. The PAD protest in 2008 - The cooking show case 
(Decision no. 12-13/2551 
(2008)) 
- The dissolution of the PPP 
case (Decision no. 20/2551 
(2008)) [‘state privileging’ 
approach] 
 
2. The UDD protest in 2010  - The constitutionality of 
Abhisit’s declaration of the 
2005 Decree in 2010 
(Decision no. 10-11/2553 
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(2010)) [‘state privileging’ 
approach] 
3. The PDRC protest 
between 2013 and 2014 
-The constitutional 
amendment bill case 
(Decision no. 15-18/2556 
(2013)) 
-The annulment of the 2014 
election case (Decision 
no.5/2557 (2014)) 
-The Thawil case (Decision 
no.9/2557 (2014)) [‘state 
privileging’ approach] 
-The constitutionality of the 
PDRC protest 
(Constitutional Court Orders 
no. 58, 59, 61, 63/2556 
(2013); 45, 50/2557 (2014)) 
[‘rights and democracy 
privileging’ approach] 
  4.3.1 The ‘state privileging’ approach: extreme factuality 
 This approach prioritises the use of emergency powers to ensure national security over 
the protection of individual rights and even at the expense of the spirit of liberal democracy. It 
involves labelling the Red faction and electoral politics associated with liberal democracy as 
threats to national security. Here, three types of Constitutional Court decisions can be 
distinguished. 
    4.3.1.1 The constitutionality of the UDD crackdown  
  The first type of verdict is most directly related to the substance of emergency 
powers in the PCLD. In 2010, the Constitutional Court played a role in deciding on the legality 
of the UDD protest but was more cautious than in 2008 as it did not directly intervene to halt 
a clash between the government and the protesters. By virtue of the 2005 Decree, many UDD 
leaders were detained and brought before the Criminal Court. Under the 2007 Constitution, 
parties to the case proceeded in any court of law were allowed to raise an objection that a 
provision of an emergency decree contravened the spirit of the Constitution.411  
  In Decision Nos.10-11/2553 (2010), two of the UDD leaders asked the 
Constitutional Court to declare Abhisit’s declaration of the state of emergency unconstitutional 
given that the protest was an exercise of freedom of expression. However, the Constitutional 
Court judges quickly dismissed the case by ruling that emergency powers under the 2005 
Decree were necessary for protecting public interest, preventing violence, and suppressing 
exigencies. This decision, in effect, declared the UDD protest unconstitutional, and the 
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military’s 19 May operation legal.412  In contrast to the above decision, the second and third 
types of verdict adopting the ‘state privileging’ approach are not directly concerned with the 
constitutionality of emergency powers. Nevertheless, they significantly affect the application 
of these powers during the mass protests.  
   4.3.1.2 The superiority of the rightist-realist view on emergencies  
  The second type of verdict is related to the competing interpretations of what 
constitutes ‘acts violating the DRMH’ under Section 68 of the 2007 Constitution. It 
simultaneously challenges what constitutes the norm and the exception in a society like 
Thailand convulsed by the PCLD.  
  Ostensibly, both the Red and Yellow factions branded governments led by their 
opponents either ‘Thaksin’s nominee’ or ‘the traditional elites’ puppet’. They also justified 
their struggle by claiming the right to protect the constitution against those in power. Clearly, 
both factions interpreted Section 68 differently. The Red Shirts and other liberals largely based 
their version on the anti-coup spirit of the 1997 Constitution, while the Yellow faction adopted 
a more conservative interpretation, regarding ‘acts violating the DRMH’ as threats to Thai-
ness. The Constitutional Court embraced the second of these, thus playing a major role during 
the PDRC protest in guaranteeing the supremacy of the ‘Schmittian’ view of emergencies and 
political crises over its ‘Kelsenian’ liberal democratic alternative.  
  Decision no. 15-18/2556 (2013), annulling the constitutional amendment bill— 
which sought to replace the partially-appointed Senate with the fully-elected one—
significantly affects the definition of emergencies and political crises. By declaring such an 
attempt ‘an act seeking to acquire political power through undemocratic means’, the judges, in 
effect, implicitly reaffirmed the precedent set by the Supreme Court in 1947 that liberal 
democracy and electoral politics are the sources of political instability, and therefore of the 
PCLD and emergencies, and that the dominance of royalist politics constitutes the state of 
normalcy. This decision indirectly helped preserve the coup culture in Thailand’s constitutional 
order, and also bolstered the legitimacy of the PDRC protest against Yingluck.    
   4.3.1.3 The Constitutional Court and a power vacuum  
  Lastly, the third type of verdict reflects how the Constitutional Court helped 
institutionalise ‘a power vacuum’ within the legal order, enabling the politics of decisionism 
to reassert itself. The decisions ousting Samak and Somchai in 2008, voiding the 2014 general 
election, and the Thawil case fit this category. Despite not being directly concerned with the 
                                                          
 412 Mérieau, ‘Thailand’s Deep State’, p 459.  
112 
 
substance of emergency powers, these judgments were implicitly premised on the Thai-ness 
tradition, and significantly affected the imposition of such powers against the PAD/PDRC, 
even paving the way for the military takeover and the imposition of martial law in 2014.  
  The Constitutional Court’s decisions ousting Samak and Somchai together with 
the dissolution of the PPP were apparently rendered when the 2005 Decree was invoked against 
the PAD protesters, resulting in the abolition of emergency powers, and even the restoration of 
public order. The motivation behind these verdicts was later inadvertently disclosed by the 
then-President of the Constitutional Court, Wasan, who publicly said that: 
  ‘[If] the government … could have joined hands [with the opposition], the country could have 
moved forward, and I believe most of the judges would have decided not to dissolve the parties … But, the country 
at that time was chaotic and the Constitutional Court had to use its judgement to maintain law and order.’413 
From Wasan’s explanation, it appears that the logic of the SoE qua an extreme emergency 
constitutes the rationale behind these two verdicts rendered during a highly volatile political 
situation. However, rather than regarding emergency powers as necessary mechanisms form 
resolving the PCLD as in the first type of verdict, the power vacuum in 2008 was implicitly 
based on the assumption that such powers which led to the restriction of rights and liberties of 
the Yellow Shirts were problems rather than means to solve political instability. Accordingly, 
their invocation needed to halted, through what the Red Shirts regard as the ‘silent coup’, to 
restore public order.  
  Contrary to the aforesaid judgement whereby the power vacuum was based on 
the need ‘to maintain law and order’ to halt emergency powers wielded by ‘public enemies’, 
the vacuum engineered by the annulment of the 2014 election and the Thawil verdicts 
facilitated the application of emergency powers to fill the vacuum itself. The 2014 election was 
annulled as a response to the PDRC’s attempts to block the election process, precipitating an 
emergency declaration. Rather than accusing the protesters, the Constitutional Court judges 
blamed the Red government for ‘its miscalculation’ by choosing to organise the general 
election during a period in which the country had been confronted with, in their words, ‘severe 
political conflicts and internal disunity among the people’.414 According to the Court, it was 
for the government ‘to bear all the costs of holding a peaceful election without recognizing the 
fault of other parties.’415 Accordingly, it was the general election, rather than the PDRC’s 
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attempts to block the election processes, which precipitated an emergency situation, thus 
justifying its annulment. Also, in the Thawil case, the Constitutional Court ordered Yingluck, 
who was then interim PM, to step down immediately on the date the verdict was rendered, 
without waiting for the new government to be sworn in. Together, these two cases hindered the 
formation of the new government, and eventually produced a ‘power vacuum’. With no PM or 
permanent government, the vacuum precipitated another coup and the imposition of martial 
law in May 2014.    
   4.3.1.4 Analysis  
  As we can see, the primary logics underlying the above cases decided by the 
Constitutional Court is the notion of ‘public order’. Yet, these decisions clearly manifest a 
number of flaws which can be identified as follows. To begin with, in Decision Nos.10-11/2553 
(2010), the judges merely asserted the fact that the emergency powers under the 2005 Decree 
are necessary to preserve national security. However, they dismissed the case without 
considering the legal question of whether the constitutional freedom of expression claimed by 
the arrested UDD activists had been exercised. Nor, did they apply the principle of 
proportionality to the use of emergency powers in practice by asking whether the latter were 
applied in compliance with the objective of law, and in such a way that was capable of resolving 
public emergency without causing excessively onerous effect on individuals. In doing so, the 
Thai Constitutional Court concedes the Schmittian position that normativism plays no role in 
constraining emergency powers. This decision needs to be compared with the Court’s orders 
concerning the constitutionality of the PDRC protest which I will turn to later. 
  Moving onto the constitutional amendment bill case, the judges explicitly 
contravened the wording of the 2007 Constitution by declaring the case admissible without a 
petition from the Public Prosecutor. Also, their decision is based on right-wing constitutional 
logic, notably its deep distrust of electoral politics. However, it is problematic because the 
judges merely presumed the possibility of ‘husband-and-wife Parliament’ entailed by the bill. 
  With respect to the ‘Cooking Show’ and ‘the PPP dissolution’ cases, it was 
obvious that by endorsing the logic of the SoE, the judges did not use ‘law’ to decide this case 
at all. In the former case, they failed to determine how hosting a cooking show constitutes 
conflict of interest that threatens the unity under Thai-ness.416 Also, the verdict is blatantly 
absurd and unprofessional since the judges used a normal dictionary, rather than the Labour 
Protection Act 1998, to construe the word ‘employee’ enshrined in the 2007 Constitution and 
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declared Samak’s act unconstitutional. It is controversial to regard the dictionary as an 
authoritative source of law because according to the Labour Protection Act 1998, Samak was 
not really an employee given that he did not receive any salary from a television company and 
had the freedom to design his own shows.417 Likewise, in the verdict of the PPP dissolution 
case, which contains less than three pages and is extremely flawed, the judges’ decision was 
explicitly based on the testimony of one witness who claimed to have received ‘the money’ 
from Yongyut without regard to the PPP’s claim that this person had been involved with the 
DP and to the exclusion of testimonies by defence witnesses. The balance between the party’s 
dissolution and the freedom to form a political party guaranteed by the 2007 Constitution was 
not even considered.418 
  Moreover, in the decision annulling the election in 2014, the judges avoided 
assessing the fact that the inability to arrange a general election on the same day, causing an 
emergency, resulted from the PDRC’s endeavour to hinder the process in 87 constituencies, 
but instead blamed the government for ‘its miscalculation’. This is legally problematic because 
the setting of an election date is a discretionary policy matter, and the 2007 Constitution did 
not allow the Constitutional Court to interfere with it. Meanwhile, given that Yingluck had 
previously dissolved Parliament and called a general election, it was legally illogical that in the 
Thawil case, the Court still ordered ‘the interim PM’ to step down.419   
  By deciding the above cases on the basis of ‘public order’, the Constitutional 
Court, even in litigation unrelated to the constitutionality of emergency powers in the PCLD 
but decided during their use, I conclude, entailed what I call extreme factuality, a position 
prioritising political considerations/facts (even by presuming them) over and at the expense of 
a commitment to legality, resting on the Schmittian ethos that in times of crises, ‘the state 
remains, whereas law [qua normativism] recedes.’420 Here, the value of legality is undermined 
as it is ultimately turned into just a mere cloak for the SoE, that is, the suspension of the 
substance of the law. Next, I turn to the second approach adopted by the Constitutional Court—
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  4.3.2 The ‘rights and democracy privileging’ approach: extreme legality 
  The series of Constitutional Court orders between 2013 and 2014 concerning the 
constitutionality of the PDRC protest exemplify this approach. By vowing to replace electoral 
politics with ‘the People’s Council’, together with attempts to block the general election in 
2014, a number of petitions were filed against Suthep before the Constitutional Court by MPs 
of the PT and other Red Shirts and pro-democracy activists, accusing him of attempting to seize 
power through undemocratic means by declaring himself sovereign, thus violating Section 68.  
 However, the Constitutional Court judges boldly dismissed these petitions, asserting 
that Suthep’s speeches concerning the People’s Council, were merely an expression of ‘opinion 
aimed at pressing the protesters’ demand for the government’s resignation in order to resolve 
the political impasse’. 421  For this reason, they subsequently declared the PDRC protest 
constitutional as an exercise of the right to freedom of political assembly certified by the 2007 
Constitution, thus, in effect, implying that any use of emergency powers to dissolve the rally 
was unconstitutional.422  Their verdict was subsequently put into effect by the Civil Court on 
the Black no.257/2557 (2014). However, the Constitutional Court judges did not consider the 
PDRC’s blatant actions of closing down government offices, blocking the general election 
process, hateful rhetoric, and even intimidating and assaulting people attempting to exercise 
their right to vote.  
 By comparison with the political crisis in 2010, the evidence suggests that the UDD 
protest was unconstitutional as the protesters had a paramilitary arm, especially the hardcore 
group led by Arisman Pongruangrong. It would have been absurd, especially in May, if the 
Constitutional Court had considered their protest to be peaceful and constitutional. However, 
the PDRC protest was not peaceful as the Constitutional Court affirmed, but the judges did not 
take into consideration these facts at all when confirming its constitutionality. Therefore, in 
contrast to extreme factuality, I call this extreme legality as the judgment cites legal principles 
without considering their ethos or the facts to which they apply (i.e., what happens in practice). 
4.3.3 An oscillation between ‘an active court’ and ‘a mute court’:  Kelsen in 
Schmitt’s shadow?  
 Overall, the main concern deduced from the above sub-sections is whether the Thai 
Constitutional Court really operated in the way envisaged by Kelsen. Evidenced by analysing 
cases related to emergency powers in the PCLD, the answer is clearly negative. Kelsen, as 
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discussed in Chapter 1, assumed the technical sufficiency important for insulating 
Constitutional Court judges from ‘direct political influence’, thus ensuring the full realisation 
of the PoA. The Thai experience, by contrast, reflects how such realisation was undermined by 
attempts by both the Red (especially Thaksin) and the Yellow factions to ensure partisan 
nominations of judges. Also, when it comes to highly political cases, notably those associated 
with political stability and the PCLD, the Thai Constitutional Court, almost from its inception, 
prefers to use ‘political or administrative expediency as its touchstone’, and inclines to rule in 
favour of dominant political elites.423 However, since the colour-coded politics took place in 
2006, the Constitutional Court, compared to the pre-1997 period when the judiciary played an 
important but passive role in legalising a coup, has increasingly been called upon to resolve the 
PCLD, and become more associated with the Yellow faction. Thus, in contrast to constitutional 
courts in some nascent democracies such as Indonesia and post-communist Hungary which 
play a vital role in facilitating a transition from authoritarianism to liberal democracy by using 
a written constitution and its democratic organisational principles as ‘touchstone’, the role in 
disqualifying (Red) politicians and electoral politics in order to preserve the hegemony of the 
Thai-ness tradition is a particular feature of the post-2006 Thai constitutional system.424 The 
instances of extreme factuality and extreme legality reveal a more intense resort to political 
expediency to deal with an emergency situation resulting from the PCLD, thus significantly 
undermining the essence of the doctrine of legal imputation—the role of law in binding state 
power to the identity thesis. My position here is also different from Mérieau’s, who thinks that 
the Constitutional Court’s politically-biased activism during a series of political crises between 
2007 and 2014 connoted attempts to transform and transfer the royal traditional authority to 
exert ‘de facto sovereign power’ against any threats to Thai-ness on the part of the judiciary.425 
Against Mérieau, by implicitly and explicitly basing their judgments, affecting the use of 
emergency powers in the colour-coded crises, on the need to secure the political order on Thai-
ness, the Thai Constitutional Court in the process, still preserved royal sovereign status.426 
Another key point we can observe from the Constitutional Court’s partisan verdicts between 
2008 and 2014 is that the judges oscillated between two stances—the Constitutional Court as 
‘an active court’ and the Constitutional Court as ‘a mute court’. Apparently, the judges were 
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active in politics, in particular, when emergency powers were imposed against the Yellow 
faction. They were prepared to uphold the ethos of the PoA by intervening to protect the rights 
and liberties of the Yellow supporters as in 2013 and 2014, and, as Wasan inadvertently 
admitted, to resolve ‘disorder’ caused by the Red government’s declaration of an emergency 
situation as in 2008. Yet, the Court became ‘a mute court’ when the military imposed a coup 
and emergency powers. It was also prepared to defer to the ‘Yellow’ PM’s decisions on 
political crises, notably the use of emergency powers against the Red Shirts in 2010, thus 
justifying the action of mass massacre. In doing so, the Red faction and other pro-democracy 
groups, no doubt, identified them as embodying ‘double standards’.427  In short, the Thai 
Constitutional Court performed a marginal role as the guardian of liberal constitutionalism. It 
played an active role only in so far as it has been used for a clear political rather than legal 
purpose. 
  In parallel with the intervention by the Constitutional Court mentioned above, the next 
section turns to the relation between emergency powers and the AoH bred by the colour-coded 
crises. I explore how the AoH affects the tension between the preservation of royal sovereign 
authority and the effort to put forward a commitment to liberal constitutionalism during 
emergencies in Thailand. 
5. The practice of emergency powers in the colour-coded crises and the AoH 
 At the outset, the colour-coded crises challenge Tan’s observation that Thailand 
normally deals with political problems through a coup, an observation made in 2009 is accurate 
only in the case of 20th century Thailand.428 Between 2008 and 2014, however, there was an 
important progress, given that despite the 2006 and 2014 coups, there were growing efforts to 
use emergency legislation to deal with the colour-coded crises. Before staging a coup in 2014, 
Prayuth had chosen to impose martial law and hold talks among conflicting interests. 
 Due to the direct ideological and physical collision between the Red and the Yellow 
factions, no doubt, the invocation of emergency powers to deal with colour-coded politics by 
a particular faction against the other involves designating the other as the ‘opposition’. In 
reality, their impositions, regardless of form and degree, were normally praised by supporters 
of the government/the military simply because they castigated the opposition faction as the 
problem. The UDD was demonised by Abhisit and the military as un-Thai or as presenting 
threats to Nation-Religion-Monarchy, while Samak, Somchai, and Yingluck branded the 
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PAD/PDRC as presenting ‘threats to the development of democracy’. 429  Accordingly, 
emergency powers applied in the colour-coded crises to foster the sense of ‘us’ and ‘them’, and 
therefore reinforced ‘the bonds of solidarity’, among addressees.430 Given that the protesters 
normally claimed the right to peaceful assembly, the restrictions of this and other rights entailed 
by emergency powers tended to make the masses increasingly uneasy with what had been 
imposed on them. 
 Overall, calling for the use of emergency powers hastens the problem of the AoH—the 
protest against ‘domination/foreign will’ to which one has to submit—already bred by the 
colour-coded crises. Partisan social media, playing roles in broadcasting political clashes, and 
in criticising their responses through emergency powers and actions affecting their profile, 
notably the Constitutional Court’s verdicts, further exacerbate the AoH.431 In the following 
sub-sections, the substance of emergency powers invoked during the colour-coded crises and 
the 2014 coup are considered. I examine how they were affected by the AoH together with the 
lack of consensus on what models should constitute the hegemonic basis for the exercise of 
emergency powers. I first consider types of emergency powers Thailand experienced between 
2006 and 2014 and contemporary comments before examining their uses in practice. 
5.1 Types of emergency powers in the colour-coded crises 
 As already illustrated, there are three main forms of contemporary emergency powers 
in Thailand: the ISA, the 2005 Decree, and a military coup together with martial law imposed 
by virtue of the Martial Law Act 1914. The 2006 and 2014 coups also paved the way for the 
TSD. Interestingly, I also showed that the 2014 coup led to the reintroduction of M-44 
enshrined in the 2014 Interim Constitution, which contained wording closely resembling M-17 
of the 1959 Constitutional Charter. I use two tables to help describe the main features pertaining 
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Table 5: Emergency laws in Thailand compared 
                                                          
 432 Section 15 
 433 Section 5 paragraph 1 
 434 Section 5 paragraph 2 
 436 Sections 6 and 7 
 437 Section 6 
 ISA The 2005 Decree Coup and martial law power 
(including M-44 of the 2014 
Decree) 
Declaration 













The Cabinet can declare an 
area or areas under the 
enforcement of the ISA 
without having to declare a 
state of emergency.432  
The PM, with the approval of the 
Cabinet, can declare an 
emergency situation throughout 
the Kingdom or in particular 
parts thereof. In case the PM 
cannot obtain such approval in 
time, he/she can declare an 
emergency situation before 
seeking for the aforesaid 
approval within 3 days.433 
The king on the advice of the 
military 
Length of 
the use of 
emergency 
power 
No specific limit A period of emergency declared 
by the PM must not be in excess 
of three months. Successive 
extensions of no more than three 
months require the approval of 
the Cabinet.434 





The operation of 
emergency powers under 
the ISA is supervised by 
the committee within the 
Office of the PM—the 
Internal Security 
Formally the PM, yet, he/she 
holds the authority to appoint 
persons to be responsible for 
resolving a state of emergency 
and to issue emergency 
ordinances.436 
The martial law declaration 
enables the military to take 
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 439 Section 18(2) of the ISA; Section 9(1) of the 2005 Decree; Section 11(6) of the Martial Law Act 
 440 Section 18(5) of the ISA; Section 9(4) of the 2005 Decree; Section 11(4) of the Martial Law Act 
 441 Section 18(6) of the ISA; Section 11(5) of the 2005 Decree; Section 9(2) of the Martial Law Act 
 442 Section 18(4) of the ISA; Section 11(3) of the 2005 Decree; Section 11(5) of the Martial Law Act 
 443 Section 9(2) of the 2005 Decree; Section 11(1) of the Martial Law Act 
 444 Section 9(3) of the 2005 Decree; Section11 (2) of the Martial Law Act 
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 449 Section 11(10) of the 2005 Decree; Section 8 of the Martial Law Act 
Command (‘ISOC’). The 
PM a director of the ISOC 
by position, and the Army 

















Emergency powers to 
(a) prohibit any uses of buildings or places;438 (b) prohibit exit from dwelling places or order 
persons to leave from a place; 439  (c) prohibit or impose any conditions on the use of 
communication routes or vehicles; 440  (d) prohibit or impose any conditions on the use of 
communication devices;441 (e) prohibit the carrying of weapons out of a dwelling place442 
 Emergency powers to 
(a) prohibit any public gatherings or assemblies;443 (b) prohibit any 
presentations, distributions or circulations of news or media 
threatening public security; 444  (c) remove or destroy building, 
structures or barriers; 445  (d) seize weapons, goods, or chemical 
substances;446 (e) to ask the criminal court to issue a warrant to 
arrest and detain preventively persons suspected of having 
participated in activities threatening national security for no more 
than 7 days;447 (f) summon persons to report before an authority;448 
(g) employ military forces to halt a state of emergency449 
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Table 6: Emergency powers and the limitation of rights 
Limitation The ISA The 2005 Decree Coup and martial 
law 
Right to life and 
liberty of a person 








Liberty of dwelling O O 
Liberty of travelling O O 













Liberty of unarmed 
assembly 
X O 
   O = a particular right is limited by emergency powers 
   X = a particular right not limited by emergency powers 
The two tables illustrate that among the three forms, a coup and martial law constitute the 
harshest form of emergency powers. As the Martial Law Act was initially enacted to ensure 
the security of the throne against the rise of liberal forces in the beginning of the 20th century, 
 Emergency powers directed at 
suppressing what the military 
deems as the source of political 
romanticism, notably dissolving 
Parliament, abolishing an 
incumbent constitution, and 
suspending all political 
activities, in particular, a general 
election and political campaigns 
by political parties  
122 
 
it gave the king and the military absolute and extensive emergency powers such as the use of 
military forces or the authority to prohibit public gatherings and any presentations, distributions 
or circulations of news or media threatening public security. In post-absolutist Thailand, the 
imposition of a military coup and the subsequent application of coup decrees and martial law 
powers allow the suspension of elements regarded by the conservatives as the source of the 
colour-coded crises, namely political romanticism associated with liberal democracy, and pave 
the way for the junta to suspend political rights and freedoms. 
 By contrast, the ISA and the 2005 Decree still allow civilian government to function 
normally and to take the leading role in responding to an emergency. The ISA authorises the 
Cabinet to use the Act within a designated area without having to declare a state of emergency, 
and for the operation of emergency powers to be supervised by the Internal Security Command 
chaired by the PM. With respect to the 2005 Decree, the PM is permitted to declare a state of 
emergency and to establish an ad hoc centre for resolution of emergency situations. In terms 
of the types of powers, the 2005 Decree shares with the ISA several emergency provisions as 
shown in Table 5 such as the prohibition of the use of buildings, places, communication routes 
and vehicles for specific purposes. Yet, the former authorises emergency powers, similarly 
enshrined in the Martial Law Act, which impose greater limits upon political rights as it 
permits, for instance, the use of military forces and the banning of public gatherings, news or 
other media.    
 The 2005 Decree was passed under a government led by Thaksin who, as mentioned, 
championed authoritarian rule under the cloak of liberal democracy. To justify the 2005 
Decree, he claimed that:  
  ‘This is a decree which makes Thailand a full democracy because we don’t use martial law any 
longer.’450 
However, this justification seems dubious due to a large number of provisions of the Decree 
seeking to consolidate emergency powers in the hands of the PM. As Connors observes, the 
Decree reflects ‘the highpoint of Thaksin’s legal authoritarianism’, and his effort to wrest 
control of emergency powers from the traditional elites.451 Due to its authoritarian nature, the 
2005 Decree, though enacted under the 1997 Constitution, contravenes Thai constitutional law 
on the following grounds. Songsak Raksaksakul, for instance, criticises the Decree for allowing 
the Cabinet to approve a three-month extension of the state of emergency without any 
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parliamentary approval or judicial oversight.452 Meanwhile, Thanut Mingthongkam attacks the 
authority to arrest and detain persons under the Decree for several reasons Firstly, the 2005 
Decree allows officials responsible for dealing with an emergency situation to seek, from a 
criminal or provincial court, an arrest warrant without being required to secure the public 
prosecutor’s authorisation. For Thanut, this weakens the process of checks and balances given 
the general role of the prosecutor in supervising the criminal process.453 He also criticises the 
conditions of preventive detention.454 The 2005 Decree prohibits the use of the following 
places to detain persons: a police station, a detention chamber/centre or a prison; and the 
treatment of that suspected person as a criminal. Nevertheless, as Thanut observes, officials are 
still permitted to detain persons in a military camp.455 Leyland, international organisations, and 
NGOs have also expressed concern that the 2005 Decree fails to subject the authority to ban 
news and media to judicial oversight.456 Worse, the Decree even allows the unaccountable 
resort to military force to deal with exigencies.457   
 The ISA was passed by a government appointed by the 2006 coup, and cites ‘the present 
threat to national security’ as the reason for it. Given that it was passed by a rightist government 
in response to the rise of the Red faction, the priority seems to be to attempt to reinforce the 
role of traditional authority in security matters.458 Harding criticises the ISA for enabling the 
PM, with the assistance of the military commander, to exercise extraordinary powers without 
having to declare an emergency and with no specific time limit, and also for precipitating the 
leakage of these powers into the normal legal system.459 He notes that the ISA creates far-
reaching immunities for its operators given that the Act precludes any checks on emergency 
powers by the legislature or by the criminal and civil courts.  
 Overall, with respect to types of emergency powers, it can be said that contemporary 
Thailand is still struggling for liberalisation and modernisation. Authoritarian emergency 
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provisions reflect the attempt to subvert the project of building liberal constitutionalism from 
within, in particular, by those who enact emergency legislation. Actually, this problem is not 
uncommon. Even in the West, emergency powers, especially anti-terrorism laws, often raise 
concern over human rights violation.460  In practice, the ISA, the 2005 Decree, and the Martial 
Law Act are currently being applied to deal with Muslim separatist militants in the South. 
Although this thesis is not concerned with emergency powers and terrorism, my point here is 
that unlike the case of the South Thailand Insurgency, the effectiveness of these emergency 
laws in the PCLD depends on ‘who’ (and ‘against whom’) apply them. It is also interesting to 
note that although the ISA was initiated by the junta-appointed government, its provisions, 
though still flouting human rights standards, are far less draconian than the 2005 Decree which 
was passed under the civilian-elected government, apparently at least partly due to the junta’s 
attempt to avoid a ‘further tarnished image’ resulting from their disrespect for liberal 
constitutionalism.  What is more, the country also experiences attempts by forces external to a 
written constitution, notably the conservative elites and the military, to preserve the status quo 
through coups. Yet, given the 1997 constitutional reform, the rhetoric of liberal 
constitutionalism has, at least, become a more important and more acceptable basis of 
legitimacy, making the practice of a coup politically less legitimate.  
5.2 Emergency powers in practice 
 Having considered the features of emergency powers applied in the colour-coded crises, 
I consider below the uses of above emergency powers in practice. I first assess the uses of 
emergency powers by the civilian governments of the Red and Yellow factions before turning 
to the 2014 coup. I intend to show that despite the flaws pertaining to Thailand’s emergency 
legislation, there is a growing tendency to liberalise the uses of emergency powers. 
  5.2.1 The Red and the Yellow governments’ emergency actions  
 The rise of an active citizenry in modern Thailand has significantly affected the pattern 
of the application of emergency powers in the contemporary PCLD. As I showed in Chapter 2, 
it was obvious that when invoking emergency powers between 2008 and 2014, both the Red 
and the Yellow factions had been more meticulous compared to the military in 1973 and 1992, 
in particular, to avoid exacerbating the AoH already bred by the colour-coded crises. Between 
2008 and 2014, army commanders, Anupong and Prayuth, baulked at staging a coup, and both 
sides increasingly avoided employing emergency powers curbing protesters’ freedom of 
expression and political assembly. Where Samak and Somchai invoked the 2005 Decree to deal 
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with the PAD, Abhisit and Yingluck chose to apply initially the less draconian ISA before 
using the 2005 Decree.461  
   5.2.1.1 The imposition of the ISA  
  The announcement of the imposition of the ISA, and the types of emergency 
powers used by Yingluck, imitated those of Abhisit verbatim. Both PMs, under the guide of 
the Internal Security Command, chose to restrict the enforcement of the ISA to a specific time 
limit and only a limited range of emergency powers was used, namely the prohibition of the 
use of buildings, premises or areas within the time limit; the prohibition on carryings weapons 
outside dwellings; and the imposition of conditions on the uses of communication routes and 
communication/electronic devices for any or certain purposes.462  
  Though the ISA contains, in Kelsen’s words, ‘legal-technical deficiencies’, 
which compromise the rule of law, its application here was less opposed by both protesters and 
the traditional elites behind the scene at least in the sense that, compared to the invocation of 
the 2005 Decree, the military and the Constitutional Court did not disrupt its application by the 
Red government. The ISA does not, for example, permit the dispersion of protesters, the use 
of military force, or censoring the media. When invoking the ISA, Abhisit and Yingluck 
outwardly declared that such invocation was largely directed at ensuring the safety of the 
protesters and the preservation of public order in general, rather than at dissolving protests.463 
In practice, the government typically set up security checkpoints to hamper carrying weapons, 
while the protesters were allowed to gather and make speeches. This strategy indicates that 
both the Red and Yellow governments increasingly saw the commitment to the liberal 
democratic ethos necessary for justifying their emergency schemes.  
 Next, I turn to the imposition of the 2005 Decree in practice. In contrast to the 
application of the ISA, I argue that the invocation of the 2005 Decree tended to exacerbate the 
AoH already bred by the PCLD. 
   5.2.1.2 The imposition of the 2005 Decree 
  I begin this sub-section by using the table below to illustrate the types of 
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  According to Table 7, some types of emergency powers were ‘standard types’ 
which, with the exception of curfew, all four PMs similarly employed, notably the banning of 
public gatherings. With the exception of curfew, Yingluck again adopted the template of 
Abhisit’s declaration of an emergency in 2010. Both also resorted to more draconian 
emergency powers such as the authority to arrest and preventively detain suspects, to deport 
aliens/prohibit suspected persons to leave the Kingdom, and to summon suspects to present 
themselves before officials. These powers were clearly directed at limiting the protesters’ 
freedom of expression and ultimately at ending the protests.  
  Nevertheless, the difference, as indicated, was that where the Yellow 
government could prolong the declaration of a state of emergency under the 2005 Decree such 
as in 2010, the military and the Constitutional Court were ready to disrupt its application by 
the Red government in 2008 and 2014. As I showed in Chapter 2 (Tables 2 and 3), Abhisit 
extended its operation for half a year in 2010, whilst those by the Red governments were 
terminated, following the Constitutional Court’s intervention, before the maximum period of 
three months. An emergency declared by Samak and Somchai lasted only two weeks, while 
that invoked by Yingluck lasted less than two months. Yet, emergency powers invoked by 
Abhisit led to the shutdown of the UDD’s television stations and culminated in the brutal 
military crackdown in 2009 and 2010, causing greater polarisation between the two factions. 
Interestingly, though Samak and Somchai ordered the banning of public gatherings of more 
than five people, this proved futile given the resistance to comply by both the military and the 
PAD. In the case of Yingluck, despite invoking emergency powers to ban protests and censor 
the media, she chose not to shut down the PRDC’s television stations nor to send troops to 
disperse protesters just as Abhisit had. However, if she had decided to do so, Prayuth would 
have undoubtedly refused. By contrast, although the declarations of the 2005 Decree ended the 
two UDD protests in 2009 and 2010, scholars, the TRC, and the Human Rights reports harshly 
condemn Abhisit for the widespread abuses of emergency powers, notably the ‘shoot-to-kill’ 
strategy, yet, make no criticism of its invocation by Yingluck given its ineffectiveness as well 
as of the imposition of the ISA by both PMs especially the prohibition on the use of force to 
disperse protests.469  
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  5.2.2 The 2014 coup  
 In 2013, the unpopular Amnesty Bill provided an opportunity for the ‘Yellow’ elites to 
totally eradicate the Red faction and to tame other pro-democracy movements. The formation 
of the PDRC came with the return of the game plan to engineer political paralysis and chaos 
just as the PAD protest in 2008 paved the way for the intervention by the Constitutional Court 
and the military.470  In other words, as in 2006, coups based on the Thai-ness justification in 
21st century Thailand have to rely more and more on ‘the masses’, helping to create a ‘power 
vacuum’ that enables the traditional elites and the military to intervene in the name of restoring 
‘public order’. 
 Compared to its 2006 predecessor, the degree of repression under the 2014 junta was 
much harsher given that the military staged a coup and declared martial law in 2006 mainly to 
topple Thaksin. Though the 2006 coup led to the temporary dissolution of parliamentary 
democracy, it avoided violent means such as the M-44 provision in the 2006 Interim 
Constitution, and swiftly restored electoral politics after 1 year. The 2014 junta, by contrast, 
seeks to prolong its power, through strong-arm tactics. Though vowing to restore parliamentary 
democracy, Prayuth keeps postponing a general election. In 2015, it replaced the rule of martial 
law, declared during the coup, with the NCPO leader order no.3/2558 (2015) enacted by virtue 
of M-44, bestowing upon military officers several powers, namely the arrest and detention of 
people for no more than 7 days, the imposition of lèse-majesté charges, searches, the seizure 
of goods and weapons, media censorship together with the ban of advertisements, and the 
issuance of orders summoning suspected people to present themselves before military officials, 
directed at repressing the UDD leaders and other progressive political activists to prevent 
another round of massive protests. Leaders of university scholars and student activist groups 
were charged and jailed for launching an anti-coup protest.  
 Here, it is obvious that the 2014 junta resorted to the more draconian M-44 rather than 
the ISA or the 2005 Decree to deal with the colour-coded politics. However, in contrast to the 
invocation of the ISA and the 2005 Decree, no time limit is set for the application of Order 
no.3/2558 (2015). Besides, the latter is exclusively supervised by the Head of the NCPO and 
is not subject to constitutional review. Also, with respect to their authority to arrest and 
preventively detain persons, unlike under the 2005 Decree, the military officials neither have 
to seek a warrant from, nor submit a written record of arrest and detention to, a criminal court.  
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 Yet, since 2006, polarised views concerning Thaksin Shinawatra have enabled the 
Yellow faction to justify the TSD. However, due to the rise of active citizenry, the Thai military 
is simultaneously aware of the ‘heavy cost’ entailed by ‘mass massacre’ as in 1992, 2009 and 
2010. The combined effect of these facts is that the more harshly these coup powers violate 
liberal democratic constitutionalism, but are applied restrictively to the UDD leaders and some 
prominent pro-democracy activists, the more effectively they can prevent another round of 
mass pro-democracy protest, yet, at a cost of restoring political unity.   
5.3 Vasuki Nesiah’s three deficits: law, norm, and institution 
 From the above, I conclude that the overall picture of the practice of emergency powers 
in the Thai PCLD can be theorised in light of what Vasuki Nesiah regards as ‘the three types 
of deficits’ pertaining to the issue of emergency powers: law, institution, and norm. In her 
chapter on emergency powers in Sri Lanka, Nesiah proposes these factors to assess the abuse 
of power and how to ensure the compliance of emergency powers with liberal constitutional 
principles. For several reasons, the Thai case however reflects how these deficits are 
interrelated and conflict with one another.  
 To begin with, the Thai experience exposes a law deficit, that is, deficiencies in formal 
legal constraints on emergency powers.471 Relevant emergency legislation, notably the ISA, 
the 2005 Decree, and the Martial Law Act, contain provisions bestowing broad and deferential 
emergency powers upon the executive and the military, possibly flouting the constitutional 
entrenchment of individual rights and liberties and providing an open-ended impunity.472 
According to Nesiah, this problem may be attenuated by enacting emergency regulations which 
clearly define ‘the areas they cover’ and by explicitly defining fundamental rights that such 
laws cannot violate.473 However, these solutions are excessively ambitious in Thailand given 
that the aspiration of liberal constitutionalism is still, as I already mentioned, subservient to the 
long-entrenched coup/authoritarian culture. Due to Thailand’s lack of a strong liberal-
democratic culture, the PoA set up in the 1997 Constitution and other legal constraints such as 
a defined time limit and legitimate purposes for emergency powers are doomed to fail. 
However, despite various attempts to subvert ‘legality’ during emergencies, emergency powers 
in the Thai PCLD largely challenge the understanding of the other two elements—norm and 
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institution deficit—and suggest rethinking the function of ‘law/constitutionalism’ during 
exigencies.  
 With respect to a norm deficit, where Nesiah speaks of this as a ‘deficit’, the Thai case 
suggests that we should consider it in the light of the challenge by rising liberal demands. The 
Yellow faction’s intense attempts to maintain Thai-ness even at the expense of liberal 
democracy is a clear indication of the absence of what Nesiah regards as ‘the integration of 
rule-of-law norms into political and legal practice but also in the public sphere at large.’474 
However, notwithstanding the norm and law deficit, the rise of an active citizenry reflects their 
role as a ‘shadow constitutional court’ in patrolling and determining the exercise of state 
authority during the PCLD, thus forcing the Thai authorities to be more aware of the culture of 
liberal constitutionalism and leading to their effort to liberalise emergency powers which, in 
turn, helps alleviate the law deficit problem.475  The comparison between the application of the 
ISA and the 2005 Decree indicates that the less those authorities disregard liberal values, the 
more likely they do not exacerbate the problem of the AoH already bred by the PCLD. This 
simultaneously reflects the lasting political impact of the 1997 Constitution on the use of 
emergency powers. Today, its aspiration for liberal constitutionalism is having, in Ginsburg’s 
words, ‘an afterlife’—an impact in strengthening contending liberal demands among citizens 
after the formal death of this particular constitutional text as a result of the 2006 coup.476 This 
afterlife impact further hastens a paradox. On the one hand, it calls for the greater need to co-
opt liberalism which, in turn, threatens the hegemony of Thai-ness and therefore the status quo 
of the Yellow elites. Nevertheless, given the greater gravitational pull of liberal forces, 
repressing them requires ‘harsh and sustained enough’ emergency powers. 477  As liberal 
demands are ongoing, this tactic tends to create a greater rift within society, and undermines 
the future prospects for a peaceful resolution to the PCLD and the long-term legitimacy of the 
Yellow faction itself. 
 Lastly, Nesiah defines an institutional deficit as (a) the absence of a judiciary equipped 
with authority to annul emergency powers flouting liberal democratic standards and values; 
and (b) a marked judicial deference to the military or the executive when reviewing emergency 
powers.478 She assesses these elements as part of the failure to impose ‘checks and balances 
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that monitor and contest illegitimate emergencies’.479 The active role of the Thai Constitutional 
Court in intervening in politics during the application of the 2005 Decree to protect rights and 
liberties of the PAD/PDRC protesters (the ‘rights and democracy privileging’ approach) 
ironically repudiates this deficit. However, if considering the Court’s discriminatory 
intervention, in particular, its adoption of the ‘state privileging’ approach together with a law 
and norm deficit and given that the Red and Yellow government were prone to follow a similar 
blueprint/verbatim to deal with a political crisis, the main problem in Thailand is not quite how 
to impose sufficient formal legal constraints on emergency powers. Rather, the pivotal 
challenge is how to deal with the problem of ‘double standards’ pertaining to their invocation 
as perceived by the Red faction. 
6. Conclusion 
 Here, I conclude my answers to the four research questions in this chapter as follows. 
With respect to the first, it appears that the constitution-making process has increasingly 
provided a vital means for traditional elites to compete with liberal forces but at the cost of 
modernising and transforming the traditional notion of legitimate emergency powers. 
Meanwhile, the answers to the second and fourth questions can be summarised as follows. It 
appears that in the context the PCLD, the more emergency powers are exercised in a liberal 
manner, the more the AoH is at least not dramatically exacerbated. But, due to the country’s 
strong authoritarian culture, the full implementation of the PoA is hardly likely. In this fashion, 
to facilitate the liberalisation of emergency powers, the Thai case then calls for greater account 
to be taken of ‘political fact’ outside the closed, self-referential system of law.   
 As for the third research question, it appears that the two spectrums—extreme factuality 
and extreme legality—indicate ‘the gravitational pull’ between the liberal-democratic and anti-
liberal realist views on emergency powers in the PCLD. Due to rising liberal demands, the 
politicisation of the Constitutional Court, as shown by extreme factuality, further puts into 
effect the institutionalisation of anti-liberal realist ideas inherent in the Thai-ness tradition 
within the realm of legal ‘ought’, thereby retaining the possibility of a coup in the context of 
liberal-democratic norms and institutions. Meanwhile, ensuring such a possibility has to 
contend with the fact that, since the 1997 constitutional reform, coups have been increasingly 
discredited by sturdier liberal forces, while legal-rational legitimacy has become the more 
widely legitimate source of political authority. The case of extreme legality suggests that 
despite their scepticism about liberal values, the Yellow faction is ready to embrace the PoA 
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to protect its self-interest. The royalist complexion of the Constitutional Court also allows the 
Yellow elites to suppress without mounting a coup what they deem to be the source of 
emergencies and the PCLD—liberal democracy and the Red faction—through a legal-rational 
mechanism.  
 Ultimately, behind the direct ideological and physical collision between the Red and 
the Yellow factions, both sides have struggled to put forward their own conception of political 
authority/legitimacy and to reject those of the other. Yet, it seems that the Yellow faction has 
had to pay a heavier price as the more it resorts to military coups, the more it cultivates, rather 
than pacifies, social polarisation. In the following chapter, I will use the findings in this chapter 
to reconsider and synthesise elements pertaining to Kelsen’s and Schmitt’s constitutional 








Chapter 4: The struggle over emergency powers in Thai political crises: the 
Kelsen-Schmitt debate revised? 
1. Introduction 
 In this chapter, I aim to address the key research question of this PhD thesis—Are there 
any elements of their models of constitutional emergencies which may need to be 
reconsidered/re-read in order to accommodate the Thai experience? Here, I apply my analyses 
in the light of the internal and external perspectives of the constitutional emergency model to 
reconsider and synthesise Kelsen’s and Schmitt’s theories of law and politics and their 
theoretical approaches. As illustrated in Chapter 3, from the internal perspective, Thai nascent 
democracy suggests the extent to which each of their constitutional emergency models might 
each be adapted to (re-)assert its political legitimacy, hegemony, and authority against the 
increasing contestation by the opposing model. By contrast, the external perspective invites us 
to reconsider the application and justification of the two models in the context of direct 
ideological and physical collision between liberal movements and anti-liberal realist forces, 
which already breed the AoH and the PCLD. Yet, in this respect, the AoH has to struggle with 
the total lack of consensus on whether the Kelsenian or Schmittian approach should constitute 
the hegemonic model of constitutional emergencies.  
 In Section 2, I revisit the asymmetry between Kelsen and Schmitt as jurists/theorists 
and the raw conflicting interests/values each endorsed. I apply the Thai experience to explain 
the deficiencies of the normative perspectives underlying their models—
individualism/collectivism, scepticism, and hostility—by turning to the following pragmatic 
considerations, namely (a) the dual state explanation recently used by some scholars to 
describe the colour-coded crises; and (b) the asymmetry between ‘an intra-systemic interest’ 
and a conflict of interest (‘CoI’). In Section 3, I focus upon the internal perspective of the 
constitutional emergency model to reconsider the Kelsenian and Schmittian competing 
concepts of ‘institution’ and their theoretical approaches to law and politics through the lens of 
the Thai experience. Based on my findings in Section 2, I strive to draw the general features of 
the alternative normative perspective for reading and understanding the Kelsen-Schmitt 
debate—the pragmatic hybrid. This alternative perspective, I argue, generally asserts that both 
constitutional emergency models cannot be fully implemented as suggested by the original 
normative perspectives. Instead, their substances and their relationship must be reconsidered 
and synthesised subject to what I call ‘the paradoxical friction’ which reflects the gravitational 
pull between what I call ‘Schmitt in Kelsen’ and ‘Kelsen in Schmitt’. The former signifies the 
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legitimacy of the Schmittian model in an increasingly sturdy liberalised society, while the latter 
connotes the Kelsenian alternative in the context of the dominant Schmittian model.  
 To clarify the substantive details of the pragmatic hybrid, I turn to the external 
perspective of the constitutional emergency model. I argue that the colliding attempts to assert 
the legitimacy of the Kelsenian and the Schmittian models, if examined based on the dichotomy 
between value-judgment ‘ought’ and authority ‘is’, comprise two subordinate issues. Based on 
these two issues, I revisit the key elements of their theories of law and politics, namely their 
debate on the norm-exception dichotomy in relation to the problem of the AoH by developing 
what I call the politics of defective co-optation (‘PDC’) (Section 4) and the relation between 
the concept of the SoE, emergency authority, and the problem of accountability (Sections 5-7). 
In Sections 6 and 7, I not only re-examine the relation between the SoE, the PTL, the CoP, and 
Schmitt’s three types of juristic thought, but also the roles of the SoE in the PCLD itself. Next, 
in Section 8, I seek to reconsider modifications for Kelsen and Schmitt in the context of the 
growing importance of liberal constitutionalism and the rise of the masses as suggested by 
contemporary scholars. Their application to the pragmatic hybrid in Thailand exposes what 
would be ‘inappropriate modifications’ and, in particular, the counter-productiveness of the 
‘liberal-type’ Weberian straight-line. Lastly, in Section 9, I propose reconceiving the Kelsen-
Schmitt debate on the scope of emergency powers in the PCLD in terms of a fragile equilibrium 
which recommends the alternative function of liberalism, that is, as a policy device for 
mitigating any exacerbation of a CoI, the AoH, the paradoxical friction, and the PDC. This also 
involves the reconsideration of the approach underlying Kelsen’s and Schmitt’s models—the 
Weberian straight-line.  
2. Revisiting the normative perspectives of individualism/collectivism, scepticism, and 
hostility: ‘Schmitt in Kelsen’ and ‘Kelsen in Schmitt’ 
 As we have seen, the Thai experience ostensibly exposes the asymmetry between 
Kelsen and Schmitt as jurists/theorists and Kelsen and Schmitt as representatives of raw 
conflicting interests and values in the PCLD. It mirrors the ongoing competition between (a) 
the attempt to subject emergency powers to democratic constitutional laws/constraints and to 
implement liberalism as the state’s fundamental value as Kelsen favoured; and (b) the Thai-
ness tradition merged with the rightist-conservative constitutional views on emergency powers 
sponsored by Schmitt. This competition subsequently reveals the absence of dominant liberal 
values, notably pluralism and liberal constitutionalism, necessary for realising Kelsen’s PoA, 
while a shared belief in ‘anti-liberal realism’, essential for realising the Schmittian existential 
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concept of the constitution, is declining. To explain this argument, two main issues need to be 
reconsidered.  
 At the outset, the aforesaid absence and decline ask us to re-examine the possible 
theoretical framework for explaining how Kelsen and Schmitt might be related to each other 
in the Thai context—the dual state explanation originally proposed by Ernst Fraenkel, a Jewish-
German lawyer, and recently applied by Amsterdam, Chambers and Napisa, and Mérieau, who 
redefines it as ‘deep state’, to explain and analyse the PCLD in Thailand. Although the dual 
state model is not the theory of emergency powers, the understanding of its deficiencies enables 
us to gain comprehensive insight into what the synthesis of the Kelsen-Schmitt debate should 
consider. Nevertheless, it is simultaneously obvious that such absence and decline can also be 
explained in terms of the struggle between ‘divergent interests’—the right-wing conservative 
and liberal forces—in the real-world political arena. This accordingly asks us to revisit the 
notion of ‘interest’ addressed by Kelsen and Schmitt.   
  2.1 The dual state explanation reconsidered  
  In his Dual State, Fraenkel assessed how ‘the autonomy of law’ advocated by Kelsen 
interacted with, and was eventually trumped by, ‘conceptual sovereign decisions’ favoured by 
Schmitt after Hitler’s rise to power put an end to the PCLD plaguing the Weimar Republic.480 
He explained this scenario in terms of what he called the normative and prerogative states. 
Fraenkel defined the former as ‘an administrative body endowed with elaborate powers for 
safeguarding the legal order as expressed in statutes, decisions of the courts, and activities of 
the administrative agencies.’481 Conversely, the latter connotes ‘[the] governmental system 
which exercises unlimited arbitrariness and violence unchecked by any legal guarantees.’482 
Fraenkel considered the Gestapo (secret police) and the Nazi Party (the NSDAP) as the agents 
of the latter, and argued that the prerogative ‘Nazi’ state functioned to undermine or restrict the 
operation of its normative counterpart in national security matters, notably by restricting and 
even abolishing constitutional constraints on emergency powers invoked to repress ‘public 
enemies’ such as the communists and the leftist social democrats.483 
 Applying Fraenkel’s thesis to Thai political crises, Amsterdam, Chambers and Napisa 
equate the normative state to a civilian government under the liberal parliamentary regime, and 
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the prerogative (or ‘deep’) state to the ‘Yellow’ network of royalist-conservative elites, 
especially in the Privy Council, bureaucrats, the military, and judges, operating autonomously 
and informally from the civilian government and possessing its own rules and hierarchical 
institutional order.484 Mérieau adds that if the latter perceives an existential threat to Thai-ness 
posed by the former, it may declare an emergency, in particular, by mounting a coup d’état and 
declaring martial law.485   
 Overall, the dual state explanation asserts that the normative state exists only as far as 
the prerogative state tolerates it. Accordingly, this explanation then gives primacy to Schmitt’s 
theses over Kelsen’s by tacitly supporting the following theoretical positions proposed by the 
synthetic reading of Scheuerman’s and Gross’s arguments on the one hand and Dyzenhaus’s 
thesis on the other. Firstly, from the liberal perspective, it reflects, in Scheuerman’s words, the 
picture of Kelsen’s ‘formal/impersonal conception of legal normativity’ succumbing to 
Schmitt’s anti-normativist theory of emergency powers—the normless will of the sovereign.486 
Gross worries that as the sovereign (who, more broadly, acts in concert with other agents of 
the prerogative state) is unconstrained by a positive law in times of crises, he might perpetuate 
the imposition of his emergency authority which facilitates ‘not only a normless exception, but 
also an exceptionless exception’.487 Secondly, it confirms Dyzenhaus’s comment that Kelsen’s 
theory of law simply offers ‘an empty proceduralism’ which precipitates ‘anything-goes 
relativism’ or the neutrality which provides ‘a ready justification’ for any content, thus failing 
to safeguard a liberal-democratic legal order from the encroachment by the prerogative state 
and reducing the former merely to the dependent normative state.488  
 In the light of my analysis in Chapter 3, both positions associated with this dual state 
explanation disregard the internal perspective of the constitutional emergency model. While 
the synthetic reading of Scheuerman and Gross is silent on the legitimacy of the Schmittian 
model in an increasingly sturdy liberalised state and society, Dyzenhaus’s thesis does not assess 
that of the Kelsenian alternative in the context of the dominant Schmittian model. I briefly call 
the former ‘Schmitt in Kelsen’, and the latter ‘Kelsen in Schmitt’. The details of Scheuerman’s, 
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Gross’s, and Dyzenhaus’s arguments here will also be assessed and rebutted in subsequent 
sections where relevant. Now, I turn to the notion of ‘interest’ internal to Kelsen’s and 
Schmitt’s models. 
  2.2 The asymmetry between ‘intra-systemic interest’ and ‘conflict of interest’
 As indicated in Chapter 1, the realisation of the PoA and the anti-liberal realist model 
is grounded in what I call the Weberian straight-line, that is, the claim that the imposition of 
state authority, involves the endorsement or rejection of any prized value. The presumption of 
the value that makes Kelsen’s PoA and Schmitt’s realist model qua the CoP effective is then 
derived from an interest or disinterest in liberal constitutionalism and democracy. In this light, 
it appears that ‘interest’ is understood in terms of as ‘desires’, ‘volition’, and ultimately as ‘a 
motor-affective attitude’. 489  However, there is another facet of ‘interest’ apparent in the 
Kelsen-Schmitt debate on emergency powers in the PCLD, namely a CoI which connotes 
‘conflicting egotistic opinions’ towards a particular political ideology, notably between 
nationalist authoritarianism or liberalism, deepening the problem of the AoH.490 As with the 
‘intra-systemic interest’, interest here is also bound to ‘value’.  
 Initially, I should recall that both scholars, by underlining the closed, self-referential 
constitutional system, also shared with Weber the view that the masses are ‘always exposed to 
momentary, purely emotional and irrational influences.’491 Accordingly, Kelsen, seeing it as a 
mark of authoritarianism, opposed the will of a single person who represents the particular 
people to the exclusion of political enemies and stands outside/beyond the PoA, whilst Schmitt 
emphasised the homogeneous people qua a voiceless object subsumed within the system of 
politics.492 Against these original theses which confine the multitude within, and deal with a 
CoI through, the state system, the rise and influence of an active citizenry over the application 
of emergency powers is apparent in Thailand. 
 Owing to such developments, the asymmetry between Kelsen and Schmitt as 
jurists/theorists and the raw conflicting interests/values each endorsed, in effect, exposes the 
sub-asymmetry between an intra-systemic interest and a CoI. On the one hand, the application 
and institutionalisation of the Schmittian model (i.e., the intra-systemic disinterest in ‘liberal 
value’), as in the colour-coded crises, becomes more likely to conflict with political struggles 
for Kelsenian perspectives. The presence of the UDD and other pro-democracy activists are 
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good examples. Nevertheless, the mass mobilisation which supports ‘Schmitt in Kelsen’ and 
generates a ‘political vacuum’, paving the way for coups and martial law, compromises 
Kelsen’s attempt to resolve the CoI and AoH associated with emergency powers in the PCLD 
through the self-referential, liberal system of law (i.e., intra-systemic interest in liberalism). 
Accordingly, emergency powers in Thai political crises highlight the importance of recognising 
that the greater the intensity of the PCLD, the more it compromises the effectiveness of the 
constitutional emergency models constructed upon the closed, self-referential system of either 
law or politics. The Thai experience then emphasises how the Weberian straight-line 
underlying Kelsen’s and Schmitt’s models fails to address the asymmetry between ‘an intra-
systemic interest’ and ‘a CoI’. It accordingly calls for redrawing the relationship between 
emergency authority, the masses, and liberal standards under the original Kelsenian and 
Schmittian models by considering ‘Schmitt in Kelsen’ and ‘Kelsen in Schmitt’.  
  2.3 Key remarks 
 Overall, ‘Schmitt in Kelsen’ and ‘Kelsen in Schmitt’ in Thailand reveal the situation 
whereby the Kelsenian and Schmittian models cannot avoid accommodating each other, 
exposing the deficiencies of the original normative perspectives underlying both. The 
alternative normative perspective, I argue, has to consider the following two elements. On the 
one hand, it denies the endorsement of liberalism or anti-liberalism based exclusively on either 
political relativism and the politics of reconciliation (individualism) or the radical form of 
communitarianism and the politics of exclusion (collectivism). It also resists scepticism and 
hostility which concern the sceptical view about and the total rejection of liberalism and anti-
liberalism. It then theoretically asks how the ‘is-ought’ relation according to the Weberian 
straight-line and the relation between law and politics in Kelsen’s and Schmitt’s models should 
be redrawn. In the light of ‘Schmitt in Kelsen’ and ‘Kelsen in Schmitt’, I call this alternative 
normative perspective for the Kelsen-Schmitt debate the pragmatic hybrid.  
3. Pragmatic hybrid qua the gravitational pull between ‘Schmitt in Kelsen’ and ‘Kelsen 
in Schmitt’: revisiting the Kelsenian and Schmittian competing conceptions of 
‘institution’ and their theoretical approaches to law and politics 
 To explain the general ideas of the pragmatic hybrid, I need to revisit the internal 
perspective of the constitutional emergency model and, in particular, the Kelsenian and 
Schmittian competing conceptions of ‘institution’ and their theoretical approaches to law and 
politics. As indicated in Chapter 1, criticising the PTL for turning the state into ‘the mechanical, 
soulless state’, Schmitt’s anti-liberal realist theory of law is premised on the notion of 
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‘institution’ qua a concrete order.493 By contrast, believing that sovereign authority constitutes 
a mark of authoritarianism, Kelsen’s legal accommodation model connotes law as ‘a 
specialised instrument’ functioning to realise the identity thesis. In the next two sub-sections, 
I reconsider these competing conceptions and approaches in the light of ‘Schmitt in Kelsen’ 
and then ‘Kelsen in Schmitt’.   
  3.1 ‘Schmitt in Kelsen’ and four main ways ‘legality’ theoretically 
institutionalising sovereign authority: ‘iron cage shattering’ authority reconsidered 
  With respect to Schmitt’s concept of ‘institution’ qua concrete-order framework, it 
follows that neither the contents of the sovereign’s decisions nor their legitimacy are derived 
from legal-rational authority. Hence, contrary to Kelsen’s identity thesis, Schmitt’s notion of 
‘institution’ indicates that sovereign authority is not, and cannot be, institutionalised by a 
written law. Instead, a positive law can at best play a role in defining who is the sovereign, but 
it is the sovereign’s emergency decisions to revive the SoE by switching off any legal 
provisions and transcending their constraints that exemplify sovereign authority.494 However, 
according to my analysis in Chapter 3, given that the conflict between the Schmittian and 
Kelsenian models is being played out in the context of global modern trends towards 
constitutionalism, liberalisation and democratisation, the attempt to maintain ‘Schmitt’ as the  
hegemonic political ideology and as the basis for the exercise of state authority in a matter of 
emergency powers in the PCLD in Thailand, arguably, cannot conceal the fact that it constitutes 
the kind of explicit defiance of liberal constitutionalism formally entrenched after the 1932 
Revolution and reinforced by the 1997 Constitution. ‘Schmitt in Kelsen’ deduced from the Thai 
experience therefore theoretically challenges Schmitt’s original thesis which confines the role 
of a positive law to defining who is the sovereign and strives to prioritise ‘factual reality’ 
(decisionism and a concrete order) over ‘normativism’ in the matter of emergency powers. It 
instead shifts the focus from his a priori premise that the sovereign is a person who decides on 
the PCLD and derives his authority from the ultimate concrete order or the state, to the a 
posteriori alternative: What institutional technique facilitates sovereign authority successfully 
to remain legitimate and hegemonic given irresistible trends towards democratisation and 
liberalisation? 
 Obviously in Thailand, written constitutions and the politicisation of the Constitutional 
Court have become important tools for providing sovereign authority with legal-technical 
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legitimacy. In other words, the ‘shift’ to which reference has been made indicates that ‘Schmitt 
in Kelsen’ concerns the growing need for Schmitt to resort to Kelsen’s technique of building 
constitutionality/legality. I argue that the Thai experience offers four main ways that ‘legality’ 
theoretically institutionalises sovereign authority: stabilisation, condemnation, rationalisation 
and insulation.  
 Firstly, rather than seeking permanent rule through coup decrees, the Thai royalist-
conservative elites have come to recognise the importance of re-making a new interim 
constitution after a successful coup, especially since 1958. The formalistic concept of 
constitutionalism which regards a written constitution as the supreme law helps stabilise the 
anti-liberal realist regime by granting the ‘cloak of constitutionality’ to mechanisms such as 
M-17 or M-44 applied to purge public enemies, in particular, liberal democracy and its 
supporters.  
 Furthermore, as indicated, the constitutional understanding observed by Tom Ginsberg 
makes permanent military rule under the TSD costly, and therefore forces traditional elites to 
shift from suppressing liberal constitutionalism to co-opting it. However, as most permanent 
constitutions initiated after coups deliberately restored weak parliamentary democracy and 
therefore coalition government, they simultaneously function as a mechanism for condemning 
the parliamentary regime as the source of political romanticism, thus preserving royal 
hegemony and the possibility of coups and any subsequent use of emergency powers.  
 Lastly, written constitutions, interim and permanent, then play a role in rationalising 
such hegemony and insulate sovereign authority from the possible charge of overthrowing a 
liberal-democratic regime. As we have seen, more sophisticated techniques and more cautious 
constitution-drafting ensure the impunity, hegemony, and re-assertion of the anti-liberal realist 
model (i.e., Thai-ness), in particular, against an ‘afterlife’ impact of the Kelsenian PoA 
explicitly adopted in 1997.  
 Besides, where Schmitt criticised the constitutional review of emergency powers in 
political crises for taking the judiciary into the realm of politics, the implementation of his 
approach in Thailand is bolstered by the royalist complexion of the Constitutional Court which 
turns its judges into key players in undermining a public enemy—the building of a fully-
fledged liberal democracy—in a more legal and rational manner. In other words, although 
constitutional provisions are crucial for institutionalising sovereign authority and creating the 
opportunity for coups, they are merely lifeless texts—the (Schmittian-ised) Constitutional 




 Overall, ‘Schmitt in Kelsen’ reveals that the validity of extra-legal emergency powers 
can no longer be derived exclusively from the juristic realm of decisionism and a concrete order 
as Schmitt envisaged, but also has to consider more about legality and legitimacy from the 
normative-liberal standpoint. It therefore involves acknowledging the essence of and 
accommodating room for the iron cage shattering authority within the iron cage (legal ‘ought’) 
itself by resorting to Kelsen’s legal technique which Schmitt originally resisted. Importantly, 
it should be noted here that I speak of ‘Schmitt in Kelsen’ in terms of what Kelsen implicitly 
regarded as ‘a defective instance of legal order’ as discussed in Chapter 1. Although sovereign 
authority is still, in theory, unconstitutional from a liberal-democratic point of view, the 
institutionalisation of authoritarian emergency powers in Thailand exemplifies how the identity 
thesis is undermined by its own methodology, that is, the technique of constitutionalisation 
intending to prevent legally unauthorised norms. 495  Through the lens of Kelsen’s legal 
hierarchy in the PTL, lower-norms which negate the constitutionality of extra-normative 
emergency powers (a coup, martial law, Thai-ness hegemony) are deemed unconstitutional 
themselves. Meanwhile, the lack of a strong liberal culture also turns the key mechanism for 
realising the PoA into one for bolstering ‘Schmitt’ in the name of legality. 
 Having examined how the Schmittian model struggles to reassert its hegemony in an 
increasingly sturdy liberal state and society, what I need to examine next is how liberal 
standards against the country’s strong authoritarian culture might be advocated, 
institutionalised, and defended. In Chapter 3, I indicated two ways that facilitate the 
liberalisation of emergency powers: (a) from the above with the support from the monarchy; 
and (b) from below through political struggles. Below, I theorise Kelsen’s and Schmitt’s 
approaches to law and politics in the light of this analysis.   
  3.2 ‘Kelsen in Schmitt’: reconsidering Kelsen’s post-foundational conception 
of normativity 
 The demands for liberal constitutionalism during emergencies against Thailand’s 
authoritarian tradition, implicitly, if not expressly, a Schmittian-type idea, suggest that we 
should first revisit the basis of Kelsen’s PoA. As already indicated, Kelsen built his thesis on 
emergency powers by combining his democratic political theory with his idea of institution 
qua a specialised instrument, that is, the identity thesis associated with the concept of 
grundnorm. As the transcendental condition which constitutes the ultimate a priori point of 
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legal imputation, the grundnorm functions to deny, in particular, legal realism which fuses 
normativism with concrete factuality, thus ensuring that legal norms are ‘specific kinds of 
cognition’ which govern their own creation within an objective, closed, self-referential 
system.496 However, the sharp distinction between law and politics and the rejection of the 
constituent power underlying Kelsen’s PTL simultaneously restricts the realisation of the PoA 
based on the grundnorm. Recalling his comment on the Preussenschlag decision, to realise his 
PoA, Kelsen had to assume the existence of ‘technical efficiency’, notably the full-time, 
impartial, and professional Constitutional Court with the authority to quash unconstitutional 
emergency powers, and to presuppose that all branches of government strongly commit to the 
identity thesis and democratic constitutional values in practice. Given these assumptions, the 
grundnorm theoretically ties the PoA to the post-foundational conception of normativity 
(‘PFCN’).497  In effect, this approach is more probable in, and has to assume, an already 
entrenched liberal democracy.  
 Below, I first conclude how the aspiration for the PoA is internally marginalised by the 
Schmittian approach. Then, I show that the Thai experience simultaneously reflects contending 
demands for liberalism both as the state’s fundamental value (‘the norm’) and as the basis for 
any use of emergency powers from the political sphere (the sphere of validity) external to the 
self-referential legal system, which help propel Kelsen’s project—something Kelsen did not 
comprehensively speak of. Given the tension between the anti-liberal realist tradition and the 
effort to make emergency powers accountable to liberal democratic standards, in Thailand 
‘Kelsen in Schmitt’ ultimately reveals the narrower discrepancy between legal ‘ought’ and 
concrete factuality (‘is’) conceived as both problem and prospect. 
  3.2.1 Schmittian-ising Kelsen: from Grundnorm to Schmitt?  
  Against Kelsen’s assumptions, the Thai experience explicitly reveals the absence of a 
strong commitment to democratic constitutional values which, in turn, mirrors three ways that 
the Kelsenian model of constitutional emergencies is marginalised by its Schmittian 
alternative. ‘Schmitt in Kelsen’ exemplifies the first of these. Where Kelsen originally sought 
to realise liberal constitutionalism through the state system, the instance of ‘Schmitt in Kelsen’, 
in particular, the politicisation of the judiciary, outwardly subordinates the operation of the 
Kelsenian model to serve the Schmittian alternative. 
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 Apart from ‘Schmitt in Kelsen’, the Kelsenian project in Thailand is also undermined 
by the problem of a law deficit. Thai emergency legislation normally contains provisions 
contravening human rights norms which grant excessively broad and deferential emergency 
powers to the military and the executive. Put theoretically, given the absence of a strong liberal 
culture, a positive law, or more precisely, Kelsen’s preferred technique of 
constitutionality/legality building, is exploited to pave the way for what Dyzenhaus calls the 
internal realist alternative which grants ‘a veneer of legality’ to any use of emergency powers 
by political elites. 498  This scenario, in turn, exposes normativism, or more specifically, 
Kelsen’s approach, to Schmitt’s critique that it overlooks the reality of ‘a spurious mixture of 
normativism and decisionism’, that is, the reality that law is applied by people’s decisions to 
serve their interests.499  
 In parallel to the above problem of a law deficit, the Thai experience simultaneously 
reflects the tendency to turn the rhetoric of liberal constitutionalism into a weapon for wresting 
control over emergency powers from traditional elites. The 1933 Act enacted by the People’s 
Party and the reason behind the promulgation of the 2005 Decree by Thaksin provide proof. 
This scenario parallels what Loewenstein, who considered Schmitt’s thesis to be fascist and 
turned it against itself by urging liberal democracies to view the latter and their supporters as 
enemies of democracy, calls ‘militant democracy’.500  In practice, this theory is subject to 
different shades of interpretation. Its mild reading suggests that the liberal democratic order 
needs to embrace Schmitt’s denial of ‘Kelsenian relativism and neutrality’ which permits all 
parties, including extremists holding ideologies inimical to the state’s survival, to participate 
equally in politics.501 It argues instead that, although the application of this concept can lead to 
the denial of ‘equal chance’ such as by banning political extremists through emergency powers, 
the exercise of this authority still needs to uphold liberal and constitutional standards, notably 
the commitment to basic rights and liberty.502 Nevertheless, the Thai case reflects the radical 
interpretation of militant democracy which asserts that ‘formalism of the rule of law’ and 
‘democratic fundamentalism’ might possibly be set aside during public emergencies as the task 
of defending liberal democracy requires ‘every possible effort [to] be made … even at the risk 
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and cost of violating fundamental principles.’503 This ironically leads to the enactment of 
authoritarian emergency laws by governments claiming to champion liberal democracy, which 
is therefore equivalent to endorsing the flip side of Schmitt’s anti-liberal CoP. In effect, while 
militant democracy in principle protects constitutional democracy, its radical interpretation 
paradoxically succeeds in undermining commitments to liberal constitutionalism in times of 
political crises themselves. 
 Notwithstanding the absence of the aforesaid presumptions hindering the intra-
systematic realisation of the PoA, in Thailand, the rhetoric of liberal constitutionalism has 
obviously become an undeniable contending force. The political struggle for liberal legality 
during the 1992 Black May incident galvanised highly vocal demands for political reforms 
from civil society and even among many royalist-conservative elites aware of the ‘political 
cost’ of another coup and martial law, resulting in the 1997 Constitution expressly adopting 
Kelsen’s PoA, which continues to strengthen contending liberal demands against extra-
normative emergency powers. Thus, rather than speaking of the PTL qua a theory of legal 
science which suffers the problems of ‘empty proceduralism’ and ‘anything-goes relativism’, 
as Schmitt and Dyzenhaus observe, or of the grundnorm qua the transcendental condition for 
the effective PoA as Kelsen did, liberal demands in Thailand shift our attention to the 
developmental phase of the project against the authoritarian tradition Kelsen built through the 
PTL and his theory of liberal democracy in the ‘real-world’ political arena. 
 Here, I must recall Schmitt’s criticism of Kelsen’s grundnorm as the ultimate source of 
the misinterpretation of the relationship between legal validity and factual reality. For Schmitt, 
as this norm is merely presupposed in order to contain human interaction within the impersonal 
legal system, it overlooks a political condition which facilitates a commitment to liberal 
legality. From my above assessment, in Thailand, competing demands to subject emergency 
powers in the PCLD to liberal constitutionalism against the dominant Schmittian view require 
this problem to be examined. It is therefore beneficial to use Schmitt’s theories of law and 
politics, which insist on the pervasiveness of politics in every sphere of human life, to address 
the deficit of the Kelsenian PFCN and even to apply the key elements of his theory to support 
implementing the Kelsenian project. 
 
 
                                                          
 503 Karl Loewenstein, Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights, I (1937) 31 Am. Political Sci. Rev 
417, pp 424, 432.  
148 
 
  3.2.2 Outside legal ‘ought’: Schmitt facilitating Kelsen? 
      Based on Chapter 3, the Thai PCLD indicates two possibilities of how ‘Schmitt’ might 
facilitate ‘Kelsen’. Recalling Pornsakol’s argument on the role of the monarchy in pushing 
forward legality during the PCLD and the importance of political struggle, royal hegemony in 
Thailand suggests applying Schmitt’s sovereignty thesis to implement Kelsen, while mass 
struggles concern the same role for the concept of political friends.  
   3.2.2.1 The sovereignty-based solution: ‘outside’ but still 
‘internal/static’   
  Pornsakol’s argument tacitly shares Andreas Kalyvas’s reinterpretation of the 
relation between Kelsen and Schmitt. To Kalyvas, the PTL focuses on human-made positive 
norms, authorised by higher authorising ones.504 Accordingly, Kalyvas shares with Schmitt the 
view that Kelsen’s legal theory reduces ‘the validity of a legal norm’ to the legitimacy of 
legality, thus, in turn, preventing Kelsen himself from accounting for the origin of liberal 
constitutionalism he aspired. 505  By prioritising ‘democratic substance’—the will of the 
people—over ‘formal legalism’, Schmitt’s theory can be re-interpreted as a reminder for public 
officials in a democratic society, that state authority, tacitly including emergency authority, is 
valid because it is delegated from ‘those directly affected by it’, namely the sovereign 
people.506 Put simply, Kalyvas’s synthetic reading of Kelsen’s and Schmitt’s theories seeks to 
add ‘the source of legitimacy’, including his position on emergency powers, to the former by 
relying on the latter, and ultimately to make both compatible with the modern trends in liberal 
democratic theory necessary for building a liberal democratic constitutional order. 
  The role of the Thai monarchy during the PCLD assessed by Pornsakol supports 
Kalyvas’s argument. Their syncretic reading leads to the conclusion that given the royal 
interventions in the political crises of 1973 and 1992, the Thai experience implicitly 
exemplifies how sovereign authority exercised in the name of the people can provide an 
internal check on emergency powers by deciding that emergency powers the sovereign 
previously sanctioned are incompatible with liberal-democratic standards and by facilitating 
the post-crisis restoration of liberal constitutionalism. Let’s call this ‘the sovereignty-based 
solution’. Nevertheless, this outcome requires rejecting Schmitt’s anti-liberal stance and 
presuming a shared political belief between the sovereign and the people and the dominance of 
                                                          
 504 Andreas Kalyvas, ‘The basic norm and democracy in Hans Kelsen’s legal and political theory’ (2006) 
32 Philosophy & Social Criticism 573, p 575. 
 505 Andreas Kalyvas, Democracy and the Politics of the Extraordinary: Max Weber, Carl Schmitt, and 
Hannah Arendt (CUP 2009), pp 101, 107. 
 506 Ibid, p 115. 
149 
 
the ‘liberal ideal’ in society. As I argued in the previous chapter, the ideological rift between 
(a) the attempt to preserve the hegemonic ‘Schmittian’ tradition of Thai-ness through a coup 
supported by the Yellow faction and (b) the contesting demands for liberal democracy and 
constitutionalism, which Pornsakol fails to assess, however compromises this solution. Above 
all, this failure suggests revisiting the theoretical basis for this sovereignty-based solution.  
  Theoretically, according to the sovereignty-based solution, Kelsen’s inability to 
account for the democratic origins of the PoA is rooted in his endorsement of the neo-Kantian 
transcendental philosophy to construct the grundnorm as the embodiment of the cognition of 
legal norms through legal imputation.507 This solution then shifts the main focus from the 
problem of ‘how things can be known’ to ‘what exists in reality’, that is, from the grundnorm 
as a presupposition to the sovereign as ‘the ontological foundation for the validity of legal 
norms’.508  However, while the sovereignty-based solution seeks to resolve the attempt to 
contain politics within the self-regulated legal system by going ‘outside’ the legal ‘ought’, it is 
static and internal in the sense that it still resorts to politics through the self-referential political 
system. Meanwhile, by hinging upon Schmitt’s original idea that the sovereign embodies the 
people, this solution, though replacing Kelsen’s transcendental presupposition with Schmitt’s 
realist-ontological alternative, is trapped within the remnant of the transcendental 
presupposition inherent in Schmitt’s CoP. This is because the sovereignty-based solution still 
has to presuppose the friendly quality or the shared political belief between the sovereign and 
the people—something which has become increasingly absent in Thai colour-coded politics 
due to the rise of the pro-democracy masses. However, this sovereign-based solution itself 
struggles to address this deficiency since it makes the idea of an active citizenry absent by 
rendering ‘the people’ conceived as a collective agency ‘synonymous to a substantive equality 
between the members of a polity.’509 
  Given that liberal demands have become contending forces in Thailand, we 
should think of an alternative to proceeding with the Kelsenian project through the system and 
its logico-transcendental presupposition for cognition. The political struggle for legality during 
violent emergencies in Thailand suggests that we should conceive the important role of an 
active citizenry in this matter.  
   3.2.2.2 Political friends: ‘outside’ and ‘external/dynamic’ 
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  As previously observed, the Thai case exemplifies how legal mobilisation, 
notably in 1992, helps drive forward the fuller adoption of the Kelsenian project in 1997. In 
contrast to Kelsen who focused largely on legal-technical and institutional conditions for 
realising the PoA, the afterlife of the 1997 Constitution reflects the symbolic impact of these 
developments, that is, of inspiring anti-coup sentiment and of bolstering competing demands 
for liberal-democratic standards for the application of emergency powers in the colour-coded 
crises. Contrary to Harding’s and Ramraj’s arguments relating to political struggles to liberalise 
emergency powers, the Thai example also suggests that supporting this project is not beneficial 
merely for pro-democracy liberals. The Yellow faction might also ‘demand’ putting emergency 
powers under legal constraints, notably when they lose their firm grip power, and their political 
interest is threatened. In effect, political struggles for liberalism based on ‘self-interest’ propel 
the liberal rhetoric to challenge the politics of exclusion within the political sphere, and also to 
increase the ‘costs and risks’ of extra-normative and harsh emergency powers, notably the 
imposition of military coups and the use of martial law powers. Accordingly, I argue that the 
Thai experience indicates how Schmitt’s notion of ‘political friends’ might be read to process 
competing demands for a Kelsenian liberalisation of emergency powers.  
  Throughout this thesis, I have discussed two ways in which the term ‘political 
friends’ is related to emergency powers in the PCLD. The first applies to justify emergency 
powers invoked to exclude public enemies by reference to high-priority values of the state. 
This position is apparent in Schmitt’s Political Theology and other writings supporting the 
expansive reading of Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution, and in contributions by scholars 
such as Dyzenhaus and Gross who assess Schmitt from this angle. Lowenstein and Schupmann 
also embrace this position when speaking of militant democracy. The second way the term 
‘political friends’ is used concerns sovereignty-based solution referred to above and derived 
from the syncretic reading of Pornsakol’s and Kalyvas’s arguments. It gives less attention to 
‘enemies’, but still emphasises ‘the friendship’ between the sovereign and the people.  
  Notwithstanding their differences, both positions still link ‘political friends’ to 
‘state authority’. The Thai experience, I argue, suggests a third reading of ‘political friends’ 
which breaks this linkage, and which also challenges Harding’s and Ramraj’s arguments 
concerning political struggles by ‘liberals’ necessary for pushing the Kelsenian project 
forward. Schmitt’s book, The Concept of the Political, permits this reading as he approached 
the term ‘friends’ in general and then assessed its relation to ‘enemies’ and ‘the state’. In the 
process, two types of political enemies derived from Schmitt’s thesis, shed light on the term 
‘political friends’. A ‘friend’ in the institutional sense contrasts ‘political friends’ with 
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‘enemies’, thus regarding the status of the state in terms of the unity of friends.510 By contrast, 
a ‘friend’ in the concrete sense refers to the existence of a competing collective entity in 
general.511  
  As political struggles advanced by ‘self-interested preservation’ are vital for 
liberalising emergency powers in the PCLD in Thailand, this experience suggests how the 
second sense of ‘political friendship’ helps fill in the gap left by Kelsen’s PFCN. This solution 
to the deficit entailed by the transcendental method of Kelsen’s PTL is epistemic as ‘friendship’ 
in the concrete sense offers the cognitive criterion and sense of the collectivity of individuals 
with a shared concrete project.512 It however deviates from the closed, self-referential political 
system by reminding us of the essence of ‘the political arena’—a battlefield for competing 
interests, values, and particular political agendas. For Schmitt, mass media, popular education, 
the network of professionals and scholars, and party assemblies are vital means for shaping 
collective identity.513  
  Based on the analysis in Chapter 1, the term ‘political friends’ is political, in 
that, it is not concerned with the real/ideal motive (value-judgment ‘ought’), i.e., why particular 
individuals commit themselves to those values and principles, including liberal values. A 
common project is only something important for empirically constructing the existential 
collectivity (concrete factuality ‘is’). Thus, political friends of Kelsen can then be defined as 
the collectivity of individual members similarly seeing the benefits of a commitment to the 
rule-bound legality and other liberal standards for the invocation of emergency powers by state 
officials, regardless of their intrinsic reason(s) for doing so. This term, given its political nature, 
is then grounded in ‘self-interest’ which exists in the cognition ‘is’ dimension rather than in its 
unreason/value ‘ought’ counterpart which concerns the genuine belief in the rule of law which 
Harding and Ramraj consider important for mobilising rights and freedoms in security matters. 
Meanwhile, since ‘friendship’ here is not tied to the state system/concrete order, it is not 
equivalent to Schmitt’s existential concept of the constitution—a fundamental criterion which 
determines the homogeneity within the state—but is ‘a condition to be established’, in 
particular, through the process of legal mobilisation.514  By pushing this commitment in a 
political struggle forward, such values are then increasingly imprinted upon the political 
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arena—a concrete order. This political struggle inevitably calls for an opposition or what 
Schmitt tacitly regarded as ‘institutional enemy’. Later in this chapter, I will assess its effect 
on Schmitt’s three types of juristic thought.  
  3.3 The paradoxical friction: reconsidering the relationship between ‘is’ and 
‘ought’ and between ‘law’ and ‘politics’ in the Kelsen-Schmitt debate 
 From the above sub-sections, the general ideas of the pragmatic hybrid can be 
identified. This alternative normative perspective, I argue, primarily acknowledges that 
Kelsen’s and Schmitt’s original theses cannot be fully implemented based on the original 
Weberian straight-line. Instead, it generally reveals the pull of Kelsen upon Schmitt and the 
pull of Schmitt upon Kelsen, and therefore theoretically suggests considering the relation 
between Kelsen and Schmitt in terms of what I call the paradoxical friction, that is, the friction 
between (a) the growing need to separate legal ‘ought’ from ‘is’ to ensure the prevalence of 
anti-liberal realism over increasingly sturdy liberal forces and (b) their connection facilitated 
by the political struggles for the PoA against anti-liberal realism and its institutionalisation 
based on ‘self-interested preservation’. Here, three theoretical lessons are suggested. 
 Firstly, the paradoxical friction redraws the relationship between factuality ‘is’ and 
legal ‘ought’ internal to Kelsen’s and Schmitt’s models.  On the one hand, ‘Schmitt in Kelsen’, 
though accommodating a greater space for legal ‘ought’, paradoxically marginalises the 
realisation of the EoR and therefore the PoA. Yet, ‘Kelsen in Schmitt’, while mobilising the 
essence of liberal democracy and constitutionalism into the real-world political space, separates 
it from the category of legal imputation under the PTL. In this light, the pragmatic hybrid 
therefore invites us to revisit how liberal constitutionalism functions beyond the sphere of 
normativism. I will more comprehensively explain this point in Section 9. 
 Following the first observation, it is therefore apparent that the pragmatic hybrid 
suggests the approach of reading the Kelsen-Schmitt debate alternative to the traditional 
‘contrasting’ approach and the ‘supplementary’ alternative. On the one hand, the ‘contrasting’ 
approach reads Kelsen and Schmitt as two jurists and representatives of raw conflicting 
interests who adopted ‘two opposing epistemological approaches to the law/politics’. 515 
Against this approach, given the paradoxical friction associated with it, the pragmatic hybrid 
reflects the attempt to assert the legitimacy of the Kelsenian and Schmittian models based on 
the method internal to their opposing model. In parallel, ‘Schmitt in Kelsen’ and ‘Kelsen in 
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Schmitt’ then seemingly advocate an alternative way of reading Kelsen and Schmitt, namely 
the ‘supplementary’ approach which regards them as ‘correctives’ to each other’s deficiencies. 
However, against such approach, the interface between the two instances turns Kelsen and 
Schmitt into each other’s opposite. Ultimately, the pragmatic hybrid shuttles back and forth 
between the two approaches. It therefore invites us to consider the paradoxical friction in terms 
of the gravitational relation between ‘reinforcement’ and ‘subversion’ between the two 
constitutional emergency models.  
 Thirdly, in the broadest picture, it follows from the second observation that the 
pragmatic hybrid challenges the relation between law and politics in the Kelsen-Schmitt debate. 
As Přibáň concludes, Kelsen who proposed the PTL qua the PFCN asserted that ‘law is not 
politics’, while Schmitt who gave primacy to concrete factuality over normativism, advocated 
that ‘politics is not law [qua normativism]’.516 The pragmatic hybrid resists placing both 
arguments at the opposite ends of the spectrum, and instead emphasises their gravitational 
connection. I argue that the general ideas of the pragmatic hybrid raise three theoretical 
questions. By answering them, its full substantive details can be identified.  
  3.4 Key theoretical questions associated with the pragmatic hybrid: a move to 
the external perspective of the constitutional emergency model 
 By exposing the interface between ‘Schmitt in Kelsen’ and ‘Kelsen in Schmitt’ 
rendering the paradoxical friction, the pragmatic hybrid invites us to revisit the external 
perspective of the constitutional emergency model. The three theoretical questions associated 
with it suggest reconsidering the key elements of the Kelsenian and Schmittian models, namely 
the norm-exception dichotomy and the competing conceptions of authority to invoke 
emergency powers and its accountability in relation to the AoH.  
 I answer the first two in the light of the key elements of this PhD thesis—competing 
value-judgments fundamental to or threatening a social order (‘ought’) and state authority to 
secure a social order (‘is’). With respect to the value ‘ought’ dimension, the first question is 
related to how the gravitational pull between Kelsen and Schmitt affects the conflicting views 
on what should count as the norm and the exception, in particular, a CoI and the AoH in the 
PCLD. By contrast, the second question is premised upon the gravitational pull between 
normativism on the one hand and decisionism and a concrete-order framework on the other, 
thus involving how the roles of the SoE and its relation with the CoP, the PTL/the PoA, and 
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Schmitt’s three juristic thoughts should be reconceived and redrawn. I examine the first 
question in Section 4 and the second question in Sections 5 to 7. 
 Lastly, the third question concerns how the Weberian straight-line, including the notion 
of ‘interest’, and the function of liberalism, including the gravitational pull between the 
legitimacy of legality and the legitimacy of law, underlying the Kelsenian and Schmittian 
models should be redrawn. I seek to answer these questions in Section 9 by taking into account 
the findings in Section 4 to 7 and also by examining in Section 8 the deficiencies of the 
suggested modifications for Kelsen and Schmitt based on the ‘liberal-type’ Weberian straight-
line (i.e., the strong reading of authority and the communicative-based authority).  
4. The norm-exception dichotomy and the AoH: the politics of defective co-optation 
 As we have seen, the norm-exception dichotomy associated with emergency powers in 
the PCLD not only concerns ‘the exception’ qua the suspension of normativism, but is also 
related to what counts as the state’s fundamental value and its threats. Based on the pragmatic 
hybrid, I now reconsider the competing conceptions of such dichotomy rendered by the 
interface between ‘Schmitt in Kelsen’ and ‘Kelsen in Schmitt’. The former connotes how the 
‘waning but still dominant’ anti-liberal ideology prevails as ‘the norm’ over ‘sturdier but still 
inferior’ liberalism, while the latter concerns how the contesting notion of liberalism seemingly 
operates as ‘the norm’ in the presence of Schmitt’s dominant anti-liberal ideology. I argue that 
the various dimensions of ‘Schmitt in Kelsen’ and ‘Kelsen in Schmitt’ provide the general 
picture of the relation between their respective preferred conceptions of ‘the norm’ and the 
problem of a CoI/the AoH in the light of what I call ‘the PDC’ and its paradox.  
 On the one hand, the Thai experience reveals how political struggles to assert liberalism 
as the norm makes permanent military rule costly, leading to the shift from repression to co-
opting liberal democracy. However, as already indicated, a written constitution and the 
Constitutional Court play a role in preserving the traditional ideology, network, and system 
which intentionally create, yet, simultaneously condemn electoral politics as corrupt and 
factional. In consequence, liberal political challenges in Thailand are unable to ensure that the 
project of building liberalism as ‘the norm’ goes all the way. Meanwhile, as the Yellow faction 
can no longer maintain an absolute grip on power, the Constitutional Court was also prepared 
to embrace the PoA as the norm to protect the mobilisation of anti-liberal ideologies by the 
PAD/PDRC from the use of emergency powers by ‘public enemies’. In this context, it can then 
be said that liberalism is co-opted by its anti-liberal realist opposite not because it is considered 
useful in reconciling the AoH as Kelsen envisaged, but because it facilitates the exception by 
breeding political romanticism and subsequently the AoH threatening homogeneity which, in 
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turn, justifies supervision by the sovereign’s emergency authority and the mobilisation and 
institutionalisation of anti-liberal homogeneous ideologies. However, such co-optation, in turn, 
creates a paradox. Given the declining legitimacy of Thai-ness hegemony, Prayuth’s current 
military regime has to rely more on harsh and undemocratic emergency measures, notably the 
NCPO leader order no.3/2558 (2015) issued under M-44 mentioned in Chapter 3, targeting 
anti-coup/pro-democracy movements to maintain ‘the climate of censorship and intimidation’, 
yet, counter-productively stirring up greater anti-conservative sentiment and social 
polarisation.517 Put theoretically, the Schmittian realist model may therefore risk its already 
declining legitimacy to prevail over liberalism as the norm by creating the exception from both 
Kelsenian and Schmittian perspectives, that is, by increasingly entrenching authoritarian rule 
and by exacerbating the lack of consensus on what constitutes political homogeneity/the true 
meaning of the constitution through harsh emergency powers respectively. However, this lack 
of consensus is paradoxical, in that, the more those emergency powers become more 
authoritarian and breed the AoH, the more such AoH paradoxically turns politics into the realm 
of ‘endless discussion’—a kind of political romanticism—which, in turn, justifies an 
‘increasingly self-destructive’ resort to the Schmittian model and its institutionalisation. 
 Overall, having been concerned also with what constitutes the state’s fundamental 
value, the PDC does not speak of the norm-exception dichotomy qua a necessary means for 
ensuring the exceptional and temporal nature of emergency powers.518 But, this does not mean 
that it aims to label this dichotomy as a chimerical rhetoric which leaves room for the 
Schmittian interpretation of ‘the exception’ qua the suspension of legal norms.519 Rather, the 
PDC asserts the gravitational pull between the competing Kelsenian and Schmittian 
conceptions of the norm-exception dichotomy in the PCLD. In this context, both liberalism and 
authoritarianism cannot absolutely and genuinely prevail over each other as the norm because 
they are gravitationally pulled by their opposite, yet, they might operate relatively as the norm 
because they precipitate the exception. Since we cannot expect the full implementation of the 
political ideology/regime based on either the politics of reconciliation or the politics of 
exclusion in the context of the pragmatic hybrid, the two competing conceptions of ‘the norm’ 
and ‘the exception’ should at best be conceived in terms of ongoing legal, political, and social 
struggles. Nevertheless, they indicate a greater cost incurred for ‘Schmitt’ as authoritarianism 
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precipitates the exception from both angles of Kelsen and Schmitt, while liberalism has become 
a more acceptable type of ‘the norm’ and standard for emergency powers of which both parties 
to the PCLD are aware. 
 The above gravitational pull provides a backbone for understanding Kelsen’s and 
Schmitt’s competing conceptions of legitimate emergency powers in the following three 
sections. Below, I examine the key element internal to the Kelsen-Schmitt debate on the 
conception of authority to invoke emergency powers—the SoE—in the light of the absence of 
consensus on whether Kelsen or Schmitt offers the best constitutional emergency model. 
5. ‘Kelsen against Schmitt’ vs Agamben’s concept of the SoE: an overview 
 As I previously discussed, Kelsen and Schmitt disagreed over whether the doctrine of 
legal imputation should be suspended when emergency powers are applied during the PCLD. 
Here, I discuss the overview of their debate under the umbrella of the most prominent 
contemporary work on the concept of the SoE by Giorgio Agamben. 
  5.1 Agamben on Kelsen and Schmitt  
 For Schmitt, the SoE, I already discussed, is linked to the threat posed by the PCLD to 
‘a fundamental value’ and therefore to the survival of the state, thus calling for the use of 
emergency powers involving sovereign authority to suspend normativism to suppress it. But, 
although the sovereign stands outside and holds emergency powers to transcend normativism, 
its authority is still derived from the juridical framework, that is, from a concrete order. This 
position is rigorously rejected by Kelsen. However, by recognising that legally-authorised 
emergency powers contain a penumbra of uncertainty, the PTL tacitly admits a connection 
between the SoE and the legal order. Both stances are however criticised by Agamben who 
examines the SoE qua ‘the problem of authoritarianism’ in his book—State of Exception.520 
Here, my main focus is not on what Agamben counts as ‘bloated’ emergency powers, but on 
how he redefines the SoE, using it as a springboard for synthesising Kelsen and Schmitt.521  
 On the one hand, Agamben regards Kelsen’s approach (though not by name) as the 
attempt to regulate the SoE through the law, and praises Schmitt for his effort to theorise the 
SoE, notably by acknowledging the suspension of normativism, the fusion of the legislative 
with executive power, and the tension between the normative force of law and its realisation.522 
Yet, against both Kelsen and Schmitt, in Agamben’s view, the SoE is neither lex specialis nor 
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dictatorship in the form of sovereign authority bridging the SoE with the juridical order.523 
Although he does not mention a concrete order qua the ultimate juridical framework for 
Schmitt, the same conclusion would be reached if he did. Ultimately, for Agamben, Kelsen and 
Schmitt were wrong to annex the SoE to the juridical order.524 According to Agamben, the SoE 
precipitates ‘a zone of anomie’ (‘an juridical void’ or ‘a space devoid of law’)—a zone whereby 
‘all legal determinations … are deactivated.’525 He worries that emergency powers, such as 
preventive detention, might be exploited to produce the SoE, thus transforming ‘the juridico-
political system … into a killing machine.’526 He partially uses Hitler’s abuse of emergency 
powers to transcend the Weimar Constitution and the Nazi concentration camps as examples. 
Subjects of emergency powers, stigmatised as ‘public enemies’, fell prey to the SoE, that is, to 
governmental violence not formally authorised by the law, yet, which deprived them not only 
of their legal rights protecting them from any abuse of emergency powers, but also of their 
status as human beings.527 Put theoretically, the SoE blurs the boundaries between ‘fact’ and 
‘law’, that is, (a) between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ the law since ‘legal categories and the idea of 
sovereignty have served as a justification for abandoning “enemy bodies” to zones outside 
strict legality’; and (b) between ‘the normative aspect of the law’ and ‘life’ as ‘the authoritarian-
charismatic power springs almost magically from the very person of [the sovereign]’.528 
  5.2 ‘Kelsen against Schmitt’ in Thailand in Agambenian perspective: its 
significance  
 As the mark of the ‘totalitarian’ turn, the characteristics of the SoE observed by 
Agamben undermine Kelsen’s PoA, and are more extreme and ambiguous than Schmitt’s 
version.529 Thus, while at one end of the spectrum is Kelsen’s theory which seeks to regulate 
the SoE through the doctrine of legal imputation, and at the other is Agamben’s definition, in 
between lies Schmitt’s theory which strives to connect decisions made by the sovereign with 
the juridical order.   
 Nevertheless, the main focus of Agamben’s theory, as with the Kelsen-Schmitt debate, 
is largely upon the SoE from the cognitive dimension, namely the apparent suspension of law 
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qua normativism, and upon the problem of authoritarianism and violence it entails. However, 
unlike Kelsen and Schmitt, it is not specifically concerned with the SoE associated with the 
PCLD. Its relevance in the light of the pragmatic hybrid in Thailand provides an alternative 
understanding for the concept of the SoE in this debate and for its relationship with the PTL, 
the CoP, and Schmitt’s three types of juristic thought. Recently, two scholars, Piyabutr and 
Streckfuss, have applied Agamben’s SoE to describe the colour-coded crises. For them, this 
phenomenon is relevant to Thailand because the Red Shirts, stigmatised as ‘un-Thais’, are 
particularly prone to being subject to violence and extra-juridical killings precipitated by 
emergency powers.530 However, Piyabutr and Streckfuss also briefly examine the problem of 
the SoE from the perspective of cognition. My synthesis below adds to their arguments 
concerning how competing liberal values affect the key features of the SoE conceptually.  
 Below, I assess the SoE from the aspect of ‘Schmitt in Kelsen’ with it (Section 6) and 
then of ‘Schmitt colliding with Kelsen’ driven by ‘Kelsen in Schmitt’ (Section 7). The former 
seeks to reconsider the relationship between the SoE, the AoH, and the Kelsenian concept of 
authority to invoke emergency powers and its accountability, while the latter addresses the SoE 
in relation to political struggles for liberal legality, the AoH and its effects on Schmitt’s three 
types of juristic thought. In both circumstances, I also apply the Thai experience to reinterpret 
the roles of the SoE in the Kelsen-Schmitt debate.    
6. ‘Schmitt in Kelsen’ in Agambenian perspective: the SoE and the Kelsenian PoA 
 As we have seen, ‘Schmitt in Kelsen’ in Thailand signifies the institutionalisation of 
emergency powers against more sturdy contending liberal forces, and is related to the 
politicisation of the Constitutional Court. Agamben however does not comprehensively assess 
the roles of judges in relation to the SoE, whilst Schmitt resisted the politicisation of the latter. 
In contemporary works, scholars observe the two main roles of judges on this issue. On the one 
hand, they can limit the effects of the SoE, notably by reassuring basic rights of individuals 
subject to emergency powers, such as the rights to non-discrimination and to habeas corpus 
review.531 On the other hand, they may be sceptical about judicial deference to the executive 
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which, in turn, leads to ‘rubber stamping’ the SoE.532 However, if the concept of the SoE and 
these two roles are considered in the context of the pragmatic hybrid in Thailand, the fact that 
these roles are both gravitationally pulling upon each other is exposed. Below, I strive to 
examine how these two roles challenge the relationship between Kelsen’s PoA and the SoE. I 
answer this question again by resorting to the ‘is-ought’ distinction.  
  6.1 The SoE from the cognitive dimension: denying the apparent suspension 
of normativism? 
 From the cognitive dimension, the shift from the apparent suspension of normativism 
to the increasing need to institutionalise the Schmittian model significantly challenges 
Agamben’s and Schmitt’s positions on the SoE, yet, more adversely affects the former given 
its portrayal of the SoE qua the phenomenon in which the juridical order is made insignificant. 
Despite the eventual coup in 2014, this shift, at least, reflects the declining legitimacy of the 
aforesaid suspension and the growing importance of legality as an important ground for 
identifying emergency powers as violations or threats to the purported high-priority value. 
When deciding on petitions concerning the constitutionality of the PDRC rallies and the use of 
emergency powers by the Red government between 2013 and 2014, Constitutional Court 
judges even used the rhetoric of rights and freedoms to protect the protesters from state 
violence. The Thai context, in short, reflects the gradual shift within the cognitive dimension 
from a juridical void in Agamben’s theory to the juridical order (Kelsen and Schmitt), and then 
from the sovereign (Schmitt) to the judiciary (Kelsen). 
  6.2 The SoE from the ideal entities dimension: Kelsen’s concept of authority 
to invoke emergency powers and its accountability reconsidered     
 This section seeks to illustrate the transfer of the SoE from the cognitive sphere to that 
of ideal entities. Here, four theoretical lessons can be identified. I consider the first two together 
as they challenge the theoretical basis of the Kelsenian concept of authority to invoke 
emergency powers and the problem of accountability underlying the realisation of the PoA. 
The third and fourth lessons, on the other hand, suggest an alternative understanding of the 
SoE.  
 As indicated in Chapter 1, Kelsen advocated the importance of normativism as a 
bulwark against the apparent imposition of the SoE. His concept of public authority requires a 
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belief in a liberal-democratic constitution, and presupposes the autonomous value of legality 
and the identity thesis. He then sought to realise the PoA by resorting to the doctrine of legal 
imputation, that is, the use of legal norms to confer meaning upon factuality ‘is’, and therefore 
proposed the idea of accountability based on a legal-democratic constitution functioning as a 
mechanism for defusing ‘political conflict through the avoidance of sovereign decision and of 
any irrevocable commitment to a particular understanding of political identity.’533  
 Against Kelsen, the Thai experience primarily suggests that whether the PoA is adopted 
or jettisoned depends not on the liberal ethos, namely the politics of reconciliation and the 
principle of legality, but on the CoP, that is, whether they are imposed by/against a public 
enemy. In situations where emergency powers, especially those under the 2005 Decree, were 
applied by the Yellow faction against the Red protesters, the Constitutional Court did not 
hesitate to jettison the PoA and even to transform itself into what Agamben calls ‘a killing 
machine’, in particular, by endorsing extra-judicial killings such as the UDD crackdown in 
2010. The Court was even prepared to create a power vacuum to pave the way for the 2014 
coup and martial law powers, adopting extreme factuality by strongly prioritising political 
considerations over, and at the expense of, rule-bound legalism, yet, still exploiting the latter 
as a cloak. But, by contrast, in 2008 and between 2013 and 2014, it embraced the logic 
underlying the PoA that the application of such powers itself by the Red government 
constituted a threat to the state and jeopardised the politics of reconciliation. In this respect, the 
Court oscillated between extreme factuality and another problematic instance of extreme 
legality by citing legal principles without considering theories underpinning them and what 
happened in practice.  
 From the latter stance, it follows, second, that the formal operation of the PoA is not 
really subject to ‘the normative priority of legality’s autonomous value’ as Kelsen envisaged, 
but to the deficiency of liberal legality criticised by Schmitt—because liberalism allows public 
enemies to capture the state’s emergency mechanism under the guise of ‘legality’. In 
consequence, its operation is defective because it is prone to transform the rhetoric of 
constitutionality/legality, rights, liberties, and political compromise into weapons for 
subverting political enemies, thus undermining the liberal conception of legal and political 
accountability aspired to by the PoA—the same result as where this project is jettisoned. This 
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deficiency simultaneously justifies a resort to the logical suspension of ‘legal imputation’ to 
repress such enemies, thus exposing the third theoretical lesson.  
 Ostensibly, the oscillating instances of extreme factuality and extreme legality 
defectively enables the PoA to break the chain of conditional facts and legal consequence 
inherent in Kelsen’s doctrine of legal imputation. By rendering the division between ‘questions 
of fact and questions of law’ meaningless, this break, in effect, echoes the logic of Agamben’s 
SoE. 534  The Thai experience accordingly mirrors the view that it is more legitimate 
increasingly to transfer the SoE from the apparent suspension of normativism to deal with the 
PCLD into the ideal realm of legal logic that governs the effectiveness/ineffectiveness of 
emergency powers in the PCLD, their institutionalisation, the imposition of pure violence, and 
the PoA. In other words, where the position of the SoE within the cognition perspective 
connotes a move towards Kelsen, that within the ideal entities alternative mirrors a departure 
from his theory to somewhere between Agamben and Schmitt given that both instances of 
extreme factuality and extreme legality reflect Agamben’s logic of legal void, yet, still hinge 
on the juridical order. Simultaneously, the above transfer suggests that we should not narrowly 
conceive of the SoE qua the suspension of normativism (Schmitt) nor qua pure violence and 
the juridical void against enemies (Agamben). Instead, it suggests considering the SoE more 
broadly as part of the political elites’ growing effort to legitimise and institutionalise the 
hegemony of anti-liberal realism. Nevertheless, this alternative understanding has to be 
considered in tandem with the fourth theoretical lesson.  
 Fourthly, the Thai experience shows that, if the Red faction pushed its Yellow opponent 
too far, especially by invoking the 2005 Decree which justified the use of force to resolve the 
PCLD, it risked its own destruction by provoking greater struggles by the protesters, the AoH, 
and a counteraction by the ‘Schmittian-ised’ Constitutional Court and the military. As 
illustrated in Chapters 2 and 3, to avoid such ‘costs and risks’, Yingluck was more meticulous 
than Samak and Somchai when applying emergency powers. She primarily resorted to the less 
draconian ISA which does not grant the power to disperse any public gatherings or assemblies 
to deal with the PDRC in 2013 and 2014. Put theoretically, in the light of the pragmatic hybrid 
bred by the greater collision between liberal and right-wing conservative forces, the attempt to 
imprint the SoE upon the Kelsenian concepts of authority and accountability paradoxically 
renders a commitment to the PoA more vital especially on the part of a faction labelled as 
‘public enemies’.  
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 Where this section examines how ‘Schmitt in Kelsen’ affects the contours of the SoE, 
I next turn to the relationship between the effort to implement the SoE through sovereign 
authority/its institutionalisation and political struggles for ‘Kelsen’ (Kelsen in Schmitt). 
7. ‘Kelsen in Schmitt’ against the SoE in Agambenian perspective: the ultimate 
undecidability and the three types of juristic thought 
 In this section, I ask: How do political struggles for liberal legality in times of the PCLD 
affect (a) the implementation/institutionalisation of the Schmittian model, and more 
specifically, the connection between normativism, decisionism, and the concrete-order 
framework in Schmitt’s legal theory? The answer to this question challenges Schmitt’s concept 
of authority to invoke emergency powers and its accountability, and reveals another alternative 
understanding of the SoE.  
 As we have seen, for Schmitt, the legitimate imposition of emergency powers in the 
PCLD depends on the unity of the elements of decisionism and a concrete order in the three 
types of juristic thoughts and their primacy over that of normativism. Meanwhile, his concept 
of the accountability of emergency powers advocates the existential concept of the constitution 
that glorifies state authority/sovereignty to impose the SoE qua the suspension of normativism 
to exclude ‘enemies’ to subdue the AoH associated with such powers rather than to hold them 
normatively accountable.535  
 However, as exemplified by the rise of the Red Shirts against the 2006 and 2014 coups 
and martial law powers, the greater the gravitational pull between Kelsen subject to Schmitt 
(Schmitt in Kelsen) and Schmitt struggling with mobilisation for liberal legality (Kelsen in 
Schmitt), the greater the asymmetry between an intra-systemic interest and a CoI/the AoH is 
exacerbated, blurring the boundaries between what is inside and outside the law which, in 
effect, exposes the rift between the three juristic dimensions in his theory of law. This can be 
explained through the authority ‘is’ and the value ‘ought’ distinction. 
 With respect to the authority ‘is’ perspective, the collision between the ‘Schmittian’ 
effort to impose the SoE and political struggles for ‘Kelsen’ blurs the relationship between (a) 
‘law in place’ which signifies the formal status of law/its state of existence and (b) ‘its 
application’ or its concrete realisation.536 From the Schmittian standpoint of the imposition of 
the SoE (i.e., the ‘Yellow’ perspective), law still remains ‘in place’ in the form of decisions 
based on a concrete order which transcends the ‘application’ of normativism. By contrast, from 
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that of the PTL (i.e., the ‘Red’ perspective), as normativism is suspended, law is not formally 
‘in place’. However, political struggles for liberal legality during political crises in Thailand 
reflect that law qua normativism is informally ‘applied’ at least as a minimal normative 
parameter for politically gauging the SoE and Schmitt’s anti-liberal concept of law qua 
decisionism and a concrete order with liberal constitutionalism.537 
 Moving onto the ‘ought’ perspective, the issue above exposes the conflict between what 
counts/is valued as ‘order’ and ‘violence outside the law’. From the ‘suspension’ standpoint, 
the imposition of the SoE is essential for ensuring a social order qua the homogeneity of the 
demos. By contrast, from the Kelsenian mobilisation alternative, the suspension of law, 
including the attempt to break the chain of legal imputation, is illegal, and constitutes or 
possibly paves the way for anarchy.538  
 From the above, we can see on the one hand that ‘Kelsen in Schmitt’ challenges 
Schmitt’s concept of emergency authority by creating the rupture between normativism on the 
one hand and decisionism and a concrete order on the other by mobilising what can be 
described as ‘normativism, not in place, but informally applied with significance’. Here, the 
logic of Agamben’s SoE—the ultimate undecidability between the juridical order and a 
juridical void—is subsequently propelled into the centre of gravitation of its interface with the 
Schmittian model and its institutionalisation, making the standards of liberal constitutionalism 
gradually more legitimate for emergency powers.539 In turn, this scenario precipitates tension 
between the two types of ‘enemies’ internal to the CoP, in that, the imposition of the SoE to 
exclude public enemies in the concrete sense—individuals/groups deemed to be threats to 
homogeneity—tends increasingly to be seen as an ‘enemy in the institutional sense’ itself. Put 
simply, this gravitational pull of Kelsen reflects how the resort to Schmitt’s notion of political 
friends and Agamben’s logic of the SoE undermine the Schmittian model by exacerbating the 
significant amount of disagreement over what constitutes ‘juridical void’ in the real-world 
political arena. Thus, while Schmitt spoke of the SoE qua the suspension of normativism in 
terms of a necessary means for resolving the PCLD, the Thai experience instead suggests that 
the logic of the SoE can help mobilise Kelsen’s idea to undermine Schmitt’s theory of law. 
 As with Section 4, I argue that the findings in Sections 6 and 7 confirm the more 
legitimate status of ‘Kelsen’, yet, subject to the gravitation pull of ‘Schmitt’. In Section 9, I 
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will conclude how the ‘is-ought’ relation and the function of liberalism underlying the 
Kelsenian and Schmittian models should be redrawn. Before that, I however need to review 
modifications for Kelsen and Schmitt in the context of the growing importance of liberal 
constitutionalism and the rise of the masses as suggested by contemporary scholars. Although 
these works are not directly concerned with emergency powers in the PCLD, their application 
to the pragmatic hybrid in Thailand indicates what would be inappropriate modifications for 
Kelsen and Schmitt, and, more importantly, reveals the counter-productiveness of the 
Weberian straight-line, in particular, the liberal-type. 
8. Revisiting recommended modifications for Kelsen and Schmitt in contemporary 
literature 
 In this section, I now turn to contemporary works of Criddle and Fox-Decent, 
Dyzenhaus, Gross, and Fatovic. These scholars suggest two ways in which the two models 
might be adapted in modern Thailand: a more rigorous commitment to liberal constitutionalism 
(Dyzenhaus and Criddle and Fox-Decent) and the role of the masses (Gross and Fatovic). Both 
suggestions share the view that Kelsen’s position is overly-procedural and that Schmitt’s is 
overly-factual.  
  8.1 Strong reading of authority 
 Dyzenhaus, Criddle and Fox-Decent together share the view that emergency powers 
should not be regarded simply as the monopoly of coercive force as Kelsen and Schmitt 
originally did. Dyzenhaus underlines the growing importance of liberal democratic standards 
in 21st century emergencies by distinguishing ‘rule of law’ from ‘rule by law’ or ‘the use of 
law as a brute instrument to achieve the ends of those with power’.540 He accordingly rejects 
Schmitt’s theory of sovereign authority, criticising it for precipitating the external realist 
position by allowing the sovereign to act however he prefers subject to no legal constraints.541 
This distinction hints at Dyzenhaus’s attempt to fix what he deems to be a key flaw of Kelsen’s 
identity thesis. In contrast to Dyzenhaus, Criddle and Fox-Decent recognise the place of the 
Schmittian sovereign in the modern world and seek to balance it with increasing individual 
rights consciousness. 
 Against Schmitt, Dyzenhaus follows the Kelsenian line by presupposing the 
autonomous value of legality and the identity thesis. However, for him, the problem of the 
PTL, as previously discussed, lies in its scientific approach which eventually allows any 
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content, including those bolstering an authoritarian regime, to be included within law, thus 
resulting in the internal realist position or the legalisation/constitutionalisation of any 
emergency powers invoked by political elites. This theory, though inspiring for the ‘rule of 
law’, then counter-productively leaves room for ‘rule by law’. 542  To make a genuine 
commitment to the identity thesis, Dyzenhaus modifies Kelsen by resorting to Hermann 
Heller’s approach which internally connects legality with legitimacy, in that, it denies the crude 
view that ‘law is the vehicle for the exercise of power’ and simply a framework that can be 
filled by any substance as Kelsen asserted in his PTL.543 It then proposes the ‘supra-positive 
grounds of legal validity’.544 In this respect, Dyzenhaus modifies Kelsen by supplementing 
rationality with unreason, that is, by adding ‘liberal morality’ to the grundnorm and thereby 
the identity thesis, arguing that emergency authority must be morally infused so that it is not 
turned into a mere utterance of the powerful made concrete.545 Emergency legislation ‘must be 
capable of being interpreted in such a way that [it] can be enforced in accordance with … [a] 
discourse of human rights’ and that it respects its addressees ‘primarily as a bearer of human 
rights’ who must be protected from the state’s arbitrary action.546 Any failure to commit to such 
‘principles of an inner morality of law’—the thicker version of the identity thesis—would 
disqualify its status as ‘law’ and eventually as acts of the state.547 Dyzenhaus regards this 
modified identity thesis—the substantive conception of the rule of law.548 
 On the other hand, Criddle and Fox-Decent’s aim of balancing sovereign authority to 
transcend individual rights protection with increasing individual rights consciousness 
implicitly suggests how Schmitt’s thesis should be adapted to the global trends of liberalisation 
and democratisation by embracing the fiduciary principle, according to which, the state wields 
its authority on behalf of citizens, ‘but [subjects] to strict limitations arising from [the latter’s] 
vulnerability to the fiduciary’s power and his intrinsic worth as a person.’549 State officials 
therefore hold an obligation primarily to ensure that the interests of its citizens, ‘treated as ends-
in-themselves’ (the principle of integrity) and therefore as equal bearers of human rights (the 
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principle of formal moral equality), prevail over the good of state officials (the principle of 
solicitude), even during emergencies.550 Criddle and Fox-Decent concur with Schmitt that 
emergencies may not be foreseeable, thus leaving room for sovereign authority, but adapting 
it by subjecting it to the fiduciary principle.551 Yet, against Schmitt, if the sovereign wields 
emergency powers in such a way that it fails to respect the above principles, ‘then he would be 
acting as an unauthorized usurper of public power rather than as the sovereign’ and therefore 
illegally.552  
 Overall, the three scholars share the view that political choices regarding when and how 
emergency powers are to be applied must commit to principle, notably the value of human 
dignity, existing separately from a positive law, yet, constituting a constitutional and inner 
moral condition of being an authority.553  This principle then constitutes ‘the fundamental 
principle of legality’.554 Ultimately, I regard their approach, which gives a greater weight to 
the justification/binding-ness perspective of emergency powers over its empowerment 
alternative, as a ‘strong reading of authority’.555 
  8.2 The communicative-based authority 
 Gross and Fatovic speak of the importance of the force external to the closed, self-
referential system of law and politics—an active citizenry—in justifying legal and extra-legal 
emergency powers. Their theses ultimately embrace Jürgen Habermas’s criticism of Weber’s 
instrumental authority on which Kelsen’s and Schmitt’s theories rest.    
 Gross shares Schmitt’s concern that sometimes a rigorous commitment to legality 
during emergencies may cause ‘grave harm’ instead of good.556 Advocating the extra-legal 
model of emergency powers, for him, public officials may employ extra-legal emergency 
measures, provided they consider it necessary for safeguarding the state. 557  Yet, he sees 
Schmitt’s support for legally unconstrained or extra-normative emergency powers as a 
hallmark of authoritarianism, and argues instead that those applying ‘extra-legal’ emergency 
measures—emergency powers which contravene legal norms—must disclose their actions, and 
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subject them to popular ex post ratification. 558  He accordingly advocates applying the 
deliberation process, allowing ‘society as a whole’ to openly and inclusively participate in 
determining whether extra-legal emergency actions should be legally ratified (and even 
rewarded) or rebuked (and therefore making relevant public officials liable for their actions) 
after the emergency is over.559  
 The scope of Gross’s argument is expanded by Fatovic, who calls for rational 
exchanges of justifications, arguments, and opinions among individuals affected by emergency 
powers, legal and extra-legal in two ways.560 First, he does not only speak of the application of 
deliberation to extra-legal emergency measures, but also, though briefly, to legal ones. 
Secondly, where Gross advocates limiting the role of the people to ‘voting up or down’ the 
validity of extra-legal measures, Fatovic expands this to include judging emergency decisions 
still under consideration. 561  For the latter, the public can participate in formulating and 
justifying strategies for dealing with exigencies through ‘[judging] the reasons offered for 
different measures, [challenging] the need for such measure at all, [proposing] their own 
alternatives, and [engaging] in a variety of other deliberative activities.’ 562  
 Both Gross and Fatovic offer various ways in which affected individuals can deliberate 
their viewpoints on emergency powers, for instance, public gatherings in townhall, informal 
meetings including academic conferences, newspaper articles, radio, television and the 
Internet.563 Newspaper and social media, Gross adds, can function as a ‘social watchdog’, 
which helps prevent public officials from shielding their emergency actions from public 
opinion, thus, in turn, enhancing deliberation.564  
 Overall, both scholars criticise emergency powers wielded by the sovereign, under the 
Schmittian model, for prioritising ‘the common good’ over ‘private autonomy’ and for deriving 
their authority simply from the sovereign’s status as the embodiment of the homogenous 
people, thus ultimately limiting their role during emergencies merely to acclaiming sovereign 
decisionism. Fatovic is also tacitly against Kelsen’s approach, notably his preference for 
procedural formalism, according to which emergency powers derive their legal validity and 
become binding if enacted through a correct legal procedure. Put simply, both scholars think 
that both Kelsen and Schmitt conflated power with authority, while they propose detaching the 
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two elements, involving communicative-based authority, which significantly draws upon 
Habermas’s theory of communicative action. 565  For the communicative-based authority, 
emergency decisions constitute what Habermas calls ‘speech acts’—a kind of communication 
through linguistic utterance between addressers and addressees. 566  Therefore, they do not 
simply connote a monopoly or one-sided application of coercive force, but are instead subject 
to criticism by affected parties along the normative dimension of validity with no a priori 
blueprint, including ‘presumed inner morality’ of state authority, and coercion.567 Believing in 
reason and rationality of human beings, the people’s yes or no determination is crucial together 
with official acceptance of the outcome for validating particular emergency action. 568 
Following Habermas’s line, Gross and Fatovic do not intend simply to arrive at a political 
compromise among affected individuals and between them and public officials, but ultimately 
at agreements inter-subjectively shared among these actors.569 
  8.3 The application of the recommended modifications to the pragmatic 
hybrid in Thailand 
 I now apply the above recommended modifications for Kelsen and Schmitt to the Thai 
context. Following what Dyzenhaus, Criddle and Fox-Decent observe, the scope of emergency 
powers in contemporary Thailand has increasingly become internally liberal. The Red and 
Yellow governments strove to justify emergency powers by expressing their commitment to a 
rule-bound legalism, notwithstanding the deficiency of formal legal constraints on emergency 
powers (i.e., a law deficit). Meanwhile, with Gross and Fatovic, the Thai contemporary 
experience reveals the important role of the masses in monitoring the exercise of state authority 
during the PCLD.  
 Above all, as already indicated, my main concern is nevertheless the technical and 
theoretical deficiencies and counter-productiveness exposed by the Thai experience for the 
modifications for Kelsen and Schmitt which apparently rely on the Weberian straight-line as 
they explicitly presuppose an authority derived from a dominant liberal-democratic interest and 
value. The pragmatic hybrid reveals that the suggested modifications based on the ‘liberal-
type’ Weberian straight-line are not sufficiently comprehensive and may even be counter-
productive for three reasons. First, given a CoI between the Thai-ness hegemony (i.e., 
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disinterest in liberal values) and demands for liberal constitutionalism, it is misleading to 
conclude that such liberalisation in Thailand stems from thickening and internally moralising 
Kelsen’s identity thesis as the strong reading of authority suggests. As already indicated, the 
pragmatic hybrid highlights the need to revisit the Weberian straight-line. Secondly, due to 
Thailand’s coup culture together with strong scepticism about liberalism, the pragmatic hybrid 
acknowledges that the attempt to thicken Kelsen’s identity thesis does not guarantee the 
institutionalisation of the Schmittian model is prevented in practice. In fact, the attempt is more 
likely to be seen by the Yellow elites and the military as the usurpation of their privileges. 
Third, the pragmatic hybrid suggests that the Weberian straight-line underlying 
communicative-based authority aiming to adjust ‘Schmitt’ to a more liberalised society might 
counter-productively deepen, rather than quell, a CoI and the AoH in the PCLD. Ostensibly, 
the communicative-based authority requires the existence of reasonable citizens who are ready 
to defer to reasonable disagreement and to coordinate with each. However, as the mass protests 
and two coups between 2006 and 2014 show, hostility between the Red and the Yellow factions 
illustrates the lack of consensus regarding what counts as ‘the norm’ and ‘the exception’ since 
each faction possesses its own ‘yes/no’ position on legitimate/illegitimate emergency powers, 
making a shared agreement difficult, if not, impossible. In fact, any attempt, as under 
communicative-based authority to reach a ‘yes/no’ answer, as with the initiation of the 2013 
Amnesty Bill, tends to galvanise the dissatisfaction of one faction, creating another round of 
the PCLD.  
 Having examined what counts as inappropriate modifications, in the next section, I 
consider the scope of emergency powers and the structure of the Kelsen-Schmitt debate in the 
context of the pragmatic hybrid. 
9. The scope of emergency powers and the structure of the Kelsen-Schmitt debate 
reconsidered: the fragile equilibrium 
 Given the paradoxical friction and the PDC, it is apparent that liberalism is still, as in 
their original debate, fundamental to the pragmatic hybrid. As indicated in Sections 4 to 8, 
although we cannot expect the full implementation of liberal democracy and the PoA qua the 
PFCN in Thailand, liberalism at least appears to be a more acceptable standard for emergency 
powers which both parties to the PCLD are prepared to adopt. This trend greatly discredits 
Schmitt’s arguments against liberalism, i.e., that it is a source of the PCLD, while ex ante legal 
constraints it advocates prevent any application of necessary, but not legally prescribed, means 
for repressing threats to a concrete order. Instead, the liberalisation of emergency powers is 
essential for avoiding greater struggles by each side. However, the main impetus for their 
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liberalisation, or more theoretically speaking, for a move on the side of Kelsen is not an 
autonomous value of legality, but the need to avoid costs and uncertainties raised by 
Agamben’s logic of the SoE resulting from the defects of Kelsen’s and Schmitt’s theories 
themselves, namely the ‘Schmittian-isation’ of the impersonal legal-technical apparatus and 
the rift between the three types of juristic thought respectively. The pragmatic hybrid exposed 
by the Thai experience therefore challenges both Kelsenian and Schmittian positions on the 
SoE. Against Kelsen who rejected the SoE qua ‘the apparent suspension of normativism’, 
seeing it as a mark of authoritarianism, the pragmatic hybrid recommends more broadly 
considering it as an opportunity for mobilising a commitment to the PoA in the real-world 
political arena. Meanwhile, contrary to Schmitt who positively conceived the SoE qua the 
suspension of normativism as the mark of unity of the three types of juristic thought, the 
ultimate undecidability exposed by the pragmatic hybrid precipitates their rupture which 
undermines the CoP. Accordingly, the challenge remains how the alternative function of 
liberalism should be conceptualised. Here, I argue that liberalism plays a role in the context of 
the pragmatic hybrid in determining what I call the fragile equilibrium.570  Below, I first 
describe the general characteristics of what I mean by the fragile equilibrium.   
 At the outset, the fragile equilibrium does not directly aim to ensure that emergency 
powers are not applied to subvert the politics of reconciliation. Neither is it concerned with ‘the 
process of balancing’ and assigning ‘appropriate weight’ to national security/public interest 
and the protection of rights and liberties, nor with the ‘trade-off’ between national security and 
the aforesaid protection as Schmitt proposed.571  Rather, based on the key features of the 
pragmatic hybrid, it generally connotes preserving a faction’s political legitimacy based on 
political prudence when it comes to the matter of emergency powers in the PCLD.572  
 Secondly, it follows from the first characteristic that since liberalism has become a more 
acceptable standard for the use of emergency powers in the PCLD, the fragile equilibrium is 
more on the side of ‘Kelsen’ than ‘Schmitt’. Yet, given that its main concern is a nascent 
democracy, the purpose of such equilibrium is not as ambitious as one might perceive. By 
highlighting the importance of political prudence in driving the liberalisation of emergency 
powers, it does not speak of how to raise liberalism to the status of a constitutional and moral 
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principle, i.e., a compulsory, intrinsic, and quintessential political morality of emergency 
powers, as does Dyzenhaus, Criddle and Fox-Decent, Gross, and Fatovic.573  
 Instead, we should then, thirdly, be aware that a growing commitment to liberal 
standards in the context of the pragmatic hybrid hinges not on a commitment to the ‘liberal-
type’ Weberian straight-line, but on the need to avoid overstepping the fragile equilibrium. As 
‘political prudence’ associated with this context is fundamentally a matter of political, rather 
than legal, judgment, the fragile equilibrium therefore invites us to revisit the Weberian 
straight-line, including the relation between law and politics, underlying Kelsen’s and 
Schmitt’s models.  
  9.1 The Weberian straight-line reconsidered  
 Subject to the general ideas underlying the pragmatic hybrid, I argue that the fragile 
equilibrium initially provides three important lessons for the theoretical structure underlying 
the Kelsenian and Schmittian models, in particular, their underlying Weberian straight-line 
approaches, and for the modifications suggested as discussed in Section 8.  
 To begin with, where the models of Kelsen and Schmitt contained a CoI/the AoH 
associated with emergency powers in the PCLD within either the liberal-democratic legal 
system or the anti-liberal political system, the problem in Thailand is that neither constitutes 
the hegemonic version of an intra-systemic interest in the first place. Subject to the pragmatic 
hybrid, the fragile equilibrium instead recognises ‘the social multitude’ as the social 
environment which co-exists with the legal and political systems.574 However, since the fragile 
equilibrium does not aim to raise liberalism to the status of a constitutional and moral principle, 
it perceives the people neither as ‘the final authority’ to judge the legitimate use of emergency 
powers, as suggested by the communicative-based authority, nor in terms of the value of human 
dignity which constitutes a constitutional and inner moral condition of being an authority 
according to the strong reading of authority. It only conceives ‘active citizenry’ as an important 
element for determining how emergency powers should be applied to deal with a CoI/the AoH 
in the PCLD. 
 The second lesson parallels the first. When speaking of an intra-systemic interest and a 
CoI, Kelsen and Schmitt defined interest as a reflection of value. Given that both scholars 
underestimated the asymmetry between the two senses of interest and the importance of the 
social multitude, they were accordingly silent on political prudence associated with the fragile 
                                                          
 573  Cf Steven Greer, The European Convention on Human Rights: Achievements, Problems and 
Prospects (CUP 2006), p 244. 
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equilibrium which reinforces a commitment to legality. Clearly, political prudence here stands 
independent from the closed, self-referential system of law and politics. Likewise, by adopting 
the ‘liberal-type’ Weberian straight-line, the two suggested modifications for Kelsen and 
Schmitt—the strong reading of authority and the communicative-based authority—are also 
silent on the liberalisation of emergency powers disinterested in a commitment to the value of 
liberalism. Put simply, according to the Thai experience, the fragile equilibrium reveals an 
alternative facet of interest beyond ‘a motor-affective attitude’ bound to value. 
 The third lesson is related to the approaches inherent in (a) the PoA and the strong 
reading of authority on the one hand; and (b) Schmitt’s anti-liberal realist model and the 
communicative-based authority on the other. In Thailand, the realisation of (a) to deal with a 
CoI and the AoH associated with emergency powers in the PCLD is compromised by the 
problems of a law deficit and a norm deficit mentioned in Chapter 3. By contrast, (b) advocates 
that ‘concrete factuality’ prevails over ‘legality’. However, rising liberal demands precipitate 
the declining hegemonic status of the politics of exclusion. Meanwhile, by heavily relying on 
the yes/no decisions on ‘valid’ emergency powers (though legality/liberal constitutionalism 
plays a role as the standard), the application of communicative-based authority in the context 
of a high degree of societal polarisation, as suggested by the enactment of the Amnesty Bill in 
Thailand, is prone to galvanise the AoH. Ultimately, I argue that the fragile equilibrium 
challenges determining what constitutes the legitimate use of emergency powers and 
responding to a CoI and the AoH associated with it by relying exclusively on either (a) the 
doctrine of legal imputation and the fundamental principle of legality or (b) concrete factuality.  
 Subject to the pragmatic hybrid, I conclude that the fragile equilibrium leaves the 
coercive enforcement of emergency powers (facticity) colliding with rational acceptability 
(validity) within the real-world political space subject to political prudence. In doing so, it then 
conceives of ‘interest’ not primarily as ‘a motor-affective attitude’ like Kelsen and Schmitt and 
their suggested modifications but as ‘self-interested preservation’. This sense of interest 
opposes strictly conflating ‘authority’ and ‘interest’ with value ‘ought’, and instead stands in 
between an intra-systemic interest and a CoI as what determines the legitimate practice of 
emergency powers is related to what ought to be done for best preserving a faction’s own 
legitimacy during the PCLD. As we have seen, the greater the level of social polarisation bred 
by the PCLD, the more the alternative understanding of Agamben’s SoE suggested above needs 
to be taken into account when applying emergency powers in order to reinforce such 
preservation. Put simply, this aforesaid ‘best preservation’ clearly involves adopting a more 
liberal approach to emergency powers in the PCLD. 
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  9.2 The theoretical characteristics of the alternative role of liberalism: 
redrawing the relationship between ‘law’ and ‘politics’ in the Kelsen-Schmitt debate 
  Following from my last argument above, we should now revisit the role of liberalism 
in the Kelsen-Schmitt debate. Subject to the paradoxical friction, the PDC, and the fragile 
equilibrium, it can be concluded from the outset that liberalism in the context of the pragmatic 
hybrid neither exclusively sides with the Kelsenian notion of normativism nor holds the 
Schmittian account that ‘law [is] a mere instrument of political power and that it can stabilize 
politics only if the political power is exercised [based on an institution, that is,] a substantive 
homogeneity in the population subject to the law.’ 575  Rather, based on the three lessons 
discussed above, liberalism in this context is tied to the importance of political prudence 
associated with the fragile equilibrium and the gravitational pull between Kelsen and Schmitt. 
It therefore functions to connect law with politics, however not within a closed, self-referential 
system but within the real-world arena of strategies with each having to account for the vitality 
of the other. It is thereby turned into a policy device providing the axis of the gravitational pull 
of the paradoxical friction, and plays a role in conveying the message directed at both officials 
and addressees of emergency powers, that by politically committing to it, the risk of 
overstepping the fragile equilibrium that exacerbates a CoI, the AoH, the paradoxical friction, 
and the PDC is mitigated. Put simply, the pragmatic hybrid suggests that we think about 
liberalism in terms of its political normative role. My next task is to conclude how such a role 
theoretically redraws the relation between law and politics in Kelsen’s and Schmitt’s models. 
 On the one hand, a staunch proponent of the strong reading of authority like Dyzenhaus 
is likely to refute that by merely speaking of law qua a message conveyor, this political 
normative role leaves room for ‘external realist position’ which suggests that public authority 
stems from the purely political force unconstrained by the rule of law, thus making the 
realisation of Kelsen’s identity thesis fictitious.576 I am aware that such a role still leaves this 
room, but deny that it subverts the identity thesis. Here, I should recall that Dyzenhaus’s 
proposal assumes a strong liberal-democratic culture and is therefore silent on the 
developmental phase of the identity thesis. Meanwhile, by conceiving Kelsen’s methodology 
of legal science and his political relativism as ‘the worms in his apple’ which precipitate the 
problem of ‘an empty proceduralism’, he also negatively thinks that politics is a threat to the 
Kelsenian attempt to realise liberalism through the PTL. The political normative role of 
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liberalism counters these arguments by reaffirming the pragmatic perspective that, rather than 
exclusively examining the PTL qua the cognition of legal norms (‘ought’), we should consider 
factuality ‘is’ necessary for helping realise the PoA in a developing democracy like Thailand. 
In other words, it suggests Kelsen should regard Schmitt as a reminder that abstraction has 
meaning only provided it is turned into ‘a political phenomenon’. 577  According to the 
pragmatic hybrid, the PoA is therefore meaningful, not primarily because the identity thesis is 
internally or externally moralised as suggested by the strong reading of authority and the 
communicative-based authority, but because it is contested and embraced by all contesting 
parties to the PCLD when their benefits are threatened to avoid the costs and uncertainties 
raised by the logic of the SoE driven by either ‘Schmitt in Kelsen’ or ‘Kelsen in Schmitt’. In 
doing so, the PoA is then turned into an integral part of standardised conduct within a society—
a concrete order, thus shifting our understanding from the PTL qua the legitimacy of legality 
to the PoA qua the legitimacy of law, that is, not only qua ‘a substantive content’ of emergency 
powers in the PCLD but also and increasingly qua ‘more legitimate qualities’ for them.578 This 
shift, in turn, not only enables Kelsen to counter the external realist position, but also Schmitt’s 
criticism that his theories of law and politics merely assert an empty proceduralism cloaking 
the internal realist position.   
 It follows from the above that the political normative role of liberalism challenges 
Scheuerman’s and Gross’s observations mentioned in Section 2 which consider Schmitt’s 
theories of law and politics in terms of the attempt to replace Kelsen’s formal normativism with 
‘the norm-less’ will of the sovereign. In other words, it invites us to think beyond what 
McCormick regards as ‘the dilemmas of dictatorships’ which assert, in general, that the more 
sovereign authority is resorted to preserve a social order, the greater the authoritarian rule is 
likely to invite the disposability of legal-technical procedures of such an order.579 Rather, the 
pragmatic hybrid exposes the dilemma for Schmitt between the imposition of his declining 
model and its insulation from rising liberal demands which ultimately turns him into a victim 
of his own logic. On the one hand, the more the Schmittian model is vehemently imposed, the 
more this act flouts Schmitt’s own logic which prefers basing emergency authority on the 
legitimacy of law qua the concrete-order framework. However, by proposing the CoP/the 
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existential concept of the constitution qua the politics of exclusion as an essential condition for 
sustaining the state, Schmitt was unable to address how to integrate the competing, yet, 
contradictory parts of a concrete order. Theoretically, this failure, I contend, stems from the 
fact that Schmitt defined the CoP qua the transcendental possibility for the political order, thus 
resulting in its inability to account for what Vinx calls ‘the politics that takes place below the 
threshold of the political’.580 Nevertheless, Vinx does not clarify what he means by such 
politics. The growing need to shift from Schmitt’s radical legitimacy of law to the liberalisation 
of emergency powers without the ‘moral value of liberalism’ due to the rift between the three 
types of juristic thought ostensibly reflects Vinx’s politics below the political. This political 
space outside the category of legal imputation below the threshold of the political defines what 
I call ‘the arena of strategies’ associated with the suggested political normative role of 
liberalism. Meanwhile, on the other hand, the growing resort to the Kelsenian technique of the 
legitimacy of legality to insulate the Schmittian constitutional emergency model from 
liberalism qua a contending part of a concrete order paradoxically comes with the ‘parallel-
side effects’ of acknowledging legal ‘ought’ as a separate realm and taking political account of 
legitimisation. The more the Kelsenian realm of legal ‘ought’/the iron cage is exploited, yet, 
conceived as an independent sphere detached from sovereign authority necessary for shielding 
the hegemony of the anti-liberal realist model from liberal standards, the more these standards 
are transferred into a separate political account of legitimisation outside the iron cage but 
attached to the concrete circumstance of real-life. In fact, such exploitation also drives forward 
the SoE from the angle of ‘Schmitt in Kelsen’, making a commitment to liberal legality more 
important to avoid overstepping the fragile equilibrium and therefore reaffirming its place in a 
concrete order. This dilemma ultimately invites us to more meticulously comprehend ‘Schmitt 
in Kelsen’ qua a matter of hegemonic preservation. This instance, though preserving the status 
of the sovereign as the embodiment of political unity in the realm of legal ‘ought’ beyond the 
cut and thrust of political conflict, would involve increasingly abandoning the notion that 
sovereign authority is ‘absolute’ in the real-world political sense to avoid greater costs and 
risks against its declining legitimacy.  
 The suggested role also finally invites us to reconsider, in the broadest sense, the nature 
of emergency powers in the Kelsen-Schmitt debate. Kelsen and Schmitt, as we have seen, saw 
emergency powers as ‘an occasional response to a situation of existential crisis’, including the 
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PCLD. 581 They are therefore expected to be applied in accordance with, and are meant to 
preserve and restore, what each regarded as ‘the norm’. However, the pragmatic hybrid in 
Thailand encourages us to think beyond the key questions underlying the Kelsen-Schmitt 
debate—how to attribute emergency powers in the PCLD to the state and how to pacify the 
AoH associated with them. The Thai situation, I again reiterate, indicates that although the 
application of emergency powers based on the CoP might help realise short-term stability, they 
tend to be counter-productive in the long run due to the country’s rising political friction. The 
fragile equilibrium then reveals another important facet, namely how the application of 
emergency powers affects the development of the PCLD. This question involves how to avoid 
turning their application into, to borrow Ramraj’s term, ‘a symbolic rallying point’ which 
provokes a greater social polarisation in the long term, which is likely to incur a greater cost 
for the Schmittian than for the Kelsenian model.582 However, against Kelsen’s state-based 
approach which attributes to a specialised legal institution—the Constitutional Court—the 
monopoly of controlling the constitutionality of, and attenuating the AoH associated with 
emergency powers in the PCLD, the pragmatic hybrid in Thailand reminds us that normativism 
realised through the closed, self-referential system of law alone cannot prevent the aforesaid 
turn. Instead, its prevention, to quote Dressel, ‘cannot be separated from social struggles over 
political power’, that is, from what Schmitt regarded as ‘the political’ to undermine the 
legitimacy of the politics of exclusion and dictatorship.583  
10. Conclusion: beyond an exclusive response to the Weberian paradox of 
modernity/liberalisation 
 Both Kelsen’s and Schmitt’s competing views on emergency powers in the PCLD are 
grounded in the Weberian paradox of modernity and liberalisation. They similarly ask whether 
the triumph of rationality over unreason/delusion, supported by liberal democracy, helps 
reconcile the AoH bred by emergency powers in the PCLD or whether it invites ‘a war between 
mini-gods’ (the polytheism of values/unreason) which leads to ‘the death of God’ (the 
homogeneity of the state).584 Emergency powers in Thailand warn us of the pragmatic hybrid 
as a way of residing or at least reducing the legal, political, and social struggles between 
‘Kelsen’ and ‘Schmitt’ as raw conflicting interests and values. The paradoxical friction, the 
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PDC, and the fragile equilibrium challenge the ways in which Kelsen and Schmitt addressed 
the Weberian paradox of modernity/liberalisation. Where the Schmittian model cannot totally 
deny increasingly accommodating itself with the polytheism of values and accepting the 
emerging legitimacy of liberal constitutionalism, the Kelsenian alternative cannot refrain from 
struggling against the Schmittian attempt to sustain and re-invoke sovereign authority. 
Therefore, the main challenge for the application of the Kelsenian and Schmittian models here 
is to recognise their gravitational pull upon each other. Ultimately, I contend that Thai political 
crises recommend thinking of the conflict between the Kelsenian and Schmittian ideas and 
their supporters in Thailand as binary-star-system—the pro-democracy or ‘Red’ star and the 
anti-liberal realist or ‘Yellow’ star. In Chapter 5, I conclude the key features of the binary-star 







Chapter 5: Conclusion: Kelsen and Schmitt in Thailand’s binary-star-
system 
‘Thai politics is as spicy as its food.’ 
         Hillary Clinton585  
1. Introduction 
 This PhD thesis confirms Chen’s advice that ‘the study of emergency powers should 
take into account the context of the political systems in which [they] are established and 
exercised.’586 The raw conflicting interests and values between the pro-democracy forces and 
the rightist conservatives in Thailand have precipitated a very high degree of polarisation and 
instability. While military coups have become outdated in many post-authoritarian upper-
middle-income, newly-industrialised countries such as Argentina, Brazil, or Turkey, 21st 
century Thailand is still prone to an apparently endless round of emergency situations, the 
PCLD, and coups. The final task of this PhD thesis is to conclude the lessons the Thai 
experience has for the Kelsen-Schmitt debate, in particular, for their theories of law and 
politics. Based on my findings in Chapter 4, I argue that the more the supporters of each 
constitutional emergency model struggle to assert its legitimacy, the more these models 
gravitationally pull the other, thus resulting in what I call the binary-star conception of 
emergency powers.  
2. The features of the binary-star conception 
 This section identifies the key features of the binary-star conception of emergency 
powers. I use the metaphor ‘binary-star-system’—the Yellow and the Red stars—to conclude 
the paradoxical friction, the PDC, and the fragile equilibrium which expose the gravitational 
relation between Kelsen and Schmitt in contexts such as Thailand because they resemble two 
stars which orbit around a common centre of gravitation, yet, no star absolutely dominates the 
other.  Instead, each is subject to the gravitational pull of the other, possibly leading to their 
collision. Based on the synthesis in Chapter 4, the key features of this conception can therefore 
be identified as follows.  
 To begin with, the binary-star conception generally exemplifies the asymmetry between 
Kelsen and Schmitt as jurists/theorists and Kelsen and Schmitt as representatives of raw 
conflicting interests and values in the PCLD. In the process, it exposes two conditions which 
compromise the full implementation of Kelsen’s and Schmitt’s original theses based on the 
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normative perspectives of individualism/collectivism, scepticism, and hostility: (a) the 
gravitational pull between ‘Schmitt in Kelsen’ and ‘Kelsen in Schmitt’ and (b) the asymmetry 
between the closed, self-referential system and a CoI/the AoH. It also indicates what would be 
inappropriate modifications for Kelsen and Schmitt, namely the rigorous adoption of the 
‘liberal-type’ Weberian straight-line—the strong reading of authority and the communicative-
based authority.  
 The conception is based on the paradoxical friction, the PDC, and the fragile 
equilibrium assessed in Chapter 4, thus redrawing the relation between key ideas and elements 
in Kelsen’s and Schmitt’s theories of law and politics as follows. Firstly, the competing 
conceptions of ‘institution’ adopted by Kelsen and Schmitt, and Agamben’s logic of the SoE 
each become tools for reinforcing and undermining each the opposing model, by proposing an 
alternative beyond the ‘contrasting’ and ‘supplementary’ approaches. Secondly, the binary-star 
conception, in particular, the fragile equilibrium, reflects the growing shift from endorsing 
liberalism qua the dominant norm and qua the category of legal imputation, based on the 
framework of individualism, scepticism and hostility, increasingly and pragmatically to 
accepting liberal standards as the axis of gravitation which orchestrates the direction of the 
AoH associated with emergency powers in the PCLD. This shift concludes that 
legality/normativism (Kelsen) in a fledgling democracy like Thailand increasingly needs to 
seek refuge in politics to enable its struggle in the real-world political space, while Schmittian 
political existentialism, given its declining legitimacy, can no longer avoid being politically 
gauged against liberal constitutionalism. Below, I first consider the gravitational pull of Kelsen 
upon Schmitt, and then vice versa. Then, I speak of the possible gravitational pull in post-2018 
Thailand before identifying theoretical factors orchestrating the gravitational strength of the 
two stars. 
2.1 Schmitt gravitationally pulling Kelsen  
 In the context of global trends towards constitutionalism, modernisation, liberalisation 
and democratisation, the Thai experience shows the growing impossibility for the right-wing 
conservatives totally to ‘repress’ liberalism. Despite Schmitt’s attack against the legitimacy of 
legality and the politicisation of the judiciary in his original works, the institutionalisation of 
the politics of exclusion and its source within the realm of legal ‘ought’ then becomes 
increasingly essential in the binary-star scenario. I conclude my findings in this thesis as 
follows. 
  On the one hand, where Schmitt originally called for annihilating political 
romanticism, Thailand’s binary-star-system reveals the importance of ‘co-optation’ by 
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constitutionalising a space for it, together with mechanisms functioning to discredit its 
legitimacy, so as to preserve the possibility of re-invoking sovereign authority and the declining 
hegemonic status of the rightist conservatives given democratisation and liberalisation. 
Accordingly, from the perspective of the Schmittian pull of gravity, liberalism is co-opted not 
because it is believed to be essential for reconciling the AoH associated with emergency powers 
in the PCLD, but partly because it is useful for weakening the shining Red star and for 
invigorating the increasingly sombre Yellow star, thus keeping the possibility of the 
sovereign’s decisions alive.  
 Besides, the roles of the Constitutional Court in engineering a political vacuum and in 
guaranteeing the rights and liberties of supporters of the Schmittian model also connote how 
Kelsen’s PoA is subject to the pull of Schmitt’s CoP. In Thailand, emergency powers in the 
PCLD preserved, or at least did not fatally damage, liberal democratic standards because they 
were ineffective to disperse protest by ‘the genuine Thais’ professing themselves as the 
guardians of Thai-ness. This is why the Yellow faction did not vehemently oppose the 
imposition of the ISA as compared to that of the 2005 Decree, and why the Red governments 
were not condemned in human rights reports. Meanwhile, the PoA formally operated when 
emergency powers were applied by ‘public enemies’—the Red government— against the 
guardian of Thai-ness—the Yellow protesters—as the Constitutional Court judges were 
prepared to safeguard rights and liberties of the latter notwithstanding their aim to overthrow 
liberal democracy. Yet, the crackdowns on Red Shirts protesters in 2009 and 2010 and the 
2013-2014 political crisis which led to the 2014 coup, indicated that liberal constitutionalism 
became a meaningless constraint on emergency powers, especially when the latter were 
invoked against public enemies. Accordingly, as these contrasting roles led to what I call 
extreme factuality (the extreme reference to fact without law) and extreme legality (the extreme 
reference to legal principles without considering their substance and fact), the effectiveness of 
the PoA based upon the CoP in the binary-star system subsequently fall prey to Agamben’s 
logic of the SoE since its operation is premised not on law but on ‘a space devoid of law’ 
deactivating consideration of legal substances. Besides, due to its discriminatory nature and the 
rise of pro-democracy movements, this gravitational pull contributes to the paradox, in that, 
the more the PoA is applied to preserve liberal values merely to serve the interest of the Yellow 
faction, the more this project becomes fictitious as its own ethos—political reconciliation—is 





2.2 Kelsen gravitationally pulling Schmitt 
 Recalling his debate on the nature and use of emergency powers with Schmitt, Kelsen 
spoke of liberal constitutionalism qua normativism. Nevertheless, this legitimacy of legality is 
largely subject to gravitational pull by Schmitt since its effectiveness and ineffectiveness are 
determined by the CoP. Notwithstanding this problem, looking back on the fragile equilibrium 
which orchestrates the AoH associated with emergency powers in the Thai PCLD, it reflects 
Kelsen gravitationally pulling Schmitt. The Thai experience also indicates the lasting impact 
in terms of afterlife of a defunct constitution—the 1997 Constitution—in invigorating the 
Kelsenian gravitational pull. Although it ultimately failed in firmly implementing Pridi 
Banomyong’s aspiration and in resolving the problem of constitutional saṃsāra, the 1997 
Constitution, to quote Harding and Leyland’s words, is however ‘a visible symbol of 
constitutional progress’ and of anti-coup sentiment, thus providing a political benchmark 
against any deviation from liberal standards even after its formal demise.587  Overall, the 
Kelsenian pull of gravity does not only suggest re-thinking law beyond the authority of rules, 
but also the paradox of Schmitt’s politics of exclusion.  
 As already discussed, the application of emergency powers in the PCLD is partisan and 
cannot avoid struggling to a great degree with the AoH. From the Thai experience, any 
deviation from a commitment to legality and pluralistic democracy by invoking emergency 
powers—in particular, a complete censorship of anti-government media and the dissolution of 
protest through the use of a military force or coup directed at limiting the freedom of expression 
of the political oppositions and ultimately at ending their activities—tends more firmly to 
designate them as an ‘opposition’ and even ‘a problem’. Subject to the alternative 
understanding of the SoE mentioned in Chapter 4, a commitment to legality and pluralistic 
democracy on the part of the state therefore has the significant effect of diminishing the AoH, 
which, in turn, helps reduce the ‘uncertainties and risks’ entailed by radical reactions against, 
or a greater polarisation rendered by, emergency powers in the PCLD. Here, I am not speaking 
of the object of the Kelsen-Schmitt debate, that is, the role of liberal constitutionalism as ‘the 
institutional form for the normative regulation of state power’. 588  Instead, the Thai case 
suggests reconsidering liberalism as a contending part of a concrete order, that is, in terms of 
the legitimacy of law which concerns the legitimate content of particular state decisions, by 
conceiving it as a basis on which contentions between competing interests and values are 
                                                          
 587 Harding and Leyland, ‘The Constitutional Courts’, p 119. 
 588 Mark Tushnet, ‘The Political constitution of emergency powers: some conceptual issues’ in Ramraj 
(ed), Emergencies, p 145. 
183 
 
organised. Liberalism then politically functions as a policy devise, that is, as ‘a helm’ steering 
the fragile equilibrium in a certain direction. The more emergency powers on the part of the 
state are committed to liberal democracy and constitutionalism, the more the ‘political costs’ 
are thrown back to the competing faction if it chooses to counteract those powers by using 
means contrary to liberal democratic standards such as efforts to paralyse the government’s 
capacity to govern, or by spearheading a coup as per the Yellow faction. My last point also 
leaves open the issue of how the function of liberalism as ‘a helm’ affects Schmitt’s original 
CoP.  
  The nature and use of emergency powers in Thai political crises further expose the 
conflict between Schmitt’s realist constitutional approach and his distaste for liberalism. They 
show that legality and democracy appeal to addressees of such powers, even those of the 
Yellow faction. In this situation, the more the sovereign strives to exclude his enemies through 
emergency powers, the more he is enmeshed in a conflict, and increasingly loses his legitimacy 
as of a pouvoir neuter, or more generally, his real-world political sovereignty, especially in the 
eyes of pro-democracy forces. This aforesaid political cost is also thrown upon the flip side of 
Schmitt—Militant Democracy, that is, the imposition of emergency powers to exclude political 
opponents stigmatised as enemies of liberal democracy. Here, the role of liberal 
constitutionalism in steering the fragile equilibrium then triggers the paradox of the politics of 
exclusion. That is to say, the more vehemently emergency powers are applied and the more 
‘Schmitt’ is institutionalised to establish the SoE to exclude enemies in the concrete sense, the 
more their struggle with ‘Kelsen in Schmitt’ creates the rift between Schmitt’s three types of 
juristic thought, making the anti-liberal realist model counter-productive and self-destructive.      
  2.3 The post-2018 gravitational pull?  
 The conflict between the Red faction and the Yellow faction is still ongoing in Thailand. 
Although the NCPO successfully prevents another mass protest through harsh emergency 
powers directed at the UDD and other pro-democracy activists, the rift seems to be greater than 
before, but now swept under the carpet, given the continuing emergence of pro-democracy 
movements, especially among new generations and the assiduous effort by the Yellow faction 
to take a firm grip on power. The arguments presented in Chapter 4 are proving to be applicable, 
and probably will be for decades, notably due to the promulgation of the current 2017 
Constitution.   
 After the 2014 coup, the NCPO implicitly followed the demands of the PDRC by 
creating the National Reform Assembly (‘NRA’) responsible for conducting ‘political reform’, 
notably by ensuring that politics is run/supervised by traditional elites. It also appointed the 
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key drafter of the 1997 Constitution, Borwornsak Uwanno, who had previously joined the 
PDRC rallies in 2013 and 2014, to draft a new permanent constitution. Borwornsak’s draft 
allowed the President of the Constitutional Court to convene an assembly of the heads of the 
legislative, executive and judicial branches, the President of the Senate (appointed by the 
junta), the leader of the opposition party, and all the Presidents of the independent agencies to 
decide on a volatile political situation, that is, both to govern during this situation and to decide 
whether the situation constitutes a political crisis. 589  However, the Red faction and pro-
democracy groups largely criticised such provision for letting technocrats determine the 
direction of the crisis.590 Wary of another round of crises, the NRA rejected it in September 
2015, forcing Prayuth to create the new CDC of 21 members, presided over by a right-wing 
veteran technocrat, Meechai Ruchuphan. 591  Supot Kaimook, an anti-Thaksin (former) 
Constitutional Court judge, was also a member of this committee. This time, the NCPO sought 
popular legitimacy for Meechai’s draft by amending the 2014 Interim Constitution to organise 
a national referendum in August 2016 (Borwornsak’s draft only required the approval by the 
NRA). Harsh suppression of dissenting voices through M-44, ‘crude’ demands for political 
stability galvanised by exhaustion of the colour-coded crises, and weariness of uncertainty if 
the draft had been voted down, led to its approval (61.35% or 16,820,402 people in favour). 
Yet, the majority of those living in the North and Northeast, the bastion of the Red faction, 
disapproved. Ironically, many of Thaksin’s supporters, notably in his hometown, Chiang Mai, 
chose to vote for the draft, possibly because of their belief that the PT will again win a landslide 
election despite the attempts of the Yellow faction to subvert it. Given King Bhumibol’s 
passing on 13 October 2016, the draft was later endorsed by King Vajiralongkorn (2016-
present) on 6 April 2017.  
  Compared to its 2007 predecessor, the 2017 Constitution, though outwardly restoring 
the semblance of liberal democracy, increasingly limits a space for electoral politics, and casts 
greater doubt on political romanticism. It enhances a stealthy military-supervised rule by 
appointing as Senators the Supreme Military Commander, the Chiefs of the Royal Thai Army, 
Navy and Air force, and the permanent secretary of the Ministry of Defence. 592  More 
importantly, it relies on Thai-ness, i.e., royal authority, rather than a kind of ‘Crisis Panel’ in 
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addressing future political turmoil.593 Meanwhile, it also preserves the Constitutional Court’s 
position as the guardian of Thai-ness given that the Court still holds its authority under Section 
49 (previously Section 68 of the 2007 Constitution) to decide, especially during emergencies, 
on what counts as acts threatening the DRMH. Actually, the new constitution even fortifies 
this role after constitutional court judges are entrusted to prescribe ‘ethical standards’ for 
politicians who are to be virtuous and moral.594 The Constitutional Court can dismiss those 
who fail to comply with the code, a power which might possibly be used to purge politicians 
of the Red faction during future emergencies.595 Constitutional court judges appointed under 
the new constitution played a vital role in doing away with Thaksin’s faction between 2006 
and 2014, notably Jarun Pukditanakul and even the new President, Nurak Marpraneet.       
 Given the continuing collision between pro-democracy and rightist-conservative 
forces, the tension between the Schmittian model and liberal constitutionalism, together with 
the state of impasse it engenders, are likely to persist for many years. The 2017 Constitution 
mirrors the Yellow faction’s increased attempt to ensure Thai-ness hegemony and the anti-
liberal realist culture in the presence of their declining legitimacy as a result of liberalisation 
and democratisation trends. This strategy, no doubt, continues to subject the Red-Kelsenian 
and Yellow-Schmittian stars to, and even exacerbates, the gravitational pull of one upon the 
other.  
2.4 Theoretical factors determining the gravitational pull 
 It can be concluded from the Thai experience that the gravitational pull between the 
two stars is intertwined with interacting forces. Its momentum is therefore dynamic and subject 
to possible shifts. In this part, I conclude that three main factors orchestrate the gravitational 
strength of these stars, namely institutional, proximate political, and personal-subjective factors 
which also help explain possible future shifts in the momentum of the mutual gravitational pull.  
 The institutional factor is concerned with the political structure within which the 
gravitational pull occurs. It is related to the structure of the incumbent constitution, in 
particular, the space it provides for liberal democracy preferred by Kelsen and authoritarianism 
championed by Schmitt and the degree of political inference over the PoA it provides. This 
factor is also reinforced by the global trends of constitutionalism, liberalisation and 
democratisation, notably the globalisation of human rights. It is beyond the scope of this thesis 
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to synthesise the Kelsen-Schmitt debate on international law. However, the domestic 
gravitational pull between the Kelsenian and Schmittian stars in Thailand cannot avoid such 
trends. Due to rising demands for liberal democracy after the 1992 Black May incident, in 
1996, Thailand acceded to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which 
obliges the state to inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations when it chooses to 
derogate from its treaty obligations when invoking emergency powers.596 It is interesting to 
note that since 2010, both the Yellow and Red governments led by Abhisit and Yingluck and 
even the current military government led by Prayuth, resorted to such provisions when 
invoking the 2005 Decree and the Martial Law Act.597 Although these notifications did not 
reduce much the abuse of emergency powers given the crackdown on the UDD in May 2010 
and Prayuth’s authoritarian uses of M-44, they at least politically reinforced the PDC after these 
‘Yellow’ governments did not seek to disquiet the fact that their own acts violated liberal 
democracy, thus overstepping the fragile equilibrium to ensure that Thai-ness prevails over it. 
 Secondly, the proximate political factor is related to the degree of mass mobilisation. 
As illustrated by the Thai context, the direction of the gravitational pull is explicitly influenced 
by the vigour of social and political movements and the strength of expressions of public 
opinion on the use of emergency powers in the PCLD. The latter element is also related to the 
‘popularity’ of a person/institution deemed to be the sovereign as well as of ‘liberal 
democracy’. Thirdly, the personal-subjective factor includes the values and incentives upheld 
by all relevant actors in emergency powers in the PCLD, namely, the palace, the military, 
Constitutional Court judges, politicians, and mass activists. 
 Based on these factors, it can be concluded from the Thai experience that the Thai 
conservative elites still possess sufficient means (the institutional factor) and motivation (the 
personal-subjective factor) to obstruct liberal democracy by manipulating emergency powers 
in the PCLD. The politicisation of the Thai Constitutional Court, in particular since 2007, 
significantly keeps the gravitational pull by the Yellow star alive. Nevertheless, the shift from 
the normative perspectives of individualism/collectivism, scepticism, and hostility to the 
pragmatic hybrid suggested by the Thai experience underscores how ‘a legitimate political 
order [is dependent] on accommodation [between] different social actors.’598 As the conflict 
between liberals and conservatives in Thailand is being played out in the context of liberal 
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trends, the traditional elites are increasingly unable to maintain an absolute grip on power. 
Therefore, the ‘tide of history’ is moving more and more towards ‘Kelsen’ than ‘Schmitt’ but 
in such a way that the former needs to resort to the gravitational pull and the approach, notably 
the notions of ‘political friends’ and ‘concrete-order thinking’, adopted by the latter. Other 
factors, notably new human rights obligations (the institutional factor) and the rise of the 
masses (the proximate political factor), appear to increase the ‘costs and risks’ of the Yellow 
star, making the resort to the Red star more legitimate and appealing for the purpose of ‘self-
interest preservation’ (the personal-subjective factor).    
3. Final remarks: contributions of the binary-star conception and future studies 
 The binary-star conception ostensibly expands the scope of the studies on emergency 
powers to address the topic of the PCLD, and goes beyond the question of whether such powers 
can be legally regulated. It provides an alternative understanding of the key elements of 
Kelsen’s and Schmitt’s constitutional emergency models and the relation between law, legality, 
the CoP, the SoE, and the masses in terms of the pragmatic hybrid. Meanwhile, as observed in 
Chapters 1 and 3, contemporary works on emergency powers built on Kelsen’s and Schmitt’s 
theories, notably those of Dyzenhaus and Gross, typically examine whether emergency powers 
are inside or outside a liberal-democratic legal order, including how to balance security with 
rights and liberties and what has to be the case for the derogation of rights and liberties in times 
of emergencies to be justified.599 Despite claiming to propose a general theory of emergency 
powers, these authors assume an established commitment to legality, human rights, and liberal 
democracy, presumptions which compromise their application in the context of emergency 
powers in fledgling democracies experiencing the PCLD. They might engage the binary-star 
conception drawn from the Thai experience to address the deficiencies of their theories, 
including by acknowledging not only the benefits of Schmitt’s notion of political friends and 
the SoE to help drive forward the PoA but also the possible politicisation of the PoA. My thesis 
is also a useful milestone and comparison for other studies on elements inherent in their theories 
related to emergency powers, in particular, their competing concepts of constituent power/the 
constitution. However, the contribution of this thesis is not purely theoretical. The lessons 
deduced from the binary-star conception are also practical.  
 As I noted earlier, this thesis reminds us that the more entrenched the PCLD and the 
greater pull between the Red and the Yellow stars, the greater the enforcement and constraints 
of emergency powers are enmeshed with legal, political and social struggles. Therefore, such 
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powers should not be only seen in terms of mechanisms for restoring ‘the norm’, but, more 
broadly, of legal and political strategies for managing the PCLD. At the national level, such 
struggles are important for ensuring ‘safe’ uses of the ISA, the 2005 Decree, and other 
emergency powers in the presence of the problems of law and norms deficits. Meanwhile, given 
that emergency powers in Thailand normally lead to the promulgation of new written 
constitutions to institutionalise the hegemony of Thai-ness and that the country is still 
experiencing constitutional saṃsāra, this PhD thesis also provides a milestone for constructing 
a conceptual framework for the constitution-making process, in particular, its relation to the 
accountability of emergency powers in such a deeply divided environment. Given the 
overthrow of the 1997 Constitution, such accountability does not depend on constitutionally 
thickening the identity thesis as Dyzenhaus suggests. Perhaps, the realisation of this goal 
requires accommodating the space for the alternative understanding of the SoE suggested by 
the binary-star conception within a constitution.600 In a broader perspective, this PhD thesis 
also provides a useful comparison and springboard for future studies applying Kelsen’s and 
Schmitt’s theories or contemporary works built on them to evaluate the use of emergency 
powers or to establish mechanisms for ensuring ‘safe’ uses and preventing permanent states of 
emergency in other volatile political situations or, more generally, in other nascent countries 
struggling to realise a commitment to liberal constitutionalism. Bari and Omar, for instance, 
assess emergency powers in volatile political situations in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan by 
using contemporary works on emergency powers built on Kelsen’s and Schmitt’s theories. 
However, their arguments are ultimately limited to the amendments of law to ensure ‘safe’ 
emergency powers. 601  Unless the interaction between liberal and illiberal forces are 
understood, it is hardly likely comprehensively to build a theoretical framework for safeguards 
recommended to ensure ‘safe’ emergency powers and prevent their permanent use in these 
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Appendix 1: Kelsen and Schmitt compared 
Criteria Kelsen Schmitt 
1. The theory of law The PTL (normativism) The Three types of juristic thought (normativism, 
decisionism, and concrete order) 
2. The theory of politics Liberal democracy with the parliamentary 
regime 
Identitarian democracy/against political 
romanticism 
3. The conception of authority 
to invoke emergency powers in 
the PCLD 
Ex ante legal authorisation/the legal 
accommodation model/autonomous value 
of legality 
Sovereign authority to transcend normativism 
4. The scope of emergency 
powers in the PCLD 
Limited by legality to protect individual 
rights and liberties 
Prioritising the state over individuals  
5. The conception of legal and 
political accountability 
Legal constitution with the constitutional 
court as the guardian of liberal 
constitutionalism 
State-ism with the HoS as the guardian of the 
homogeneity of the people 




























Appendix 2: Timeline 
1351-1767:  Ayutthaya Kingdom 
1782-present: Bangkok (Rattanakosin) Kingdom 
 - 1851-1868: King Mongkut 
 - 1868-1919: King Chulalongkorn 
  - the Chakri Reformation 
 - 1910-1923: King Vajiravudh 
  - Thai-ness as state ideology 
 - 1925-1935: King Prajadhipok 
  - The 1932 Revolution/constitutional monarchy established  
 - 1935-1946: King Ananda 
 - 1946-2016: King Bhumibol 
  1947 – coup restoring Thai-ness and the DRMH 
  1957 and 1958 – Sarit rose to power; royal hegemony restored 
  1973 – popular uprising overthrowing Thanom Kittikachorn 
  1976 – mass massacre at Thammasat University and coup 
  1978 – the 1978 Constitution setting up semi-liberal democracy 
  1988 – Chatchai Choonhavan won a general election 
  1991 – coup overthrowing Chatchai 
  1992 – the Black May incident 
  1997 – the 1997 Constitution promulgated 
  2001 – Thaksin Shinawatra became PM 
  2005 – Thaksin won a general election by landslide  
  2006 – the PAD rally and the coup overthrowing Thaksin 
  2007 – the 2007 Constitution promulgated; Samak Sundaravej become PM 
  2008 – the PAD protest; the Airport Crisis; the Constitutional Court ousting 
   Samak and Somchai Sundaravej Wongsawat; Abhisit Vejjajiva became 
   PM 
  2009 – the UDD mass protest; the Bloody Songkran incident 
  2010 – the UDD protest; the Savage May incident 
  2011– Yingluck Shinawatra became PM 
  2013 – the Amnesty Bill proposed; the PDRC launched a protest 
  2014 – Prayuth Chan-ocha staged a coup ousting Yingluck and became PM 
   himself  
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